Darby v. State

Decision Date06 November 1987
Docket NumberNo. 48S00-8601-CR-73,48S00-8601-CR-73
Citation514 N.E.2d 1049
PartiesJoy Lynn DARBY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

William D. McCarty, Anderson, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Joseph N. Stevenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Joy Lynn Darby directly appeals from a verdict of guilty, but mentally ill, of Voluntary Manslaughter, class B felony, as an included offense of the charged crime of Murder. She was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment. We address seven (7) consolidated issues, including:

1. competency to stand trial;

2. admissibility of evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of Darby's automobile;

3. sua sponte resubmission of Darby's service revolver for jury inspection;

4. allowing testimony allegedly beyond the proper scope of a rebuttal case;

5. propriety of a jury instruction concerning the lack of a requirement to find malice or premeditation;

6. propriety of a jury instruction on presumption of sanity; and

7. sentencing.

The facts show that Joy Darby killed Roger Nodine. Darby was a hospital employee and a Henry County Reserve Deputy. Nodine was a member of the Madison County Sheriff's Department. They had been dating. Darby became pregnant and had an abortion. After the abortion, Nodine started to date others. Darby was upset over the deterioration of the relationship.

On November 5, 1984, Darby went to see Nodine at about 5:20 a.m. Nodine was in his trailer with another woman. As Darby pulled into the driveway, she saw an unfamiliar car and decided to talk to Nodine away from the trailer. She parked her car and went back to Nodine's trailer. She told him she had car trouble and asked his help. They sat in her car and talked about their relationship. Darby was very upset because although she had agreed Roger could see others, she had not known he was having anyone over all night. Darby told police that at that point "she lost it" and admitted shooting Nodine. Ballistics tests confirmed Nodine was shot with Darby's service revolver.

Clifford Randolph heard loud voices and drove down his long driveway to investigate. He saw Nodine lying on the ground in front of one car. Nodine had been shot but was able to speak. Darby had her hand under her jacket as if she had been shot. Darby ran up to Randolph, said she had been shot, and asked him to call an ambulance. Randolph drove next door to use the telephone and within 30 seconds, heard another shot from the direction of the cars. Randolph called the police and gave a description of Darby. Nodine was pronounced dead at the hospital. He received six (6) gunshot wounds, any one of which could have been fatal.

Investigators located Darby at her grandmother's house. Darby gave officers her service revolver and a .25 caliber pistol, and agreed to go to the police station. Deputy Carl Sells observed Darby's automobile parked outside and noticed a reddish substance that appeared to be blood on the right side, down the right fender, and along the entire passenger side. Officer Samuel Hanna read Darby her Miranda rights and asked her about the red marks. Darby said she didn't know anything about them, but later, said the blood was from an animal she had hit a week or more earlier. Hanna told Darby he had to tow the car to find out about the blood. Darby said that would be fine. Later on, when Hanna talked to her and mentioned towing her car, she said it was done with her permission.

Deputy Dale Stegner watched the car until it was towed. Before it was towed State Trooper George Boaz lifted some of the reddish substance from the car because he was afraid it might be lost when transporting the car to the jail. No warrant had been obtained to search the car. The car was taken to the garage of the Henry County Jail. When a search warrant for the vehicle arrived that afternoon, a state trooper recovered another sample of the same substance. The substance taken from the automobile was human blood of a type consistent with the blood that had soaked Nodine's shirt.

Darby developed amnesia concerning the shooting and recalled nothing about it.

I.

Darby first asserts the court abused its discretion in finding her competent to stand trial. The test of competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether she has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her. Resneck v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 230, 235; Mato v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 945, 946.

Darby claims her amnesia precluded the possibility of her conferring with counsel concerning the immediate facts of the shooting and thus, it was impossible for her to present a realistic defense. She argues her form of amnesia normally goes away fairly rapidly. Thus, a finding of incompetency to stand trial would only have delayed her trial until she was able to aid her attorneys and would not have prejudiced the State.

The examinations of Darby made pursuant to her claim of legal insanity showed she suffered psychogenic amnesia concerning the immediate events of the shooting. No evidence of malingering was found. Clinical psychologist George Lewis and psychiatrist Gregory V. Richardson, M.D. testified concerning Darby's inability to recall events during the time span of the crime. Psychologist Robert W. Jeffries concluded Darby did not meet the criteria for insanity. Psychiatrist Marc Weinbaum, M.D. concluded Darby was sane at the time of the crime.

