Danielson v. Huether

• Decision Date: 19 December 2018
• Docket Number: 4:18-CV-04039-RAL
• Citation: 355 F.Supp.3d 849
• Parties: Bruce DANIELSON, Plaintiff, v. Mike HUETHER, David Pfeifle, Marty Jackley, Heather Hitterdal, City of Sioux Falls, State of South Dakota, John Doe, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

355 F.Supp.3d 849

Bruce DANIELSON, Plaintiff,

v.Mike HUETHER, David Pfeifle, Marty Jackley, Heather Hitterdal, City of Sioux Falls, State of South Dakota, John Doe, Defendants.

4:18-CV-04039-RAL

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division.

Signed December 19, 2018

Bruce Danielson, Sioux Falls, SD, pro se

Alexis A. Warner, James E. Moore, Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, PC, Sioux Falls, SD, for Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBERTO A. LANGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Bruce Danielson, proceeding pro se, sued the State of South Dakota, South Dakota's Attorney General Marty Jackley, the City of Sioux Falls, the City's former mayor Mike Huether, and City employees David Pfeifle and Heather Hitterdal (collectively "the Defendants"). Doc. 1. Danielson alleges that the Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 – 1968, and state law. Doc. 1. The Defendants have moved to dismiss all of Danielson's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 11. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. Facts

A district court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) usually draws the facts from the complaint, documents that are embraced by the complaint, matters of public record, and items subject to judicial notice. See Dittmer Props., L.P. v. FDIC, 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013). Here, Danielson has requested leave to amend his complaint before dismissal with prejudice and has submitted an "Appendix of Proposed Supplemental Pleading" in support of this request. Doc. 18 at 32–53. He states that the "exemplar proposed amendments" in the appendix "are intended to illustrate the detail which is known and can be pleaded as required." Doc. 18 at 5; see also Doc. 18 at 26 (referring to the appendix as his "proposed amendments"). The District of South Dakota's Local Rules state that "any party moving to amend a pleading must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading to its motion to amend with the proposed changes highlighted or underlined so that they may be easily identified." D.S.D. Civ. LR 15.1. Although Danielson has not complied with the local rules for filing an amended complaint, this Court will consider the allegations in the appendix along with those in the complaint when deciding whether Danielson has stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Pratt v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 124 F. App'x 465, 466 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 214 (8th Cir. 1996).¹

Danielson, a resident of Sioux Falls, is a long-time advocate for open government and public access to government information. Doc. 1 at ¶ 30. He participates in Sioux Falls City Council meetings and frequently criticized Huether's conduct as mayor. Danielson contributes articles and videos of public events to www.southdacola.com, a blog operated by Scott Ehrisman. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 31–32. Ehrisman uses the blog to write about local politics and promote government transparency. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 32, 50.

Although Danielson's allegations against the Defendants are wide-ranging, the dominant theme is that Huether used his power as mayor to retaliate against Danielson for criticizing him and investigating his conduct. According to Danielson, Huether had him arrested in July 2014 to prevent him from testifying at a Sioux Falls City Council meeting, Doc. 1 at ¶ 95; Doc. 18 at 32–36; instigated his prosecution in September 2014, Doc. 1 at ¶ 96; Doc. 18 at 37; attempted to intimidate him after he spoke at City Council meetings, Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 80–84, and refused to treat him like other members of the media when he was collecting information for the southdacola blog, Doc. 1 at ¶ 98. Danielson also claims that Huether struck him in the back of the head during an April 2015 City meeting, causing damage to his teeth, head, and neck. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 33–34. Danielson alleges multiple conspiracies by the Defendants, including a conspiracy between Huether and Jackley to cover-up Huether's assault of Danielson and a conspiracy to use Huether's power as mayor to create favorable investments opportunities for Huether's family.

Danielson alleges that the Defendants violated § 1983, RICO, and state law. He is suing Huether, Jackley, Pfeifle, and Hitterdal in both their official and individual capacities, and requests punitive damages, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees from all the Defendants.

II. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construe all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, but need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions. Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc'ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768–69 (8th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although detailed factual allegations are unnecessary, the plaintiff must plead enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely,’ " Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ). Still, "conclusory statements" and "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement" do not satisfy the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration in original) (citation and internal marks omitted).

The Eighth Circuit requires district courts to construe pro se complaints liberally. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). This means "that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Id. at 915. Importantly, however, this rule of liberal construction does not excuse a pro se plaintiff from alleging enough facts to support his claims. Id. at 914. That is, even though a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the district court will not "assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint." Id. at 915.

III. Analysis

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any "person" who, acting "under color of" state law, deprives the plaintiff of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" or granted by federal statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants construe Danielson's complaint as alleging four claims under § 1983 : a First Amendment retaliation claim, a First Amendment claim based on the failure to treat Danielson like other members of the press, a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim, and a claim against the City of Sioux Falls under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Danielson appears to agree that these are the § 1983 claims he is bringing, although he disagrees with the Defendants about the scope of some of his claims and what he must show to succeed on them. Defendants argue that Danielson's § 1983 claims should be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims against the State of South Dakota and Jackley in his official capacity; prosecutorial and qualified immunity bar any claims against Jackley in his individual capacity; and all of Danielson's allegations fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). This Court addresses these arguments in turn.

1. Claims against the State of South Dakota and Jackley in his Official Capacity

Danielson's claims against the State of South Dakota and claims for damages against Jackley in his official capacity must be dismissed. First, § 1983 only provides a cause of action against a "person" who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another of his or her federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The Supreme Court in Will held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983" when sued for money damages. Id. Section 1983 therefore does not allow Danielson to sue the State of South Dakota or Jackley in his official capacity for damages. Id.; see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n. 24, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) ("State officers in their official capacities, like States themselves, are not amenable to suit for damages under § 1983."). Second, absent consent by the state or congressional abrogation of immunity, the Eleventh Amendment generally bars federal-court lawsuits seeking monetary damages from states or individual state officers in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304 ; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) ; Treleven v. Univ. of Minn., 73 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1996). Section 1983 did not abrogate South Dakota's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), and South Dakota and Jackley have raised Eleventh Amendment immunity as a defense in this case. Danielson argues, however, that South Dakota has consented to suit under SDCL § 21-32-16, which...