Daniels v. State

• Decision Date: 06 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC11–2170.,SC11–2170.
• Parties: Aaron DANIELS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

121 So.3d 409

Aaron DANIELS, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC11–2170.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 6, 2013.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert Jay Krauss, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Sara Elizabeth Macks, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

LABARGA, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The district court certified that its decision is in express and direct conflict with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Riesel v. State, 48 So.3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The issue before us concerns whether the standard jury instruction for the offense of manslaughter by act, as amended in 2008, ¹ erroneously stated the required elements of the crime and whether fundamental error occurred when that instruction was given in Daniels' trial. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the 2008 standard instruction for manslaughter by act erroneously required the jury to find that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim, in contravention to the requirements of section 782.07, Florida Statutes (2009). We further conclude that giving the 2008 standard jury instruction constituted fundamental error in this case. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Second District in Daniels and approve the decision of the First District in Riesel.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The facts of the murder in the instant case were summarized in the district court opinion in Daniels as follows:

On May 4, 2007, after an altercation with one person at a residence, Daniels left, went to his home to retrieve his hand gun, and returned to the residence. Daniels fired one shot with the intent of hitting the man involved in the previous altercation. However, the shot hit a female bystander [Amanda Fanter] in the head, and she died. Daniels was charged with one count of first-degree murder.

During taped interviews with officers, Daniels stated that prior to firing the shot, he saw the victim but was being approached by a group of men, including the man with whom he had previously fought. Daniels assumed the men had guns because he had a gun. Daniels fired the gun once and ran. He stated that he did not aim at the victim and that although he “probably” meant to hit one of the men, he did not mean to kill anyone.

72 So.3d at 228. The altercation arose out of an incident in which Daniels went to confront the boyfriend of his former girlfriend, the mother of Daniels' daughter. According to Daniels' statements to Detective Spoor of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Daniels heard that the boyfriend was negligent in caring for Daniels' daughter while babysitting her. When Daniels went with several friends to confront the boyfriend, he was met by a group of men with whom he argued. Daniels then left the scene and returned with a gun. During the second visit to the apartment complex, according to Daniels' statement to Detective Spoor, Daniels approached the apartment building and saw a female yelling to “call down the guys” who, he said, were coming.

Daniels said he assumed the men had a gun, so he “just bust off one and ran off.” He said he did not aim at Fanter but that he shot “[r]eally just to back off—not really back off because I probably did mean to hit one, but I didn't mean to—you know, I didn't mean to kill no one, but—.” Daniels insisted during the interview that he did not point the gun at Fanter and that although he intended to fire at the men, he did not intend to kill the victim.

Nicole Schipper, a friend who had driven Daniels back to the apartment complex, testified that on the way there Daniels displayed a handgun and told her that he had been in an argument earlier with some people and intended to go back and scare somebody. Schipper dropped off Daniels and some other men at the complex and was preparing to leave when she saw Daniels stop and raise his arm. She then heard two shots.² Daniels and the other men jumped back in her car and, as they were leaving the scene, Schipper said, Daniels told her, “I hope I didn't kill her.”

Daniels was charged with first-degree murder and tried by jury commencing on September 15, 2009. At the conclusion of the evidence and closing argument, the trial judge instructed the jury as to first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter by act. The instruction given for manslaughter by act was read to the jury in pertinent part as follows:

Manslaughter. Before you can find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Elements. One, Amanda Lynn Fanter is dead; two, Aaron Treves Daniels intentionally caused the death of Amanda Lynn Fanter.

However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have previously explained those terms.

In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act which caused death.

No objections to the jury instructions for manslaughter were lodged by defense counsel. The jury returned a verdict finding Daniels guilty of second-degree murder, with a special interrogatory verdict finding that Daniels did actually possess and discharge a firearm in the commission of the offense and, as a result, Amanda Fanter died. The trial court entered judgment for second-degree murder and sentenced Daniels to life in prison with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory term under the 10–20–Life statute.³

On appeal, Daniels argued that the manslaughter by act jury instruction was erroneous and that the error was fundamental in his case, but the Second District disagreed and affirmed his conviction and sentence in Daniels, 72 So.3d at 232. In so doing, the court concluded that the 2008 manslaughter by act instruction “does not include an erroneous intent-to-kill element” found fundamentally erroneous in State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010). Id. at 228. In so holding, the Second District certified that its decision expressly and directly conflicted with the decision of the First District in Riesel in which that court concluded that the 2008 instruction “is not materially different from the instruction held to be fundamental error in State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010), because it, too, erroneously stated that intent to kill was an element of manslaughter.” Riesel, 48 So.3d at 886.

The district court in Daniels relied on the fact that the 2006 standard instruction found to be erroneous in Montgomery was amended in 2008, before issuance of Montgomery, and included the following phrase: “In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act which caused death.” ⁴ The district court in Daniels recognized that “[i]t is undisputed that manslaughter by act does not require proof of intent to kill the victim.” 72 So.3d at 229. However, the district court concluded:

We now hold that the 2008 amended instruction did not erroneously require proof of intent to kill. Any error in the prior instruction was cured by the addition of language clarifying that the requisite intent was that necessary to commit an act. The 2008 amended instruction is materially different from the instruction at issue in Montgomery, and Daniels was not deprived of an accurate manslaughter instruction.

Daniels, 72 So.3d at 230. In so holding, the district court also noted:

[T]he Montgomery court stated that the 2008 amendment “added additional language to clarify that the requisite intent for manslaughter by act is the intent to commit an act that caused the death of the victim[.]” Id. The court went on to summarize that “the relevant intent is the intent to commit an act which caused death,” concluding that the amended language was sufficient to cure any defectresulting from the language of element two.

Id. at 230 (quoting Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 257). Thus, the Second District interpreted the reference to the 2008 amendment in our decision in Montgomery as a conclusion that addition of the phrase “only an intent to commit an act which caused death” clarified the overall intent of the manslaughter instruction, thereby rendering it correct. Finally, the Second District in Daniels stated:

Because we conclude that the instruction given at Daniels' trial did not require the jury to find that Daniels intended to kill the victim, Daniels was not deprived of an accurate manslaughter instruction and the trial court did not fundamentally err in giving the 2008 amended instruction. We certify that this decision conflicts with Riesel v. State, 48 So.3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and its progeny within the First District.

Id. at 232.

The First District in Riesel was faced with the same issue presented in this case. Riesel appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and, on appeal, contended that giving the 2008 version of the standard jury instruction for manslaughter by act in his case constituted fundamental error because it erroneously continued to require that the jury find the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim. The First District agreed that the requirement was erroneous and further that the language added to the instruction in 2008 did not eliminate the separate requirement in the instruction that the jury find the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim. The First District stated:

The manslaughter instruction in the present case is not materially different from the instruction held to be...