Loss of memory is not a basis for determining a defendant is incapable of adequately assisting in her defense. Ritchie v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1369, 1371; Reagon v. State, (1969), 253 Ind. 143, 146-47, 251 N.E.2d 829, 830-31, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042, 90 S.Ct. 1364, 25 L.Ed.2d 653. The trial court is vested with the discretion to determine if reasonable grounds exist for believing a defendant is competent to stand trial. The trial judge's decision will be disturbed only on a showing of clear abuse. Resneck, 499 N.E.2d at 235; Ritchie, 468 N.E.2d at 1371. The trial judge was presented with evidence of Darby's competency and, significantly, no evidence that she was unable to consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or lacked a rational or factual understanding of the proceedings against her. Thus, the trial court had reasonable grounds to determine Darby was competent to stand trial.

II.

Darby next claims an illegal search and seizure of her automobile required exclusion of evidence. Darby's automobile yielded blood stains, cartridge cases, tire casts, and fabric from the victim's clothing found underneath the car. Darby moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the seizure of her automobile, but the trial court denied the motion.

The record shows when the police located the car, the officers observed a reddish substance that appeared to be blood on the right front quarter of the car. Darby, upon explaining it was animal blood, agreed to have the car towed to the police station. Then, while officers awaited the towing of the car, State Trooper Boaz, afraid the substance might not survive the towing, obtained a sample. The car was eventually towed in and was not searched until a search warrant was obtained. A second sample was taken in the later search.

Darby argues her automobile was seized without a warrant, and scrapings were illegally taken from it. An automobile may be searched without a warrant under circumstances where there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that officers are entitled to seize. Perrault v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 322, 325. To justify a warrantless intrusion, a police officer need not have probable cause to make an arrest but must point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion upon an individual's right of privacy. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Jones v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1255, 1258. Under the "plain view" doctrine, if a police officer, while in a place or position where he has a right to be, inadvertently discovers items of readily apparent criminality, he may properly seize the items. Garrett v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 8, 12; Alcorn v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 491, 496-98, 265 N.E.2d 413, 416-17; See also Cochran v. State (1981), Ind.App., 429 N.E.2d 672, 674. The police knew Nodine had been killed and suspected Darby was involved. Police saw a reddish substance which appeared to be blood on Darby's car. Darby agreed to have the car towed to police headquarters. Police feared the substance might not survive the trip and thus took a sample. These facts are sufficient to warrant the search and seizure of Darby's car.

Darby maintains she did not consent to the search and seizure of her automobile, but rather acquiesced in the announced intention of the officers to take her car. However, police officers testified she consented to the seizure of the automobile and having it taken to the police station for samples. Since the evidence conflicts on this point, the jury decides which testimony is true. Earls v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 516, 519. On review, we consider this as any other question of fact and neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Earls, 489 N.E.2d at 519. Where a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, that search may not be contested as illegal at a later time. Earls, 489 N.E.2d at 519. Therefore, the evidence was not illegally obtained and was properly admitted.

III.

Darby next claims the trial judge erroneously participated in the adversarial process by sua sponte recirculating the murder weapon among the jury. Darby's service revolver was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Morris v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 18 Noviembre 2009
    ...98, 126, 126 P.3d 938, 962 (2006)("[M]emory impairment ... does not, standing alone, establish incompetency."); Darby v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (Ind.1987)("Loss of memory is not a basis for determining a defendant is incapable of adequately assisting in her defense."); Commonwealth v.......
  • People v. Clay, 1-03-2690.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 30 Septiembre 2005
    ...accord United States v. Hearst, 412 F.Supp. 858 (D.C.Cal.1975); State v. Johnson, 112 Ariz. 17, 536 P.2d 1035 (1975); Darby v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 1987); State v. Emerson, 375 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1985); Annotation, Amnesia as Affecting Capacity to Commit Crime or Stand Trial, 46 A.L.R......
  • Willoughby v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 10 Abril 1990
    ...that the jury erred in not returning a verdict for a more serious crime. Kirkley v. State (1988), Ind., 527 N.E.2d 1116; Darby v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1049; Hamman v. State (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 276; Hammons v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1250, reh'g denied, 496 N.E.2d 1284;......
  • Malone v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 29 Enero 1996
    ...added). These instructions, read as a whole, informed the jury that guilt must rest upon a "knowing" state of mind. See Darby v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1049, 1055. Furthermore, the instructions sufficiently stated the specific elements of the offense of burglary, including the inten......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT