Dargie v. Dargie

• Decision Date: 30 July 2001
• Citation: 778 A.2d 353,2001 ME 127
• Parties: Deborah DARGIE v. Roger DARGIE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

778 A.2d 353

2001 ME 127

Deborah DARGIE v.Roger DARGIE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 16, 2001.

Decided: July 30, 2001.

Coleman G. Coyne Jr., Esq., (orally), Murphy and Coyne, Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Ronald P. Lebel, Esq., (orally), James E. Belleau, Esq., Skelton, Taintor & Abbott, P.A., Auburn, for defendant.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER and CALKINS, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1]Roger Dargie appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court(Androscoggin County, Studstrup, J.), affirming the judgment of the District Court(Lewiston, Beliveau, J.), granting a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.We affirm the judgment.

I.

[¶ 2] Roger argues that the District Court erred when it failed to make further findings of fact pursuant to his request.A party may, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), request a court to "amend its findings or make additional findings."The trial court"`has a duty to make findings sufficient to inform the parties of the reasoning underlying its conclusions and to provide for effective appellate review.'"Sewall v. Saritvanich,1999 ME 46, ¶ 9, 726 A.2d 224, 225(quotingPeters v. Peters,1997 ME 134, ¶ 10, 697 A.2d 1254, 1258)."If the judgment does not set forth adequate findings on the contested issues and the court does not make the requested findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52, intelligent appellate review is impossible and the denial of a motion for further findings of fact constitutes an abuse of discretion."Id.(citingPeters,1997 ME 134, ¶ 11, 697 A.2d at 1258).

[¶ 3]The District Court's Judgment is thirty-five (35) pages long.Of those thirty-five pages, nineteen (19) are devoted to findings of fact.Roger correctly asserts that he is entitled to findings of fact sufficient to allow for appellate review.What Roger seeks, however, is not further findings of fact, but the rationale used by the District Court to reach the conclusions that it reached; that he is not entitled to.The District Court made sufficient findings of fact such that intelligent appellate review is not precluded in this case.

II.

[¶ 4] Roger argues that the trial court erred in its division of the marital assets.When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review the decision of the District Court directly.Kapler v. Kapler,2000 ME 131, ¶ 6, 755 A.2d 502, 506(citation omitted)."We review the division of marital property for an abuse of discretion."Long v. Long,1997 ME 171, ¶ 19, 697 A.2d 1317, 1324(citingArey v. Arey,651 A.2d 351, 353(Me.1994)).The District Court's division of marital property will be vacated only if there is a "violation of some positive rule of law or if the division results in a `plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.'"Doucette v. Washburn,2001 ME 38, ¶ 23, 766 A.2d 578, 586(quotingPederson v. Pederson,644 A.2d 1045, 1046(Me.1994)(citations omitted)).

[¶ 5]The District Court's authority with respect to the distribution of marital property is governed by 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(1998).¹A divorce court is not required to divide marital property equally, but rather, "is required to make the division fair and just considering all of the circumstances of the parties."Doucette,2001 ME 38, ¶ 24,766 A.2d at 586(citations omitted).

[¶ 6] During the course of the marriage, the parties accumulated numerous articles of personal property and acquired title to one parcel of real estate.Roger challenges the court's distribution of four items of marital property: (1) the $150,000 in life insurance proceeds received by Deborah on the death of her father, (2) Roger's interest in Safe Approach, Inc., a company in which he is a 50% owner, (3)the parties' Taywood Road residential property, and (4) a Century cabin cruiser and boat-slip.The District Court awarded Deborah both the insurance proceeds and the Taywood Road real estate.The court awarded Roger the boat and boat-slip, and his interest in Safe Approach, Inc., subject to a payment of $56,000 to Deborah.

A.The proceeds of the life insurance policy.

[¶ 7] Deborah was the beneficiary of a term life insurance policy on her father's life.Roger contests the court's award of the life insurance proceeds to Deborah.At the time of the hearing, Deborah was employed by Professional Graphics, a business owned by her now-deceased father.Evidence was introduced showing that Deborah's father increased Deborah's weekly compensation to aid her in the payment of the term life insurance premium.

