Danz v. Schafer
Decision Date | 06 November 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 1505,1505 |
Citation | 422 A.2d 1,47 Md.App. 51 |
Parties | Thelma DANZ, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jean Rita Winters v. Charles E. SCHAFER et ux. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Joseph L. Evans, Baltimore, with whom was Michael E. Marr, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellant.
Timothy J. Martin, Towson, for appellees.
Argued before MOYLAN and WILNER, JJ., and IRVING H. FISHER, Specially Assigned Judge.
The issue squarely before us on this appeal is the standard for reviewing a verdict rendered by a trial judge sitting without a jury on the basis of an agreed statement of facts. If it is standard A, we shall affirm; if it is standard B, we shall reverse. The issue could not be more cleanly joined.
The appellant, Thelma Danz, is the Personal Representative of the Estate of the late Jean Rita Winters. She sued the appellees, Nora P. Schafer and Charles E. Schafer, wife and husband, for approximately $8,000 allegedly owed by the Schafers to Mrs. Winters. Mrs. Winters had been Nora Schafer's aunt. The Schafers, defendants below, had defended on the theory that they had received the money from Mrs. Winters as a gift. The case came on for trial before Judge Edward A. DeWaters, Jr., in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. No witnesses were called and counsel for both sides elected to proceed on an agreed statement of facts. That statement was as follows:
'On September 30th, 1974, Mrs. Jean Winters withdrew from Baltimore County Savings and Loan Association, Incorporated, account number 3336, in the name of Jean Rita Winters, in trust for Nora Patricia Schafer, the sum of seventy-two hundred dollars, for the purpose of a personal loan to incorporate and pay loans in the name of Charles E. and Nora P. Schafer.
We do hereby promise to pay Mrs. Jean R. Winters the principal amount of seventy-two hundred dollars and interest at annual rate of six and one-quarter per cent on the balance due to account number 3336, in portions as soon as our finances enable us to do so.
In the event of our death, the estate is to pay to the account the full balance remaining of the said amount. Signed, Charles E. Schafer and Nora P. Schafer.
I would like to make this notarized copy, I might add, I would like to make that Exhibit 2.
Let it be noted that although in this case there is no dispute as to any of the first- level facts such as who said what to whom and where and when (and the credibility of witnesses has, therefore, no bearing on the decision), there yet remains a fact-finding issue to be resolved-the high-level fact finding of what to make of those first-level facts. From those arguably ambiguous first-level facts, the fact finder must come up with an ultimate, second-level fact. Does one infer from the undisputed physical phenomena and the undisputed conduct of the parties that Mrs. Winters made a gift of the money to her niece or does one infer that she made a loan? Even observing the same event, reasonable minds might read into it different significances. Judge DeWaters, for his part, recognized that two contrary meanings could be drawn from the undisputed evidence:
"The primary issue before this Court is whether the transaction between the parties was in the nature of a loan and thereby created an indebtedness, or a valid inter vivos gift thereby extinguishing the Plaintiff's claim."
Judge DeWaters went on correctly to outline the essential elements for a valid inter vivos gift as spelled out by the Court of Appeals in Rogers v. Rogers, 271 Md. 603, 319 A.2d 119. Against that standard, he measured the undisputed facts in the instant case and the inferences (here is the critical area of dispute) that might fairly be drawn therefrom and rendered his ultimate opinion (a blend of the undisputed events and the disputed inferences) as follows:
Following the critical day of September 30, 1974, there did, to be sure, occur some very significant actions on the part of the Schafers. They signed a promissory note indicating that ten months earlier the delivery to them of $7,200.00 had been a personal loan. They did, moreover, make several deposits into the joint bank account. These actions could, in the view of a particular observer, indicate that the original intention of Mrs. Winters even as of September 30, 1974 had been to make a loan. Some other observer, however, in his prerogative, might choose to view the gestures as calculated merely to placate a loved one-or, more cynically, perhaps, a potential Santa Claus or potential Daddy Warbucks-and thereby avoid the possible loss of possible future largess. For his part, Judge DeWaters gave little significance to the events post-September 30, 1974:
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