Daniels v. Upton

• Decision Date: 25 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-94
• Parties: XAVIER DANIELS, Plaintiff, v. FIELD OPERATIONS MANAGER UPTON; ROBERT TOOLE; and STANLEY WILLIAMS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

XAVIER DANIELS, Plaintiff, v. FIELD OPERATIONS MANAGER UPTON;

ROBERT TOOLE; and STANLEY WILLIAMS, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-94

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

August 25, 2016

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, submitted a Complaint and Amended Complaint in the above captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1, 4.) For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS all monetary damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities and all claims for punitive and compensatory damages. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Eight Amendment claims based on the conditions of his confinement and Defendant's alleged failure to protect. However, Plaintiff arguably sets forth plausible claims that Defendants violated his due process rights during his period of administrative confinement at Georgia State Prison. Consequently, his claims for injunctive relief and nominal damages on those claims will proceed, and the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to serve Defendants with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint. Nonetheless, the Court should DENY Plaintiff's claim for preliminary injunctive relief.¹

BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff filed this action contesting certain conditions of his confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his rights to due process by placing him in the Tier II administrative segregation unit ("Tier II Unit") after inmates at Smith State Prison assaulted him on February 17, 2014. (Doc. 1, p. 2.) After the assault, Plaintiff was transferred to the infirmary unit at Georgia State Prison. Id. On March 13, 2014, prison officials moved Plaintiff to an Administrative Segregation Unit while the Inmate Affairs Unit and the Georgia Department of Corrections investigated his assault. Id. Plaintiff states that he is being held in the unit—despite not meeting the stated criteria for the program—as punishment for being assaulted. (Id. at p. 3.) He asserts that Defendant Stanley Williams, the former Warden of Smith State Prison and current Warden of Georgia State Prison, has prevented Plaintiff's security level from being dropped. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Williams told him that he will not be removed from the Tier II Unit until Plaintiff provides the name of the inmate who assaulted Plaintiff at Smith State Prison. (Id. at p. 4.) He also contends that Defendant Upton, the Field Operations Manager, and Robert Toole, the Warden of Georgia State Prison, participated in keeping Plaintiff in the Tier II Unit. (Id. at pp. 3-4, 7-9.)

Plaintiff claims that the conditions in the Tier II Unit differ greatly from the conditions in the general population of the prison. (Id. at pp. 4-6.) He states that inmates in the Tier II program have limits on privileges, the food they are served, and the items they can buy. Id. He alleges that in the Tier II program, low security prisoners are mixed with violent offenders and prisoners with mental illnesses. Id. Plaintiff also claims that other inmates' feces litter the Tier II area, and that Plaintiff is served food through a dirty tray flap. Id. In addition to sanitation issues, Plaintiff contends the Tier II Unit is plagued by poor ventilation, excessive noise, peeling paint in the showers, unsafe recreation, and limited mail access. Id.

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff supplements his claims to allege that he "has lost over thirty pounds due to psychological damage including personal humiliation and mental anguish." (Doc. 4, p. 1.) He goes on to allege that Defendants have placed Plaintiff in Phase Three of the Tier II Unit and denied him protective custody because Defendants assume that Plaintiff is withholding information about his assault. (Id. at 2-3.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that isfrivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, this Court must give deference to prison officials on matters of prison administration and should not meddle in issues such as the contents of a prisoner's file. Courts traditionally are reluctant to interfere with prison administration and discipline, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) ("Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform."), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In such cases, "[d]eference to prison authorities is especially appropriate." Newman v. State of Ala., 683 F.2d 1312, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 1982) (reversing district court's injunction requiring release of prisoners on probation because it "involved the court in the operation of the State's system of criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary" and less intrusive equitable remedy was available); see also Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407-08 ("Acknowledging the expertise of these officials and that the judiciary is 'ill equipped' to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management, this Court has afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest ofsecurity, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (acknowledging that courts have "accorded wide-ranging deference [to prison administrators] in adoption and execution of policies and practices that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) ("Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent escape or unauthorized entry."); Bradley v. Hart, No. CV513-127, 2015 WL 1032926, at *10 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2015) ("It does not appear to be appropriate for this Court to order that prison officials remove entries from Plaintiff's file, which may or may not be accurate.").

Further, in order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff...