Dante Difronzo's Case.

Decision Date12 April 2011
Docket NumberSJC–10785.
Citation459 Mass. 338,945 N.E.2d 350
PartiesDante DiFRONZO'S CASE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

459 Mass. 338
945 N.E.2d 350

Dante DiFRONZO'S CASE.

SJC–10785.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 8, 2011.Decided April 12, 2011.


[945 N.E.2d 351]

Leonard Y. Nason, Bedford, for the employee.Eugene M. Mullen, Jr., Boston, for the insurer & another.Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, & DUFFLY, JJ.1COWIN, J.

[459 Mass. 338] This is an appeal from a decision of the reviewing board (board) of the Department of Industrial Accidents (department)[459 Mass. 339] regarding the workers' compensation claim of the employee Dante DiFronzo. DiFronzo was denied benefits by the National Union Fire Insurance Company (insurer) after being struck by a motor vehicle in a public way.

An administrative judge awarded DiFronzo compensation and medical expenses, and unpaid interest due on each, and ordered the insurer to pay DiFronzo's attorney's fees. The judge concluded that the insurer had defended the claim without “reasonable grounds” for so doing, and ordered the insurer to pay both the entire cost of the proceedings and double back benefits 2 pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 14(1) ( § 14(1)).

On appeal, the board reversed the § 14(1) penalty of double back benefits and costs.3,4 DiFronzo appealed from the board's decision to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case here on our own

[945 N.E.2d 352]

motion. We affirm the decision of the board.

1. Background. DiFronzo was employed as a laborer on a large-scale construction project in downtown Boston, referred to as the “Big Dig” or Central Artery/Tunnel Project, one element of which involved the conversion of an elevated highway into a subterranean highway. The construction project was divided into “work zones” from which the public was excluded, but the adjoining streets remained open to the public. Workers on the project regularly crossed the public streets to move between work zones or for other work-related tasks.

On September 22, 1998, DiFronzo was crossing North Street soon after completing his regular work shift when he was struck by a motor vehicle. 5 At the time of the accident, DiFronzo had just finished putting away his tools and was proceeding in the [459 Mass. 340] direction of a work zone on the opposite side of North Street where the employer's trucks were located.

Two days after the accident, the insurer conducted a recorded interview with a witness who said he had been speaking with DiFronzo just prior to the accident. In that interview, the witness stated that, after he spoke with DiFronzo for ten to fifteen minutes, DiFronzo “saw his bus and he said [‘]I've got to go now that's my bus.[’]” According to the account, DiFronzo then ran out into North Street where he was struck by the motor vehicle. The witness said DiFronzo commuted home from work on that bus route every day.

DiFronzo applied for workers' compensation benefits, but the insurer denied his claim on the basis that DiFronzo had finished his work day and was on his commute home when he was injured. DiFronzo then sought a hearing before an administrative judge of the department.

At the hearing, the insurer's prior interview with the witness was entered in evidence. DiFronzo, however, testified that he was crossing North Street at the time of the accident not for the purpose of catching a bus, but to use a two-way radio in one of his employer's trucks to contact his supervisor. DiFronzo said that he was going to tell his supervisor that the area where he worked was no longer manned, and to ask whether there was any further work to do.

Based on all the evidence in the case, the administrative judge credited DiFronzo's version of events. The judge granted DiFronzo total incapacity compensation, reasonable and necessary medical expenses, and interest due on unpaid benefits. The judge also awarded DiFronzo's counsel an enhanced attorney's fee and, pursuant to § 14(1), assessed to the insurer the whole cost of the proceedings and a penalty of double back benefits for having defended the claim without reasonable grounds.6 See G.L. c. 152, § 14(1).

[945 N.E.2d 353]

The insurer appealed to the board. The board affirmed the [459 Mass. 341] award of compensation benefits, recommitted the case on the issue of the attorney's fees, and reversed the administrative judge's award of a § 14(1) penalty. The sole question now on appeal is whether the board properly reversed the judge's award of a § 14(1) penalty.7

2. Discussion. The workers' compensation statute directs that review of a decision of the board is to be in accordance with G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7) ( a )-( d ), ( f ), and ( g ). See G.L. c. 152, § 12(2). We may thus reverse or modify the board's decision when, inter alia, it is “based upon an error of law” or is “[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7) ( c ), ( g ). We accordingly consider “whether the decision is factually warranted and not ‘[a]rbitrary or capricious,’ in the sense of having adequate evidentiary and factual support and disclosing reasoned decision making.” Carpenter's Case, 456 Mass. 436, 439, 923 N.E.2d 1026 (2010), quoting Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. 251, 258, 643 N.E.2d 1023 (1994).

This case calls for a construction of statutory text. We accord substantial deference to the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with primary responsibility for its administration, although “ultimately the ‘duty of statutory interpretation is [459 Mass. 342] for the courts.’ ” Moss's Case, 451 Mass. 704, 709, 889 N.E.2d 43 (2008), quoting Slater's Case, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 326, 330, 770 N.E.2d 534 (2002).

The double back benefits and costs assessed against the insurer by the administrative judge in this case were imposed pursuant to § 14(1). That provision instructs that such benefits and costs are to be granted when a proceeding has been “brought, prosecuted, or defended by an insurer without reasonable grounds.” G.L. c. 152, § 14(1). In assessing the present case, both the administrative judge and the board adopted the standard of “reasonable grounds” set forth in Gonsalves v. IGS Store Fixtures, Inc., 13 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 21, 24 (1999). In that case, the board applied an objective standard of reasonableness, inquiring whether a “cautious and prudent person” would consider the grounds for bringing, prosecuting, or defending the proceeding to be reasonable. Id.

DiFronzo and the insurer agree with the board that the statute sets forth an objective rather than subjective standard, and we conclude as a preliminary matter that the board did not err in so construing the statute. The Legislature's decision to condition § 14(1) penalties on the absence of “reasonable grounds” implies an objective inquiry.8 Cf.

[945 N.E.2d 354]

Police Comm'r of Boston v. Personnel Adm'r of the Dept. of Personnel Admin., 423 Mass. 1017, 1017, 671 N.E.2d 1231 (1996) (endorsing objective, rather than subjective, inquiry to determine whether failure to give proper notice was “reasonable under the circumstances,” as required by civil service statute, G.L. c. 31, § 38); Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir.2007) (construing statutory reference to “good faith and ... reasonable grounds” to mean “good faith and...

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