Daniels v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 310,310
• Citation: 24 Md.App. 1,329 A.2d 712
• Parties: Clayton Earl DANIELS a/k/a Thomas Moore v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 1

24 Md.App. 1

329 A.2d 712

Clayton Earl DANIELS a/k/a Thomas Moore v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 310.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 18, 1974.

Jeffrey I. Goldman, Baltimore, with whom was Roland Walker, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellant.

Arrie W. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Milton B. Allen, State's Atty. for Baltimore City and Walter F. Balint, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before ORTH, C. J., and MOYLAN and LOWE, JJ.

ORTH, Chief Judge.

On 18 September 1973 in the Criminal Court of Baltimore a jury convicted CLAYTON EARL DANIELS, also known as Thomas Moore, of murdering Ervin Pye wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, (1st count of indictment 17209160), of attempting to rob him with a deadly weapon (1st count of indictment 17209162), and of robbing John Cauthorne with a deadly weapon (1st count of indictment 17209161), all on 11 December 1972. On 9 January 1974, a life sentence, dating from 26 December 1972, to run concurrently with any sentence he was then serving, was imposed on the murder conviction, and, on each of the attempted robbery conviction and the robbery conviction, a sentence of 15 years to run concurrently with the life sentence was given. Daniels appealed from the judgments. We reverse them.

Daniels is unhappy with the way his guilt was determined. He claims that the trial court erred in four respects. We are constrained to share his concern, for under our system of criminal justice, the keystone of which is the presumption of innocence, guilt must be determined in accordance with established rules. If error is made reaching that determination, and if the error is not harmless, the accused is entitled to have the judgment against him reversed, and, at the least, to be tried again, or at the most, to stand free.

Of the four errors assigned by Daniels, we need consider only one, because it is dispositive of the appeal. ¹ We find reversible error in that portion of the judge's charge to the jury with respect to alibi evidence.

In charging the jury the judge told them that it was their duty to weigh the evidence and their right to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony of witnesses. He explained:

'(Y)ou have heard evidence of a statement of eye-witnesses-at least two eye-witnesses-and I instruct you that you are to weigh their testimony just as you would weigh the testimony of anyone else. The factors to be considered are, for instance, how well did they know the defendant, how long they had known him, and how easily or how difficult it was for them to recognize him under the conditions of the robbery, and to weigh the testimony of the eye-witnesses based upon that factor, and the manner in which they testified, and the demeanor in Court, and to give to their testimony what weight you believe is appropriate under all of the circumstances.'

He then referred specifically to alibi witnesses:

'You must apply an equal degree of test to the testimony of the alibi witnesses. Alibi witnesses occupy a strange separate niche of their own in the weighing of evidence in a criminal case. The testimony of alib witnesses are to be received carefully and subject to careful scrutiny on your part. ² You must consider their motive, just as you consider the motive of the eye-witnesses, but the alibi must cover the entire time in which the crime took place, and the burden of proof in this respect is upon the defendant to prove, not by a reasonable doubt, but a preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity and truthfulness of the alibi theory, and of the alibi witnesses. Again, their demeanor in Court, and manner on the stand, and the impression which they made upon you are matters entirely for you to decide. The testimony of a single eye-witness, if believed, is enough to warrant a conviction. If you believed the alibi witnesses based upon these principles, then your verdict should point to innocence.

In other words, to sum it up, it is a careful weighing by you of the testimony of all of the witnesses whom you have heard, keeping in mind that eye-witnesses' testimony, based upon a number of factors, including their familiarity with the defendant, how long they have known him, how difficult or how less difficult or easy it was to identify him under these circumstances, and the alibi witnesses, of course, their testimony must be received with scrutiny and care because of the type of testimony that they are offering, whether it covers the entire time in which the crime was supposed to have taken place, and whether or not their testimony has proved to you by a preponderance of the evidence the truthfulness of the alibi.' (emphasis added)

The State had no exceptions to the charge. The defense had several objections, one of which concerned the instruction on alibi evidence. Defense counsel said: 'I would object to that instruction being given for the reasons that I don't think that the case cited by Mr. Balint (Assistant State's Attorney) squarely held that that test was a matter of law to be applied to alibi witnesses in all cases.' ³ The court replied:

'Well, there was a flat statement as I read that part of the opinion and it should be regarded with careful scrutiny or rigid scrutiny or something like that.'

The error was in that portion of the instruction in which the judge declared that ths burden was on the accused to prove his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence. We observed in Robinson v. State, 20 Md.App. 450, 459, 316 A.2d 268, 272, cert. denied:

'We think the sound view to be that an alibi is not an affirmative defense, placing any burden upon a defendant beyond the self-evident one of attempting to erode the State's proof to a point where it no longer convinces the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt. Prood of an alibi, like any other defense testimony, is simply a means of controverting the State's effort to establish criminal agency.'

The Robinson opinion was filed after the trial here and the judge below did not have the benefit of it. We pointed out in Robinson, at 457, 316 A.2d at 271, however, that the clear intimations of Floyd v. State, supra, 205 Md. at 581, 109 A.2d 729, were that 'the alibi simply erodes the State's proof of criminal agency . . ..' See also Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 655, 119 A.2d 917. We affirmed the Robinson holding in Jackson v. State, 22 Md.App. 257, 322 A.2d 574, and applied it to reverse the judgment because of instructions substantially the same as those here given. We explained, at 263-264, 322 A.2d at 577, and deem it advisable to iterate what we then said:

'There appears to be some confusion among the Bench and...