Danner v. Hass
| Decision Date | 06 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 51601,51601 |
| Citation | 257 Iowa 654,134 N.W.2d 534 |
| Parties | Don Dee DANNER, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Honorable A. V. HASS, Judge, District Court of Iowa in and for Lucas County, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John A. Jarvis, Chariton, for plaintiff.
Lawrence F. Scalise, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, and Joseph H. Zeller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, for defendant.
On June 8, 1964, the respondent-plaintiff was convicted in justice court, upon plea of guilty, of the offense of violation of Code section 321.285, I.C.A. which deals with illegal speeding on the public highways, committed on June 6 of the same year. The department of public safety, hereinafter known as the department, suspended his driver's license for sixty days under the authority of section 321.210. The department also suspended the license and plaintiff's automobile registration until the plaintiff should furnish proof of financial responsibility under the provisions of section 321A.17.
Thereupon the plaintiff asked and was accorded an administrative hearing as provided in section 321.211. This hearing was held before a duly authorized agent of the commissioner of public safety. It resulted in an affirmance of the suspension, but its term, so far as the penalty under section 321.210 was involved, was reduced to thirty days. It does not appear that any hearing was held or any determination made as to the suspension under section 321A.17; but on the appeal to the district court under section 321.215 which deals only with suspension under section 321.210, the validity of section 321A.17 was also challenged.
The trial court upheld the action of the department under both sections 321.210 and 321A.17. The plaintiff brings certiorari, alleging that the court acted illegally in so doing.
I. The department first contends that certiorari will not lie under the record shown here. But since the constitutionality of the statutes under consideration is challenged, we think the question of illegality is present. Under section 321.215, which permits an appeal from the ruling of the administrative officer of the department, the decision of the court of record is final. Certiorari is the only available remedy, and we hold it is a proper one. Hitchcock v. Department of Public Safety, 250 Iowa 1016, 1019, 1020, 98 N.W.2d 1, 3.
II. The plaintiff demanded a jury trial in the district court. This was denied. The court held that it had not been timely requested. This ruling was correct; and we also determine that the statute does not give the appellant in such matters a right to jury trial. The question is not argued here and we give it no further consideration.
It may be noted, however, that the right to trial by jury is not absolute in all civil cases; there is generally not such right in special proceedings; and its denial violates no constitutional provision. Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Company 175 Iowa 245, 327, 154 N.W. 1037, 1067, 157 N.W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann.Cas.1917E, 803.
III. While the plaintiff's brief in this court covers other matters, we agree with the trial court that his petition on which the case was tried on appeal in the district court alleged chiefly constitutional defects in the statutes. It is pleaded that the acts of the defendant commissioner of public safety were illegal and contrary to the constitutions of the United States and of the State of Iowa in that sections 321.210(7), and 321A.17 constitute a delegation of legislative and judicial powers without fixing proper standards or rules and regulations and 'in terms so vague, uncertain and indefinite as to be unreasonable and utterly void'; that they constitute an unreasonable exercise of police powers and taking of property rights without compensation and without due process; and that section 321.215, providing for appeal to the courts, is vague, indefinite and uncertain in failing to prescribe trial de movo so that there is again a denial of due process.
IV. At the outset we are confronted with a preliminary question involving the suspension of the license under section 321.210. While it is not raised by the defendant, it requires a decision. The trial court in affirming the decision of the department fixed the beginning of the thirty day period of suspension of the license to begin on October 24, 1964. Since the operation of this provision was not stayed, it is evident the time of suspension is now long past, and so far as section 321.210 is concerned there is nothing we can do to remedy any harm to the petitioner. Under these circumstances we have often held that we will not decide moot questions. Nitta v. Kuda, 249 Iowa ,853, 857, 89 N.W.2d 149, 151; Johnston v. Kirkville Independent School District, 240 Iowa 1328, 1329, 1330, 39 N.W.2d 287, 288, and citations.
At first impression, it appears that these cases decide all questions raised so far as section 321.210 is involved. We can not restore the plaintiff's license for the thirty days immediately following October 24, 1964. But an examination of the authorities discloses an exception to the rule which we think prevails here, and requires a decision on the merits of the case at bar. The exception is thus stated in 5 Am.Jur.2d, section 768, pages 210-212: * * *
'Among the issues of which the courts frequently retain jurisdiction because the public interest is involved, although the immediate issues have become moot, are questions of constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or construction of statutes or the propriety of administrative rulings or cases having to do with the collection of the public revenue.'
This view has been followed in several cases. In McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 188 S.W.2d 745, 747, which involved the suspension of the license of a liquor dealer for six months, the court said:
In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz et al., 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772 30 A.L.R.2d 1132, it is pointed out that, among other reasons for refusing to hold a question moot is that 'the very urgency which presses for prompt action by public officials makes it probable that any similar case arising in the future will likewise become moot by ordinary standards before it can be determined by this court.' The same principle was applied in Payne v. Jones, 193 Okl. 609, 146 P.2d 113, 116, where it was also held that the determination of moot questions lies in the discretion of the court, but that such discretion should be exercised in favor of decision when questions of public interest are involved.
Other courts have adhered to the same rule, that even moot questions should be determined when they involve matters of concern to the public generally, and especially when the situation is such that often the matter will be moot before it can reach an appellate court. We have concluded that our discretion should be exercised in favor of a decision on the merits in the instant case.
V. The major point urged by the plaintiff is that section 321.210 is unconstitutional, as applied to the situation involved. The petition, while alleging unconstitutionality, does not tell us what parts of the constitutions of the United States and of Iowa are thought to be transgressed. But we find these stated in the plaintiff's brief and argument. It is there said that they are Article I, Section 9, Article III, Section 1, and Article V, Section 1, of the Iowa constitution, I.C.A., and the 5th and 14th amendments to the constitution of the United States. Article I, Section 9, supra, and the two amendments to the United States constitution are due process of law clauses and raise the same question; while Article III, Section I, and Article V, Section 1, supra, are each relied on to show the claimed improper delegation of legislative power. We shall consider this latter question first.
VI. Section 321.210 so far as material here, says: 'The department is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:
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It is the contention that the words 'serious violation' do not set up a sufficient or intelligible standard; and that to permit the department to place its own interpretation upon them is to permit it to legislate; that is, there is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the department.
In Spurbeck v. Statton, 252 Iowa 279, 283, 284, 106 N.E.2d 660, 663, we stated some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality, must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; if any reasonable basis may be conceived...
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