[¶ 8] In justifying its award of the full $150,000 to Deborah, the court succinctly stated that

[t]here is ... no question in this court's mind that the proceeds of this insurance policy although marital are hereby awarded to [Deborah].She is entitled to all the proceeds because the facts support this position.The father intended to benefit his daughter by providing her with the insurance policy and placed it in her name.The father's estate plan took this into consideration.The plaintiff will not receive a special bequest upon the death of her mother.However, her siblings are entitled to a $100,000 bequest.It is obvious to the court without further comment that the "intention" of the plaintiff's father and his company was to provide for plaintiff separate from the other children because of her involvement over the years with Professional Graphics, Inc.[,] her father's business.

[¶ 9]The District Court determined that the insurance proceeds were marital property, and then, based on the unique and special facts of this case, properly awarded the proceeds to Deborah.We cannot say that awarding Deborah the life insurance proceeds "results in a `plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.'"Doucette,2001 ME 38, ¶ 23,766 A.2d at 586(quotingPederson,644 A.2d at 1046).

B.The parties' home.

[¶ 10]The parties jointly own a home located on the Taywood Road in Auburn, which they stipulated is valued at $118,000.There is a first mortgage on the home, held by Androscoggin Savings Bank, with a balance of approximately $51,000.The court awarded Deborah the home, where she lives with the parties' daughter, subject to a mortgage debt for which Deborah is responsible.

[¶ 11] Awarding Deborah the Taywood Road home does not "result[] in a `plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.'"Id.

C.Safe Approach, Inc., and Roger's boat.

[¶ 12]The court awarded to Roger his interest in Safe Approach, Inc.In determining the value of the company, the District Court heard testimony from two expert witnesses.Based on that testimony, the court concluded that the fair market value of Roger's 50% interest in Safe Approach, Inc. was $112,000.The District Court, in determining Safe Approach's market value, noted that its valuation, "is... conservative considering all of the ... options...."We will not substitute our judgment for it on that issue.SeeKapler,2000 ME 131, ¶ 9, 755 A.2d at 507.

[¶ 13]The court determined that Roger's interest in Safe Approach was marital property.It awarded that interest to Roger and ordered him to pay one-half of the value attributed to that interest in the company to Deborah.The court also assigned Roger the responsibility for repayment of the debt secured by the second mortgage on the Taywood Road real estate.Roger borrowed this money in 1994 and, subsequently, loaned it to Safe Approach.Safe Approach has been amortizing the debt.

[¶ 14]The parties requested that the court award Roger the boat and boat-slip.The court subsequently awarded Roger the parties' Century cabin cruiser and the boat-slip at the Jordan Bay Marina.

[¶ 15] When making its property award, the District Court noted that

the court is convinced that an equal division of marital assets would not be equitable or just under the circumstance of this case.There is no question that the plaintiff's insurance proceeds should not be divided equally or fractionally but should be awarded entirely to the plaintiff.Also the court has considered in detail the value of the defendant's interest in Safe Approach, Inc[.] and considers its conclusion of value as the more conservative considering all of the other options ....

[¶ 16]We again emphasize the general rule that a divorce court is not required to make an equal distribution of marital property; rather, it is required to make the division "fair and just considering all of the circumstances of the parties."Doucette,2001 ME 38, ¶ 24, 766 A.2d at 586(citation omitted).It is clear to us that the District Court properly considered all of the circumstances of the parties.Therefore, we cannot conclude that the court exceeded the bounds of its discretion when dividing the marital assets and debts.SeeLong,1997 ME 171, ¶ 19, 697 A.2d at 1324(citation omitted).

III.

[¶ 17] Roger also contends that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that Deborah's income is $27,000 per year, (2) finding that Roger's income is $65,000, and (3) calculating spousal and child support.

A.The parties' income.

[¶ 18]The court's determination of the parties' income is a finding of fact that we review pursuant to the clearly erroneous standard.Ramsdell v. Ramsdell,1997 ME 14, ¶ 5, 688 A.2d 918, 921(citingQuin v. Quinn,641 A.2d 180, 181(Me.1994)).Deborah's testimony, and her M.R. Civ. P. 80(C) financial statement, shows that, at the time of the hearing, she was earning $500 per week plus fringe benefits.In light of the less-than-exact evidence, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its determination of Deborah's income.

[¶ 19] Roger also asserts that the court erred in not imputing additional income to Deborah for (1) income that she may earn as a result of Roger's payment to her for her marital interest in Safe Approach, Inc., and (2) her receipt of...