Daniels v. Trailer Transport Co.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1950
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Citation: 42 N.W.2d 828,327 Mich. 525
• Parties: DANIELS v. TRAILER TRANSPORT CO. et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 828

42 N.W.2d 828

327 Mich. 525

DANIELS v. TRAILER TRANSPORT CO. et al.

No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 18, 1950.

Buell Doelle, Detroit, for appellants.

Jennings, O'Neil & Jarvis, Knoxville, Tenn., for appellee. Kelley, Sessions & Kelley, Lansing, of counsel.

Before the Entire Bench.

SHARPE, Justice.

Leave having been granted, defendants appeal from an award of the department of labor and industry entered March 17, 1949, granting plaintiff compensation and medical expenses.

The essential facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff, a resident of the State of Illinois, was invited by an employee of defendant company to come to Texas for the purpose of securing employment. Plaintiff went to Texas and secured employment with defendant, Trailer Transport Company, as an axle man.

Defendant company had its home office in Michigan, but was engaged in operations in different states. When plaintiff entered into employment with defendant company he signed an 'Addition to Payroll' form which reads as follows: 'I hereby agree to comply with all the requirements and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the insurance companies, and Trailer Transport Company. I also elect to become subject to, and bound by, the provisions of the workmen's compensation law of the State of Michigan.'

Following his employment, plaintiff worked for defendant company in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Mississippi, Florida, and Tennessee where he was severely injured during the course of his employment on September 26, 1946.

Compensation benefits under the Tennessee workmen's compensation law, Code, § 6851 et seq., were voluntarily paid to plaintiff. On September 24, 1947, plaintiff filed a claim for compensation in Michigan. On March 17, 1949, the commission awarded plaintiff compensation at the rate of $21 per week for permanent total disability less credit for compensation paid under the Tennessee act.

In an opinion filed, the commission stated: 'The defendant is subject to our Act. Furthermore, it has agreed to be bound by the provisions of our Act in the event of injury to the plaintiff. The provisions of our Act covering all employees under 'any contract of hire' of every employer subject to the provisions of our Act are broad enough to cover the plaintiff's injury. The contractual agreement of the parties deprived the plaintiff of the right of a negligence action for damages and therefore satisfied the requirement of our Act that the recovery of compensation benefits 'shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer.' The defendant is estopped from denying the applicability of the Michigan Workmen's Compensation law when it has agreed to be bound thereby and when by virtue of such agreement the plaintiff has been deprived of a valuable right.'

Plaintiff urges that neither the residence of the employee, the place or state of hiring, or the place or state of injury is controlling; and that the Michigan compensation act is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to confer jurisdiction upon the Michigan compensation commission to render the award in question.

In support of this claim plaintiff relies upon the following provisions in parts 1 and 2 of the workmen's compensation act, P.A.1912, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 10, as amended by P.A.1943, No. 245, which he contends are controlling:

Part 1, section 2, of which provides in part: 'On and after the effective date of this section, every employer, public and private, and every employe, unless herein otherwise specifically provided, shall be subject to the provisions of this act and shall be bound thereby.' C.L.1948, § 411.2, Stat.Ann.1949 Cum.Supp. § 17.142.

Part 1, section 5, which provides in part:

'The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this act: * * *

'Private. 2. Every person, firm and private corporation, including any public service corporation, who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.' C.L.1948, § 411.5, Stat.Ann.1949 Cum.Supp. § 17.145.

Part 2, section 1, which provides in part: 'An employe, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is at the time of such injury subject to the provisions of this act, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided,' C.L.1948, § 412.1, Stat.Ann.1949 Cum.Supp. § 17.151.

Plaintiff also urges that section 19 of part 3 of the act does not purport to define and fix the rights and liabilities of employers and employees, but is only a portion of the procedural part of the act.

Section 19 of part 3 of the act, C.L.1948, § 413.19, Stat.Ann. § 17.193, which was...