Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 31 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:13cv656-MW/CAS
• Parties: SELVIN DANIELS, III, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

SELVIN DANIELS, III, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

Case No. 4:13cv656-MW/CAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

August 31, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY § 2254 PETITION

On December 4, 2013, Petitioner Selvin Daniels, III, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On November 12, 2014, Respondent filed an answer. ECF No. 14. Respondent also filed exhibits. ECF No. 16. Petitioner has not filed a reply, although given the opportunity to do so. See ECF Nos. 17, 20.

The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all issues raised, the undersigned has determined that no evidentiary hearing is required for disposition of this case. See Rule 8(a), R. Gov. § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Cts. For the reasons stated herein, the pleadings and attachments before the Court show Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, and this § 2254 petition should be denied.

Background and Procedural History

By information filed July 12, 2005, in case number 05CF02268, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County, the State of Florida charged Petitioner, Selvin Daniels, III, with one count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes, in connection with events that took place on or about June 25, 2005, involving the death of Lisa E. Hamilton. Ex. A at 1.¹ On July 21, 2005, a grand jury indicted Daniels for first degree murder, in violation of section 782.04(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes. Id. at 2-3. On August 9, 2005, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Id. at 22.

Daniels proceeded to a jury trial on October 22 and 23, 2008, before Judge Angela C. Dempsey. Exs. C-E (trial transcript). Daniels did nottextify. Ex. D at 386. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder. Ex. A at 142-43; Ex. E at 561-62. The penalty phase of the trial took place on October 24 and 28, 2008, and, as the advisory sentence, the jury recommended imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Ex. A at 141; Ex. G at 702. On October 29, 2008, the court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Ex. A at 147-54; Ex. G at 704.

Daniels appealed his conviction and sentence to the First District Court of Appeal (DCA), assigned case number 1D08-5780. Ex. H (Initial Brief); Ex. I (Answer Brief). On February 17, 2010, the First DCA affirmed the case per curiam, without a written opinion. Ex. J; Daniels v. State, 28 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (table). The mandate issued March 5, 2010. Ex. J.

On September 9, 2010, Daniels filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in the state trial court. Ex. K at 1-43 (exclusive of exhibits). The State filed a response on December 15, 2010, requesting an evidentiary hearing. Ex. L at 231-32. The state post-conviction court, Judge Dawn Caloca-Johnson, held an evidentiary hearing on December 14, 2012, during which Daniels was represented by counsel. Exs. M, N. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge made oral findings and, in an order rendered December 17, 2012, the judge denied Daniels' Rule 3.850 motion "for reasons announced on the record." Ex. L at 412; see Ex. N at 221-55.

Daniels, represented by counsel, appealed to the First DCA and filed an initial brief in case number 1D13-0148. Ex. O. The State filed an answer brief. Ex. P. On August 14, 2013, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the appeal without a written opinion. Ex. Q; Daniels v. State, 118 So. 3d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (table). The mandate issued August 30, 2013.

In the meantime, on October 11, 2011, through counsel, Daniels filed a second amended Rule 3.850 motion. Ex. L at 393-406. In this motion, he argued he was entitled to a new trial, pursuant to State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010), based on the jury instruction read at his trial for manslaughter by intentional act. Id. The state post-conviction trial court summarily denied this motion on December 9, 2011, noting that every state district court of appeal has determined the Montgomery case does not apply retroactively. Id. at 410-11. The court further noted that the Montgomery opinion was issued April 8, 2010, and Daniels' judgment and sentence became final over a month earlier, on March 5, 2010, when the First DCA issued its PCA in his direct appeal. Id.

As indicated above, Daniels filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on December 4, 2013. ECF No. 1. He raises four grounds, including two alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC):

(1) Trial Court Error - Motion for Mistrial: The trial court prejudicially erred in denying the defense motion for mistrial after the prosecutor commented on Daniels' Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in violation of his constitutional rights and contrary to clearly established federal case law. Id. at 4-5.

(2) Trial Court Error - Jury Instructions: Petitioner Daniels is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on manslaughter by intentional act, a necessary lesser charge, and because the Florida Supreme Court recently pronounced, for the first time, that such error violates a defendant's right to a fair trial in violation of his federal constitutional rights and contrary to clearly established federal law. Id. at 5-10.

(3) IAC - Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) investigate and call exculpatory witnesses, (b) take depositions, and (c) put Daniels on the stand, in violation of his federal constitutional rights and contrary to clearly established federal case law. Id. at 11-22.

(4) IAC - Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare an adequate theory of self-defense, in violation of Daniels' federal constitutional rights and contrary to clearly established federal case law. Id. at 23-28.

Respondent has filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF Nos. 14, 16. Petitioner has not filed a reply, although he was given the opportunity to do so. See ECF Nos. 17, 20.

Analysis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody. Section 2254(d) provides, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2011). "This is a 'difficult to meet' and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011), and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). This Court's review "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1388.

For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate ineffectiveness, a "defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. For this Court's purposes, importantly, "[t]he question 'is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination' under the Strickland standard 'was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.'" Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). "And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard." Id. It is a "doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard." Id.

Ground 1: Trial Court Error - Denial of Motion for Mistrial

In his first ground, Petitioner Daniels argues the state trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor commented, during closing argument, on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. Daniels raised this claim in state court as the first point in his direct appeal. Ex. H at ii, 6-9. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the appeal without a written opinion. Ex....