Daniels v. Sutton
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-10009-JEM/Becerra |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | TIM RANDOLPH DANIELS, Plaintiff, v. ERIC SUTTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, in his official capacity, Defendant. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Eric Sutton's (“Defendant”), Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”), ECF No [64]. Plaintiff Tim Randolph Daniels (“Plaintiff”) filed his Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [71], and Defendant filed his Reply, ECF No. [74]. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge, referred this Motion to Dismiss to the undersigned. ECF No. [66]. The undersigned also held oral argument on this matter (the “Hearing”), ECF No [89]. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.
The Magnuson Act grants the federal government exclusive management of marine fisheries in federal waters. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1976). Under the statute, federal waters include the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), which begins at the outer boundary of each State's territorial waters and extends 200 nautical miles. See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed.Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983). Although the EEZ generally begins within three nautical miles from a State's territorial border, Florida's border in the Gulf of Mexico extends approximately nine nautical miles from the coastline. Art. II, § 1(a), Fla. Const. The State of Florida retains jurisdiction to regulate fisheries within its State territorial waters before the EEZ begins. See 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(1). Within the EEZ, the Magnuson Act empowers the federal government, through its Regional Management Fishery Councils, to create a fishery management plan (“FMP”) for certain species of marine life in need of conservation and management. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1). In addition, under the Magnuson Act, “[a] State may regulate a fishing vessel outside the boundaries of the State . . . [if t]he fishing vessel is registered under the law of that State, and [] there is no fishery management plan or other applicable federal fishing regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)(3)(A).
In 2001, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (“FWC”) promulgated a series of Administrative Codes regulating the commercial fishing of pompano (the “Florida Pompano Regulations”). See F.A.C. 68B-35.001 et seq. While gill nets are permitted in federal waters, the Florida Constitution prohibits the use of gill nets in State waters. See Art. X, § 16, Fla. Const. Accordingly, the FWC enacted the Florida Pompano Regulations in “[r]esponse to reports of illegal gillnetting in state waters” and to address the difficulty in distinguishing between permissible federal activity and illegal State activity. ECF No. [54-1] at 11.
Under these regulations, the FWC created and defined a zone within the EEZ in the Gulf of Mexico, between Cape Sable and Hurricane Pass in Collier County, called the Pompano Endorsement Zone (“PEZ”). See F.A.C. 68B-35.005. The Florida Pompano Regulations impose various restrictions on commercial pompano fishing in and out of the PEZ where the fishing vessel does not have a “pompano endorsement.” Specifically, a Florida-registered vessel without a pompano endorsement cannot fish within the PEZ and is prohibited from using gill and entangling nets in the rest of the EEZ. See Id. However, if a Florida-registered vessel has a pompano endorsement, not only may they fish in the PEZ, but they are also legally able to use gill nets to capture an unlimited number of pompano within the PEZ. See Id. These regulations only apply to owners of vessels registered in Florida; a vessel registered in another State is not subject to any of the Florida Pompano Regulations within the EEZ.
Plaintiff brings this action alleging that F.A.C. 68B-35.002(10), which defines the PEZ, and F.A.C. 68B-35.005, which sets out the regulations for fishing pompano in the PEZ with and without a pompano endorsement, violate the Equal Protection Clause, Supremacy Clause, and Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to their discriminatory impact on Florida residents and on interstate commerce, and because they conflict with the Magnuson Act.
Specifically, on April 14, 2020, the FWC arrested Plaintiff for violating one of the Florida Pompano Regulations. Plaintiff was aboard his Florida-registered vessel when the FWC approached and boarded his vessel after observing that the vessel had “entangling nets and pompano outside of the [PEZ].” ECF No. [54-1] at 3. Plaintiff confirmed to the FWC that the “sole purpose” of the trip was to harvest pompano and agreed with the FWC officer that his vessel was located outside the PEZ. Id. at 4. However, when the FWC officer indicated that Plaintiff was in violation of F.A.C. 68B-35.004(4) given the “goal of targeting pompano, having entangling nets onboard, [and] being outside of the SPZ (special permit zone) for use of those entangling nets[, ]” Plaintiff indicated he was unaware of the regulation. Id. at 4-5. The Florida Pompano Regulation for which Plaintiff was arrested, F.A.C. 68B-35.004(4), is not challenged in this action, but sets out the allowable and prohibited gear for fishing pompano within and without State waters. See F.A.C. 68B-35.004(4).
Plaintiff's first Complaint alleged that the Florida Pompano Regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the United States Constitution. See ECF No. [1] at 8-9.[1] The District Court adopted the undersigned's Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice on various grounds. ECF Nos. [53], [56]. First, Plaintiff failed to plead an injury sufficient to demonstrate standing as the original Complaint did not allege that he had been arrested. ECF No. [53] at 7-8. Second, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to “clearly articulate how Defendants' actions have violated the Magnuson Act” giving rise to a substantial question of federal law. Id. at 9-10. Finally, the Complaint constituted a “shotgun pleading” such that the Complaint “does not adequately provide Defendants with notice” of the underlying claims and factual allegations. Id. at 11. After the undersigned filed a Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal but before the District Court ruled, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. ECF No. [54]. The District Court accepted the Amended Complaint, the operative pleading now subject to the instant Motion. ECF No. [56] at 2.[2]
The Amended Complaint realleges that two of the Florida Pompano Regulations are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, Supremacy Clause, and Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that the Florida Pompano Regulations are contrary to federal law, discriminate against Florida citizens in that its limitations only apply to the detriment of owners of Florida-registered vessels, and contain landing restrictions for all vessels, regardless of State of registration, which directly impacts interstate commerce.
Defendant's instant Motion sets out five grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. First, Defendant contends that Plaintiff still does not have standing to bring suit because he fails to sufficiently allege injury, causation, and redressability requirements of standing. See ECF No. [64] at 6-8. Second, Defendant argues there is no substantial federal question to trigger subject matter jurisdiction because the only federal issue is premised on Plaintiff's misreading of the Magnuson Act. See Id. at 9-13. Third, Defendant alleges the Amended Complaint violates the Rule 8 pleading standards. Id. at 14. Fourth, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred because the Florida Pompano Regulations have been in place since 2001, and Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of them since at least 2004. See Id. at 14-16. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim as to his Equal Protection, Supremacy Clause, and Commerce Clause claims, as well as his claim for injunctive relief. See Id. at 16-22.
In his Response, Plaintiff counters that he has standing because he was arrested pursuant to the Florida Pompano Regulations, an allegation that was not contained in the first Complaint. ECF No. [71] at 7. Second, Plaintiff argues that he has established federal subject matter jurisdiction because his action is based and relies on the Magnuson Act. See Id. at 7-11. Third, as to whether Plaintiff has complied with Rule 8, Plaintiff responds that the Amended Complaint addresses the issues previously raised by the Court. Id. at 11-12. Fourth, Plaintiff responds to Defendant's statute of limitations defense by asserting that “Florida's four-year [s]tatute of [l]imitations applies to such claims of deprivation of rights under [Section] 1983, ” apparently relying on Plaintiff's arrest date to establish that the claim is within that four year period. Id. at 12. Finally, Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently pled his causes of action by challenging the purpose of the Florida Pompano Regulations, and reasserting that there is a conflict between the Magnuson Act and these regulations. See Id. at 13-16.
In the Reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's standing arguments fail because Plaintiff was arrested for violating a regulation not challenged in the Amended Complaint and he cannot...
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