Darby v. Hindman

• Decision Date: 30 November 1915
• Citation: 153 P. 56,79 Or. 223
• Parties: DARBY v. HINDMAN ET AL.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

153 P. 56

79 Or. 223

DARBY v. HINDMAN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Oregon

November 30, 1915

In Banc.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baker County; Gustav Anderson, Judge.

Petition contesting the validity of a probated will by Mary H. Darby against Albert Hindman and others. From a decree sustaining the validity of the will, contestant appeals. Reversed, and a decree entered declaring the alleged will invalid.

This is a contest as to the validity of the will of one Thomas Huffman, who died in Baker county about September 11, 1913. An instrument, purporting to be his last will and testament was admitted to probate on October 23, 1913, and thereafter the contestant filed her petition contesting the alleged will on the ground of want of mental capacity in the testator to execute a will. The county court entered a decree sustaining the validity of the will, which decree was affirmed by the circuit court upon appeal, and contestant appeals to this court.

A. S Bennett, of The Dalles, and John L. Rand, of Baker, for appellant. Claude Hindman, of Baker, for respondents.

McBRIDE J. (after stating the facts as above).

The burden of proof was upon the proponent to establish every fact necessary to make a valid will, including the mental capacity of the testator. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 Or 42; Luper v. Werts and Smith, 19 Or. 122, 23 P. 850; Holman's Will, 42 Or. 345, 70 P. 908; Mendenhall's Will, 43 Or. 542, 72 P. 318, 73 [79 Or. 225] P. 1033. There is no dispute between counsel as to the rules of law applicable to this case; the sum of all the authorities being:

"A sound and disposing mind or testamentary capacity implies that the testator fully understands what he is doing and how he is doing it."

A very careful examination of the testimony here fails to satisfy us of the testamentary capacity of the decedent. On the contrary we are convinced that at the time the alleged will was executed he was in a semiunconscious condition, and that he was neither capable of comprehending his relation to the persons who were or should or might have been the objects of his bounty, or the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will. The testimony which seems to us to be the most likely to be disinterested and fair, and which we therefore accept indicates that he did not know he was signing or executing a will, but that its whole contents were the suggestion of other minds and his signature, which was effected by another...