Darby v. Schweiker
| Decision Date | 19 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 82-1984. |
| Citation | 555 F. Supp. 285 |
| Parties | Deborah DARBY v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Deborah Harris, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Peter F. Vaira, U.S. Atty., Joseph Masiuk, Asst. U.S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
In this action, plaintiff Deborah Darby seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the defendant, Secretary of Health and Human Services, from terminating her disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., prior to an evidentiary hearing.1 Plaintiff asserts that the present procedure is in violation of the equal protection clause because recipients of disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., receive such a hearing prior to the termination of their benefits. Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons which follow, the motion will be denied.
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., provides social security disability insurance ("social security disability") to disabled workers. This program is financed by revenues from employer-employee payroll taxes and provides monthly benefits to disabled persons who have worked sufficiently long to have insured status as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 414. The benefits are paid irrespective of financial need.
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., provides supplemental security income ("welfare disability") to disabled persons not qualifying for social security disability. This program provides a welfare system for the disabled, eligibility for which is based on financial need. A disabled person can receive disability benefits under both programs (social security and welfare) if that person's income, including any social security benefits to which they are entitled under the social security disability program, is below the welfare disability eligibility limit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100.
The social security and welfare disability programs are not entirely independent. An identical definition of disability is employed in both. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) with § 1382c(a)(3) (1970 ed., Supp.III). Moreover, a claimant fully eligible under the medical and vocational standards of both programs does not have a choice of benefits. If the social security disability payments to which the claimant is entitled under his or her earnings record exceed the welfare disability eligibility limit, the claimant automatically receives payments under the social security program only. If the claimant's social security disability payments do not exceed the welfare disability eligibility limit, the claimant will receive both social security and welfare disability benefits.
Termination of social security disability or welfare disability benefits will occur if it is determined that the claimant is no longer disabled, or has returned to work. At the termination stage, there is an important distinction between the two disability programs. Recipients of either welfare disability alone, or a combination of welfare and social security disability, who receive notice of termination are entitled to full benefits pending an evidentiary hearing on the termination decision. Recipients of social security disability alone, however, are not entitled to full benefits, after receiving notice of termination, while awaiting an evidentiary hearing. The proffered reason for this procedural difference is that eligibility for social security disability is not based on financial need, whereas eligibility for either welfare disability or welfare and social security disability together is based on financial need.
The complaint charges that while recipients of welfare disability benefits or recipients of combined welfare and social security disability benefits continue to receive benefits after notice of termination but before an evidentiary hearing, "needy" recipients of social security disability alone who receive notice of termination do not receive similar continuation of benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing. For "needy" social security disability beneficiaries it is claimed that this practice violates equal protection.
A "needy" beneficiary is one whose income, after termination of social security disability benefits, would make him or her eligible for welfare disability. In other words, without their social security disability benefits, "needy" beneficiaries are, from a financial perspective, eligible for welfare disability. Because, however, the identical definition of disability is employed in the welfare disability and social security disability programs, a "needy" beneficiary whose social security disability benefits are terminated is ineligible for welfare disability.
Plaintiff Darby is a social security disability recipient who had her social security disability benefits terminated and then reinstated after an evidentiary hearing held this past July 1982.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services has moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and plaintiff lacks standing. The Court will address the Secretary's arguments in the order presented.
Plaintiff has asserted the following three grounds for jurisdiction: mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361; federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will address each of these grounds in turn.
Plaintiff first claims that this Court may hear her action under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Specifically, plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the defendant to pay benefits pending a hearing in accordance with the equal protection obligation of the Fifth Amendment. However, as the Supreme Court stated in Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402-403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123-24, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976), "the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." The party seeking the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, and must show that the right to issuance of the writ is clear and undisputable. Kerr v. United States District Court, supra, at 403, 96 S.Ct. at 2124. See also Naporano Metal & Iron Co. v. Secretary of Labor of U.S., 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir.1976). Issuance of the writ is in large part a matter of judicial discretion. Kerr v. United States District Court, supra. See also Citibank N.A. v. Fullam, 580 F.2d 82 (3d Cir.1978).
Under these standards, the Court concludes that mandamus is not appropriate to plaintiff's case. First, it is not at all obvious that plaintiff has a clear and undisputable right to the performance that has been demanded. See Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 932-33 (3d Cir.1982) (). Second, even assuming such a right had been shown, no extraordinary circumstances compel this Court to intervene. See Kuchner v. Schweiker, C.A. 82-1839 (E.D.Pa. July 30, 1982) (). In view of the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Kerr, and in view of this Court's finding that plaintiff has an alternative ground to invoke federal jurisdiction, the Court declines to utilize mandamus as the basis upon which it will hear the claim.
Plaintiff's assertion of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is incorrect. The Supreme Court held in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975), that the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., preempts federal question jurisdiction. However, a look at that Act, also raised by plaintiff as a grounds for jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326-333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 898-902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), indicates that § 405(g) of the Act provides plaintiff with jurisdiction.
In Eldridge the plaintiff brought a due process challenge to the social security disability program's termination procedure. There, as here, the Secretary challenged the district court's jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Supreme Court had previously held in Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, that the only avenue for judicial review of the Social Security Act was § 405(g) thereof. Section 405(g) requires exhaustion of administrative remedies provided under the Act as a jurisdictional prerequisite. In Eldridge it was uncontested that the plaintiff had failed to either exhaust those remedies or obtain a waiver. Based on Salfi the Secretary argued that the plaintiff's claim was jurisdictionally barred. The Court disagreed. In bridging the gap between the Act's requirements and the plaintiff's deficient response, the Court considered the constitutional nature of plaintiff's claim. The Court concluded that because the plaintiff's constitutional challenge was entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement, and of the type that irreparable injury not recompensable through retroactive relief could be caused to plaintiff by an erroneous determination, deference to the Secretary's decision not to waive the exhaustion requirement was inappropriate. The Court thus held that § 405(g) of the Act conferred jurisdiction despite plaintiff's failure to exhaust the Act's administrative remedies.
For jurisdictional purposes the present case is in the same posture as Eldridge. Like the Eldridge plaintiff, plaintif...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rivera v. Heckler, Civ. No. 82-3331.
...it is unlikely that plaintiffs could have litigated their constitutional claims within this period. See Darby v. Schweiker, 555 F.Supp. 285, 289-90 (E.D.Pa.1983); Schisler v. Schweiker, supra, slip op. at 8-9. If restoration of benefits mooted plaintiffs' claims, defendants' actions would e......
-
Diogenes v. Malcolm
...See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2124, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); Darby v. Schweiker, 555 F.Supp. 285, 287 (E.D.Pa.1983). I am also in agreement with the magistrate's conclusion that the case should be transferred to the Northern District of New York. ......