Dario Sanchez v. United States

Citation341 F.2d 379
Decision Date10 February 1965
Docket Number6340,No. 6376,6379.,6376
PartiesRuben DARIO SANCHEZ, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent, Appellee. Isaac ROBINSON, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent, Appellee. Harold A. RUSSELL, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

No. 6376:

Donald E. Paulson, of Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, Boston, Mass., by appointment of the Court, on brief for appellant.

Francisco A. Gil, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Gilberto Gierbolini, Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief for appellee.

No. 6340:

Anthony A. Giannini, Providence. R. I., for appellant.

William J. Gearon, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Raymond J. Pettine, U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.

No. 6379:

Donald E. Paulson, Boston, Mass., by appointment of the Court, with whom Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.

William J. Koen, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.

Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, and SWEENEY and WYZANSKI, District Judges.

ALDRICH, Chief Judge.

These appeals from denials of three petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, coming from three districts, seek to raise one ultimate question as to the sufficiency of the indictments, and may be disposed of in one opinion. We note, without more, that in two cases there are subsidiary questions which might well be determinative against the individual petitioners, but we prefer to reach the ultimate issue.1 This is whether an indictment charging unlawful transfer of a narcotic or drug without a written order, 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) or § 4742(a),2 is fatally defective if it fails to give the name of the transferee.

Petitioners rely upon Lauer v. United States, 7 Cir., 1963, 320 F.2d 187. In that case, arising under section 4705 (a), the court held that although the identity of the transferee was "not an element of the offense," his name was nonetheless an essential part of the indictment because it was "central" to the prosecution. We gather from the opinion that the court had two considerations in mind: that the name of the transferee was needed in order to prepare a defense, and to show, in case of a subsequent prosecution, the identity of the offense. Except for Lauer we know of no case which requires an indictment to supply with full particularity all that might be needed with respect to either of these matters. The test of an indictment is whether it sufficiently identifies the offense, not whether it might have been more complete. United States v. Debrow, 1953, 346 U.S. 374, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 L.Ed. 92. Alternatively, from the standpoint of double jeopardy, resort may be made to parol evidence. See Bartell v. United States, 1913, 227 U.S. 427, 433, 33 S.Ct. 383, 57 L.Ed. 583.

In Russell v. United States, 1962, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, on which the court in Lauer placed substantial reliance, the Supreme Court pointed out, at p. 766, at p. 1048 of 82 S.Ct. that the indictment was so "cryptic" that it would have permitted a "conviction to rest on one point and the affirmance * * * on another." It also noted, at pp. 768-769, 82 S.Ct. 1038, that it could have permitted proof of an act that was not criminal at all. Neither situation prevails in the cases at bar. Each indictment stated all the elements of the offense and gave the date, the city where the transaction occurred, and either the weight, in case of heroin, or the number of cigarettes, in case of marihuana. We align ourselves with those circuits which have declined to follow United States v. Lauer. United States v. Dickerson, 6 Cir., 1964, 337 F.2d 343; Adams v. United States, 8 Cir., 1964, 333 F.2d 766, cert. den. 1/18/6...

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7 cases
  • United States v. Aloi
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • December 21, 1977
    ...the persons to be suborned were unnamed and the times and places not particularized. Id. at 446-48, 28 S.Ct. 163; see Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d 379 (1st Cir. 1975); Llamas v. United States, 226 F.Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. United States v. Ga......
  • People v. Adams
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 29, 1970
    ...also, Aggers v. United States (8th cir. 1966), 366 F.2d 744; United States v. Jackson (3rd cir. 1965), 344 F.2d 158; Sanchez v. United States (1st cir. 1965), 341 F.2d 379, cert. den. 381 U.S. 940, 85 S.Ct. 1775, 14 L.Ed.2d The question remaining here is the effect of the indictment's incor......
  • Adkins v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1973
    ...also, Aggers v. United States (8th cir. 1966), 366 F.2d 744; United States v. Jackson (3rd cir. 1965), 344 F.2d 158; Sanchez v. United States (1st cir. 1965), 341 F.2d 379, cert. den. 381 U.S. 940, 85 S.Ct. 1775, 14 L.Ed.2d In Aggers v. United States, (8th cir.) 366 F.2d 744, the court said......
  • United States v. Rizzo
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • October 4, 1973
    ...identity of the purchaser was not an element of the offense. The First Circuit has come to the same conclusion. Dario Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d 379 (1st Cir. 1965) 7 "The section defining the offense, 29 U.S. C. § 530, is not a general proscription of assaults, but a particularized......
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