Darby v. Presley
| Decision Date | 20 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2190403 |
| Parties | Alvin DARBY v. Willie Earl PRESLEY |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
J. Milton Coxwell, Jr., of Coxwell & Coxwell, Monroeville, for appellant.
Patrick L. Hays, Jr., of The Hays Law Firm, LLC, Greenville, for appellee.
Alvin Darby appeals from a judgment of the Butler Circuit Court that, among other things, declared Willie Earl Presley ("Presley") to be the sole owner of an eight-acre tract of land located in Butler County ("the property"). We reverse and remand.
The property was deeded to Martha Jane Presley in 1907. Many years thereafter, Martha Jane died intestate and without issue or a surviving spouse. Martha Jane had at least two siblings, Mary Darby and Dave Wallace.1 After Martha Jane died, Mary Darby's son, Jerry Darby, began paying the annual property taxes on the property. After Jerry Darby died, two of his sons, Alvin Darby and George Darby, continued to pay the property taxes and generally looked after the property. The parties agree, however, that the property is "heir property," meaning that the property is owned by the heirs of Martha Jane -- presumably, in this case, the children of Martha Jane's siblings and/or their descendants -- as tenants in common. See § 35-6A-2(5), Ala. Code 1975 (defining "heirs property"), a part of the Alabama Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, § 35-6A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. The parties admit that they cannot identify all the potential cotenants of the property, including their number and respective ownership interests. Nevertheless, the record indicates that there are "a lot" of "heirs" of Martha Jane owning fractional interests in the property that were not joined as parties to the action.2
Sometime around the year 2000, George Darby purported to give Presley permission to place a mobile home on the property. Afterward, Presley cleared approximately one acre of the property, established utility service for the property, had a septic system installed on the property, prepared a pad for the mobile home, installed a driveway approaching the mobile home, and planted a garden on the property. Presley did not sign a lease and was not asked to pay rent, although George claims that he had asked Presley, in lieu of paying rent, to pay the annual property taxes, which Presley did not do except for the years 2016, 2017, and 2018. At the time of the trial in this case, Presley had lived on the property for approximately 19 years.
Alvin and George stopped paying taxes on the property in approximately 2013. On May 29, 2014, Alvin acquired a tax deed to the property at a public tax sale after paying the sum of $99.35. Presley stated that, in 2015, he had asked George about purchasing two acres of the property but had learned that Alvin and George did not own the property outright. Presley stated that George had told him at that time that Alvin had been attempting to resolve the title issues with regard to the property and had said that Alvin and George would sell Presley a portion of the property once a clear title was obtained.
In 2016, Presley began clearing additional land to expand his garden. George told him he could not expand his garden and ultimately asked Presley to remove his mobile home from the property. On April 29, 2016, Presley, claiming to be an heir to Martha Jane, paid $197.09 to the Butler County Revenue Commissioner in an effort to redeem the property, and he received a certificate of redemption.
On September 1, 2016, Alvin commenced an ejectment action against Presley,3 and he later amended his complaint to assert a claim requesting that the trial court set aside the certificate of redemption issued to Presley because, according to Alvin, Presley was not a member of a class of people entitled to redeem the property pursuant to § 40-10-120, Ala. Code 1975.4 Presley filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the property and claiming ownership of the property by adverse possession. He later amended his counterclaim to seek a judgment declaring that the certificate of redemption was valid and that he was the owner of the property by virtue of his having redeemed the property.
A bench trial was conducted on February 19, 2019. At trial, Presley abandoned his adverse-possession claim and, instead, argued that he was an heir of Martha Jane and, like Alvin, owned an undivided interest in the property that had entitled him to redeem the property.5 Alvin disputed Presley's relation to Martha Jane at trial but admitted that he was uncertain as to the identities of all the descendants of Martha Jane who might own interests in the property. George testified similarly on Alvin's behalf. Presley testified that he had always believed that he was an heir of Martha Jane, but he did not otherwise specifically describe his relationship to Martha Jane or how his purported ownership interest in the property had devolved from her to him.
On September 6, 2019, the trial court entered a final judgment. In support of its judgment, the trial court made certain findings of fact, including a finding that Presley was a descendant and heir of Martha Jane. The trial court held that, because of that fact, Presley's redemption of the property was valid, that Presley was entitled to prevail as to Alvin's ejectment claim, and that Presley was the sole owner of the property by virtue of his having redeemed the property. This appeal followed.6
On appeal, Alvin contends that the trial court erred in declaring Presley to be the sole owner of the property.7 In support of his position, Alvin cites the general rule that "[r]edemption from a tax sale by one cotenant inures to the benefit of all the cotenants, who, after the redemption, may rehabilitate their cotenancy." Ex parte Walker, 739 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1999). Presley, for his part, agrees with Alvin that he did not become the sole owner of the property by virtue of his redemption of the property. Nevertheless, he contends that he is entitled to ownership of the portion of the property upon which he has made improvements, and he requests that we remand the case with instructions for the trial court to consider partitioning the property and awarding him ownership of that improved portion of the property.
Before addressing the merits of the parties’ arguments as to the ownership of the property, we must first consider whether the parties’ failure to join the other cotenants as parties to the action constitutes a defect requiring reversal of the judgment. Although the failure to join indispensable parties was not raised by the parties in the trial court or on appeal, " ‘[t]his defect can be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the appellate court ex mero motu.’ " Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. v. Delongchamp, 320 So.3d 574, 579 (Ala. 2020) (quoting J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v. Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834, 850 (Ala. 1981) ).
With respect to the application of Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., regarding the joinder of necessary and indispensable parties, this court has explained:
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Randolph County Commission v. Landrum
...property owners are indispensable parties to this action. Byrd Cos., supra ; and Johnston, supra."Likewise, in Darby v. Presley, 327 So. 3d 242, 248 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), we stated:"[T]he record establishes there are heirs of Martha Jane [Presley] owning undivided interests in the property......