Darby Candy Co. of Baltimore City v. Hoffberger
| Decision Date | 28 June 1909 |
| Citation | 73 A. 565,111 Md. 84 |
| Parties | DARBY CANDY CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY v. HOFFBERGER. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore Court of Common Pleas; John J. Dobler, Judge.
Action by Harry Hoffberger against the Darby Candy Company of Baltimore City. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed, without awarding new trial.
Benjamin Rosenheim and Lee S. Meyer, for appellant.
Milton D. Greenbaum and Daniel Greenbaum, for appellee.
The appellant is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of candy in Baltimore city. The appellee is engaged in the livery and stable business of hiring and boarding horses for compensation, in Baltimore city. This suit was brought by the appellee against the appellant, to recover damages for the loss of two horses, belonging to the appellee, and hired to the appellant. The declaration contains two counts, and they set out the causes of action. The first count charges that among the horses so hired was a spotted sorrel horse and at the time of the happening of the injury, on or about September 16, 1906, this horse was perfectly sound and in good health and condition; that by reason of the gross carelessness and negligence of the defendant, its agents, and servants in the use of the horse while entirely under the control and in the custody of the defendant, its agents, and servants, and without any fault or negligence of the plaintiff, the spotted sorrel horse was so injured and maimed that it is now totally unfit for use, and is permanently disabled. The second count charges that among the horses so hired was a bay horse; that at the time of the happening of the injury, to wit, on or about November 12, 1906, this horse was perfectly sound and in good health and condition; that by reason of the gross carelessness and negligence of the defendant, its agents, and servants in the use of the horse while entirely under the control and in the custody of the defendant, its agents and servants, and without any fault or negligence of the plaintiff, the bay horse was so ill-used that it died. At the trial of the case below the appellant reserved 12 exceptions, presenting the various rulings of the court upon the admissibility of testimony, to the granting of the plaintiff's second, third, and fourth prayers, to the rejection of the defendant's prayers Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and to the overruling of the defendant's special exceptions to the plaintiff's second, third, and fourth prayers. The verdict and judgment was in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant has appealed.
The case being one of bailment for hire, the principal question is whether the plaintiff has established by legally sufficient evidence under the pleadings his right to recover against the defendant company. It will be seen that the defendant's third prayer was based upon the insufficiency of evidence to prove that the injury to the horses was caused by reason of the gross carelessness and negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the pleadings. The defendant had the undoubted right to have the jury confined to the issue made by the pleadings. The law is well established that the fact of negligence is for the jury where there is evidence legally sufficient to prove it, but in the absence of such evidence it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury. In the view we take of this case it will not be necessary for us to consider all the questions raised on the record, because we are of the opinion that the court below committed an error in rejecting the defendant's third prayer, which is as follows: "The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that there is no legally sufficient evidence, under the pleadings entitling the plaintiff to recover, and therefore the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant." The settled principle in this state applicable to the extent of the liability of the bailee, in a case of bailment for hire, is clearly stated in the cases of Hambleton v. McGee, 19 Md. 43, Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 72 Md. 454, 20 A. 1, 20 Am. St. Rep. 479, and the recent case of Baltimore Refrigerator Co. v. Kreiner, 109 Md. 361 71 A. 1066. In all of these cases the rule is distinctly established that the onus of proving want of reasonable and proper care is on the bailor, and that the bailee is not liable for an accidental injury not caused by negligence. And this is so because bailees for hire are not insurers of the bailed property.
The burden of proof is also upon the plaintiff to show causal connection between the defendant's acts or omissions, to constitute negligence, and the injuries complained of. And where under the evidence the injuries complained of may have resulted, either from the defendant's negligence, or from some other cause, or causes, for which he is not responsible the plaintiff cannot recover, as he has not discharged the burden of proof. 21 A. & E. Ency. of Law, p. 216, and cases there cited. In the case at bar both counts in the declaration charge that the injuries were caused by the gross carelessness and negligence of the defendant, its agents, and servants, in the use of the horses. There is no evidence in the record to sustain either of these allegations as set out in the declaration. On the...
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