Danse Corp. v. City of Madison Heights
| Decision Date | 29 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 119011. |
| Citation | 466 Mich. 175,644 N.W.2d 721 |
| Parties | DANSE CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF MADISON HEIGHTS, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Hoffert & Associates, P.C. (by David B. Marmon), Bingham Farms, MI, for the petitioner-appellant.
Sherman & Sherman, P.C. (by Larry H. Sherman), Bingham Farms, MI, for the respondent-appellee.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, P.L.C. (by Robert F. Rhoades and Samuel J. McKim, III) Detroit, MI, for the Michigan Municipal League.
The Michigan Tax Tribunal entered a judgment, holding that certain personal property belonging to petitioner did not constitute "special tools" and was therefore subject to taxation. On appeal, petitioner argued that guidelines utilized by the Tax Tribunal were not determinative, since they were not rules promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act.1 The Court of Appeals affirmed.2 We reverse the judgments of the Tax Tribunal and Court of Appeals because the guidelines relied on to expand the definition of "special tools" did not have the force of law as they were not promulgated under the APA. We remand this case to the Tax Tribunal for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
Petitioner manufactures roof line ridge vents for residential construction. In that process it uses plastic injection molds and related components. It excluded the molds from personal property statements and, as required, noted that fact on the personal property statements it filed. A personal property audit was performed, and respondent subsequently notified the State Tax Commission that personal property allegedly subject to taxation had not been included on petitioner's 1994 and 1995 personal property statements and sought an increase in the assessment valuation. The State Tax Commission held that the molds were not exempt "special tools" within the meaning of M.C.L. § 211.9b and corrected increased assessment valuations were approved. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Michigan Tax Tribunal. After an evidentiary hearing, the Tax Tribunal held that petitioner was not entitled to a M.C.L. § 211.9b exemption for the molds. It found that the Legislature intended to allow the State Tax Commission to define what "special tools" meant.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. Petitioner has applied for leave to appeal.3
Issues concerning the interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law that this Court decides de novo. Lincoln v. General Motors Corp., 461 Mich. 483, 489-490, 607 N.W.2d 73 (2000). In Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Treasury Dep't, 445 Mich. 470, 476, 518 N.W.2d 808 (1994), we noted that, in the absence of fraud, review of a Tax Tribunal decision is "limited to determining whether the tribunal erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong principle[.]" "[F]actual findings are conclusive if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." Id.
MCL 211.9b provides:
The State Tax Commission has adopted a rule defining "special tools."4 What is commonly referred to as rule 21 provides:
"Special tools" as used in section 9b of the act, means those finished or unfinished devices, such as dies, jigs, fixtures, molds, patterns, and special gauges, used or being prepared for use in the manufacturing function for which they are designed or are acquired or made for the production of products or models and are of such specialized nature that their utility and amortization cease with the discontinuance of such products or models.
Pursuant to M.C.L. § 211.10e, assessing officials are required to use an assessor's manual prepared by the State Tax Commission "as a guide in preparing assessments." The Tax Tribunal utilized seven guidelines from the State Tax Commission Assessor's Manual in reaching the determination that the plastic injection molds were not "special tools"5 and therefore were not exempt from personal property tax under M.C.L. § 211.9b. In determining that the Assessor's Manual guidelines were applicable, the Tax Tribunal stated in part:
The State Tax Commission (STC) further provided seven guidelines to determine whether a "particular device is a special tool" based on that tool's purpose, "utility and amortization." Although these guidelines are clarifications of its Rule 21 general definition and not promulgated rules, this Tribunal must look at the Legislature's intent of allowing the State Tax Commission to not only define what a special tool is, but to further allow the STC to clarify how to recognize a special tool when an assessor sees it and the "utility and amortization" of that special tool.
The Court of Appeals majority agreed that the factors from the Assessor's Manual were determinative. The Court relied on M.C.L. § 211.10e, which provides:
All assessing officials, whose duty it is to assess real or personal property on which real or personal property taxes are levied by any taxing unit of the state, shall use only the official assessor's manual or any manual approved by the state tax commission, consistent with the official assessor's manual, with their latest supplements, as prepared or approved by the state tax commission as a guide in preparing assessments. Beginning with the tax assessing year 1978, all assessing officials shall maintain records relevant to the assessments, including appraisal record cards, personal property records, historical assessment data, tax maps, and land value maps consistent with standards set forth in the assessor's manual published by the state tax commission.
It also relied on OAG, 1981-1982, No. 5,909, p. 207 (May 20, 1981). It further noted that exemption statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxing unit and that a prior decision of that Court appeared to accept a definition of "special tools" that included a factor from the guidelines. The dissenting judge would have held that the Assessor's Manual did not have legal authority because it was not promulgated as an administrative rule and thus could not impose additional requirements to meet the definition of "special tools" beyond that contained in rule 21. The dissenting judge would have held that the plastic injection molds were "special tools" as defined by rule 21 and that, therefore, petitioner was entitled to the statutory exemption.
In order for an agency regulation, statement, standard, policy, ruling, or instruction of general applicability to have the force of law, it must fall under the definition of a properly promulgated rule. If it does not, it is merely explanatory. Goins v. Greenfield Jeep Eagle, 449 Mich. 1, 7-10, 534 N.W.2d 467 (1995). As the Tax Tribunal noted, rule 21 was properly promulgated under the APA, and therefore has the force of law.
However, it is undisputed that the Assessor's Manual was not promulgated as an administrative rule. Therefore, the manual may be used as a "guide," but does not itself have the force of law. The portion referred to can only be used to explain rule 21; it cannot impose requirements not found in rule 21 to meet the definition of "special tools." Thus, for petitioner to have a valid exemption under M.C.L. § 211.9b, the molds at issue need only meet the requirements of rule 21.
MCL 221.10e does not exempt the Assessor's Manual from APA promulgation requirements. The rules governing construction of a statute are well known. Giving effect to the intent of the Legislature is a fundamental task. We are required to examine the plain language of the involved statutes. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature's intent and the statute must be applied as written. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129,135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). No further construction is necessary or allowed to expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover. In re MCI, supra at 411, 596 N.W.2d 164. The court must presume that every word has some meaning and, if possible, effect should be given to each provision. People v. Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich. 278, 285, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999).
Following these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the plain language of M.C.L. § 211.10e demonstrates a legislative intent that the Assessor's Manual is to be used "as a guide." It cannot be concluded from a plain reading of the statute that the Legislature intended that the State Tax Commission was entitled to bypass the APA and promulgate the Assessor's Manual as a rule having the force of law. The mandatory "shall" language in M.C.L. § 211.10e refers to the requirement that assessors use the Assessor's Manual as a guide. The statute was apparently enacted in order to create uniformity among appraisal techniques. See OAG, supra at 207.6
Likewise, M.C.L. § 211.9b does not provide the authority for a conclusion that the Legislature intended that the State Tax Commission could bypass the promulgation requirements of the APA. We quote that statute again:
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