Darby v. Greenman

• Decision Date: 16 September 2021
• Docket Number: August Term, 2020,Docket No. 19-2084
• Citation: 14 F.4th 124
• Parties: Devin DARBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David GREENMAN, Rafael Hamilton, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

14 F.4th 124

Devin DARBY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.David GREENMAN, Rafael Hamilton, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2, Defendants-Appellees.^*

Docket No. 19-2084

August Term, 2020

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: December 7, 2020

Decided: September 16, 2021

Alexander A. Reinert, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Susan Paulson (Richard Dearing, Deborah A. Brenner, on the brief), for James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Cabranes, Carney, and Park, Circuit Judges.

Judge Carney dissents in a separate opinion.

Park, Circuit Judge:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background ¹

In February 2017, Darby was housed at the Otis Bantum Correctional Center ("OBCC") on Rikers Island when he began to experience inflammation and pain in his right cheek area. During a health screening, dental clinicians found a three-by-three-centimeter bulge in Darby's gums. Darby sought medical attention by submitting a written sick call request to a correctional officer responsible for placing it in a medical intake mailbox. He was seen at the Rikers Island health clinic the next day and received ibuprofen

for his pain. Darby submitted another sick call request a few days later. The next day, he was examined by a Rikers Island dentist who detected an abscess and scheduled him for an appointment with Dentist Defendant David Greenman.

Greenman saw Darby six days later, on February 17, 2017. During the appointment, Greenman suggested a dental extraction, which Darby insisted was unnecessary. Greenman identified a parotid gland issue and advised that Darby "would need to see a specialist for his gum pain, outside of Rikers Island." Compl. ¶ 19. A week later, Darby began inquiring about when he would be treated. Greenman called Darby back to the clinic, but Darby refused the visit, which he viewed as "another attempt at extracting his tooth." Id. ¶ 20.

By late February, Darby "suffered from pain, inflammation, swelling, inability to chew, sleeplessness, and impaired speech." Id. ¶ 23. He submitted approximately fifteen sick call requests between late February and late April "to follow up on his worsening condition." Id. Darby "received no medical attention, care or other response to his numerous sick call requests." Id. ¶ 26. Between mid-March and late April, he also submitted to a "grievance box" three or four written grievances that "described in detail the worsening pain and suffering he was experiencing, and requested immediate medical attention." Id. ¶¶ 27–28. Darby claims that his sick call requests and grievances were "repeatedly ignored." Id. ¶¶ 26, 30.

In late April, Darby was transferred from OBCC to the Robert N. Davoren Complex ("RNDC"), also at Rikers Island. During his intake at RNDC, Darby described his gum pain and was scheduled for an appointment with Dentist Defendant Rafael Hamilton. On May 25, 2017, Darby met with Hamilton, described his symptoms and history, and was scheduled for a second appointment. At Darby's second appointment, on June 5, Hamilton performed a dental cleaning. Darby "protested and explained that he had a serious gum issue, and needed more than a cleaning," but "Hamilton ignored him." Id. ¶ 37. Darby's symptoms persisted, and in mid-June, he submitted four sick call requests "describing his pain and symptoms and request[ing] immediate medical care." Id. ¶¶ 38–39. He received no response.

In late June, Darby was transferred to another facility and was eventually referred to a specialist. After several visits with different specialists, a large mass was found in Darby's gums. He underwent gum surgery in February 2018.

Darby seeks an unspecified amount of damages for "significant and lasting damage" resulting from Defendants’ failure to provide him with proper medical treatment. Id. ¶ 44. Specifically, Darby's relationships with friends and family—including a three-year relationship with his then-fiancée—suffered because of his impaired speech. He also lost 20 pounds due to difficulty chewing. Darby alleges that if the Dentist Defendants had provided prompt and appropriate medical care, he would not have suffered the physical pain he endured, and if the Doe Defendants had responded to his grievances, he could have been treated earlier and avoided significant pain.

B. Procedural History

Darby, proceeding pro se , commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the City of New York, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation ("NYCHHC"), and Correctional Dental Associates ("CDA"); Dentist Defendants David Greenman and Rafael Hamilton; and the Doe Defendants. He also brought state-law claims of medical malpractice against NYCHHC, CDA, Greenman, and Hamilton.

During an initial conference, the district court explained to Darby that his constitutional claims, as alleged, would not survive a motion to dismiss and offered him the opportunity to amend. Darby filed an amended complaint, and Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Darby subsequently moved to supplement his complaint with additional facts that he claimed would "clearly demonstrate that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference." Supp. Compl. at 1. The district court granted the motion and thus construed the amended complaint to include the newly alleged facts.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss as to all Defendants. See Darby v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. , No. 18-cv-2869, 2019 WL 1994490, at *1 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2019). It dismissed the section 1983 claims against the City, NYCHHC, and CDA for failure to allege a municipal policy or practice that resulted in a violation of Darby's constitutional rights. Id. at *3. The district court also dismissed the constitutional claims against the Dentist Defendants and the Doe Defendants. The court held that Darby had not alleged that any of these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a sufficiently serious medical need. Id. at *4–7. As to the Dentist Defendants, the district court held that, "at most, defendants’ conduct ... constitute[d] medical malpractice," which "is not a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference." Id. at *6. The court also found that Darby failed to establish personal involvement by the Doe Defendants because he "ha[d] not alleged that the grievances ever reached [them] before he was transferred to another facility," nor had he alleged any "facts—rather than legal conclusions—to suggest that the [Doe Defendants] knew or should have known of an excessive risk to [his] health." Id. at *7.

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Darby's state-law claims for medical malpractice and dismissed them without prejudice to refiling in state court. Id. Finally, the court denied leave to amend as futile because Darby "ha[d] not stated a claim for relief after filing an amended complaint, which he further supplemented." Id.

Darby timely appealed.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Bacon v. Phelps , 961 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 2020). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "[A] complaint that merely ‘tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement’ fails to meet this standard," Gallop v. Cheney , 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ), as do "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]," Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

We construe a pro se complaint "liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests."

Walker v. Schult , 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). "Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief." Id.

B. Deliberate Indifference

In Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment[,] ... whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Id. at 104–05, 97 S.Ct. 285 (citation and footnote omitted). The Court subsequently extended the protections for convicted prisoners established in Estelle to pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that "the due process rights of a person [detained but not convicted] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp. , 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983).

"[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not" does not meet this standard. Id . at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

"[A] detainee asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs can allege either that the defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should have known that failing to...