Darling v. Gosselin, 980226

Citation589 N.W.2d 192
Decision Date27 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 980226,980226
PartiesMargaret DARLING, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Donny GOSSELIN, Defendant and Appellee. Civil
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Michael L. Gjesdahl (submitted on brief), of Gjesdahl & Deitz, PLLP, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.

MARING, Justice.

I

¶1 Margaret Darling appeals the district court's order directing the judicial referee to amend her order. The district court concluded post-judgment interest cannot be properly docketed by the clerk of the district court. We reverse and remand.

¶2 On December 28, 1992, Margaret Darling received a judgment against Donny Gosselin establishing the paternal relationship between Gosselin and the parties' child. The judgment ordered Gosselin to pay child support of $350 per month, one-half of the child's health insurance premiums, and one-half of any uncovered medical expenses.

¶3 From the beginning Gosselin failed to stay current on the child support payments and his share of the health insurance premiums. On February 11, 1998, Darling moved the district court to reduce Gosselin's total support arrearage to a single, docketed, lump-sum judgment, including accrued interest.

¶4 Prior to a hearing on the motion, the parties stipulated, through April 1998, Gosselin was in arrears of $3,555 in child support payments, $1,212.49 for accrued interest on the child support payments, and $1,788.45 for his share of the child's health insurance premiums. At the hearing on April 28, 1998, the parties requested the judicial referee enter an order recommending the clerk of the district court to issue two separate docketed money judgments against Gosselin: one judgment for the child support arrears and accrued interest totaling $4,767.49 ($3,555 + $1,212.49) through April 1998, and a second judgment of $1,788.45 for Gosselin's share of the insurance premiums. The judicial referee adopted the parties' stipulation, and her order of May 11, 1998, stated in relevant part:

6. The Office of the Clerk of District Court shall issue two separate docketable money Judgments, both against Donny Gosselin and in favor of Margaret Darling. One Judgment shall be in the amount of $4,767.49, and shall represent the child support arrearage and interest set for[th] in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. The second money Judgment shall be in the amount of $1,788.45, and shall represent the health insurance premiums described in paragraph 4 above.

¶5 On May 20, 1998, the district court issued an order directing the referee to amend her order, concluding as a matter of law "interest is not properly docketable by the Clerk of District Court. The remedy would be Post Judgment interest." Darling timely appealed the district court's order.

II

¶6 When the district court reviews a judicial referee's findings of fact on the record, it does so under a clearly erroneous standard. Steffes v. Steffes, 1997 ND 49, p 8, 560 N.W.2d 888. Similarly, we review the district court's reversal of any factual finding by a judicial referee under the clearly erroneous standard. Throndset v. Hawkenson, 532 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D.1995). A judicial referee's conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable by the district court. Id. Similarly, a district court's conclusions of law are not subject to the clearly erroneous rule applicable to findings of fact, and are thus fully reviewable upon appeal. Gabriel v. Gabriel, 519 N.W.2d 293, 294 (N.D.1994).

¶7 In Baranyk v. McDowell, 442 N.W.2d 423, 425-26 (N.D.1989), this Court interpreted N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05 and held a due and unpaid child support payment becomes a judgment as a matter of law. See id. (concluding that with N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05 the "legislature intended past-due child support obligations to be treated as judgments under state law [,]" which have the "full force and effect of a judgment of the district court"). The only distinction between a judgment under N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05 and one entered by a district court is that due and unpaid child support obligations cannot be docketed until a judgment order is obtained from the district court and filed with the clerk of court under N.D.R.Civ.P. 58. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 426; see also Fuson v. Schaible, 494 N.W.2d 593, 595 (N.D.1992). Specifically, due and unpaid child support obligations are entered in the judgment docket only "upon filing by the judgment creditor ... of a written request accompanied by a verified statement of arrearage or certified copy of the payment records of the clerk of district court ... and an affidavit of identification of the judgment debtor[.]" N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05(1)(...

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7 cases
  • Norberg v. Norberg
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 29, 2014
    ...[n]ot subject to retroactive modification.” A due and unpaid child support obligation becomes a judgment as a matter of law. See Darling v. Gosselin, 1999 ND 8, ¶ 7, 589 N.W.2d 192. A vested child support obligation cannot be retroactively modified. Marchus v. Marchus, 2006 ND 81, ¶ 8, 712 ......
  • In re Estate of Conley
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 23, 2008
    ...controlled the distribution of his estate. II [¶ 15] The legal conclusions of a district court are fully reviewable upon appeal. Darling v. Gosselin, 1999 ND 8, ¶ 6, 589 N.W.2d 192. The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, which is also fully reviewable on appea......
  • In re B.F.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 6, 2009
    ...findings of the district court under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. Benson, at 77. See also Darling v. Gosselin, 1999 ND 8, ¶ 6, 589 N.W.2d 192; Throndset v. Hawkenson, 532 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D.1995). A judicial referee's conclusions of law are fully reviewable i......
  • Jordet v. Jordet
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 5, 2012
    ...become a judgment as a matter of law which can be docketed as a judgment for enforcement and execution against the obligor. See Darling v. Gosselin, 1999 ND 8, ¶ 7, 589 N.W.2d 192;Mahoney v. Mahoney, 538 N.W.2d 189, 196 (N.D.1995). Generally, a person who has been denied one remedy by a cou......
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