Darnell v. Dayton Hudson Corp.

Decision Date11 December 1992
Docket NumberIP 87-1180-C.
Citation808 F. Supp. 1370
PartiesGeorge A. DARNELL, Plaintiff, v. DAYTON HUDSON CORPORATION and Target Stores, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Raymond J. Haftsten, Jr., Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Susan B. Tabler, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, IN, Robert L. Grossman, Grossman & Millard, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM ENTRY ON ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TINDER, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 1987, George A. Darnell filed suit against Defendants,1 alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Darnell's complaint is based on constructive discharge, and essentially alleges that Target made his working conditions intolerable because of his age, and thereby forced him to retire involuntarily.

On March 29, 1989, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Darnell could not prove that he was constructively discharged, could not prove a prima facie case, and could not prove that Defendants' proffered business justifications for Darnell's treatment were pretextual. After examining the parties' briefs and supporting documents, the court denied Defendants' motion, and the case proceeded toward trial.

On November 16, 1992, the court sua sponte reconsidered Target's motion for summary judgment. The court heard both parties' arguments on whether Darnell was constructively discharged from his employment and if so, whether age was a determining factor in creating intolerable working conditions for him. In an order entered concurrently with this entry, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Target.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, George Darnell, is a citizen of the United States and resides in Hendricks County, Indiana. Darnell is in the "protected" class because he was over age 39 when he quit his employment. Defendant Target Stores (Target) operates retail stores in Indiana and throughout the United States.

Darnell became employed by L.S. Ayres, on September 17, 1946. Between 1970 and 1980, Darnell worked in the Ayr-Way division of L.S. Ayres as a manager of several of its Ayr-Way stores in the Indianapolis, Indiana area. In approximately 1976, Stevens Brothers purchased the Ayr-Way division from L.S. Ayres.

In June 1980, Ayr-Way/Stevens demoted Darnell from store manager to assistant store manager. As a result of this demotion, Darnell was transferred to Store T-129,2 and received a pay cut.

In approximately October 1980, Dayton Hudson Corporation and Target stores acquired the Ayr-Way stores from Ayr-Way/Stevens. Upon such acquisition, Darnell retained the position he held with Ayr-Way and remained in Store T-129. His title was changed to "merchandise manager."

In June 1982, Darnell requested and received a transfer to Store T-102 as operations manager. Darnell remained at Store T-102 until it closed in October 1984 due to poor sales. When Store T-102 was closing, Darnell mentioned to district manager Richard Larson that he was considering retiring. Larson told Darnell that Target needed him, and asked him to stay. Darnell agreed to stay, and was assigned to Store T-116.

Shortly after assigning Darnell to Store T-116, Larson asked Darnell to work at Store T-112 as a temporary operations manager through the Christmas season. Darnell agreed to do so. Darnell was particularly well suited for this assignment because he had managed Store T-112 for three years under Ayr-Way.

After the Christmas season, Darnell returned briefly to Store T-116. Shortly thereafter, Larson asked Darnell to fill in at Store T-110 to help remedy problems there. In asking Darnell to take this assignment, Larson called Darnell his "relief pitcher" or "ace reliever," which Darnell considered a compliment. Darnell agreed to take the assignment at Store T-110. Prior to this assignment, Darnell requested a calculation of his retirement benefits under Target's pension program.

While assigned to Store T-110, Darnell worked under store manager, Brenda Hickman. Darnell believed that Hickman did not like him. According to Darnell, Hickman demeaned him and gave him degrading work assignments in order to force him to quit. Darnell alleges generally that Hickman made his working conditions intolerable by requiring him to work long hours, requiring him to perform menial tasks, and reprimanding him in the presence of his subordinates.

In late summer 1985, Darnell met with Hickman to discuss his vacation schedule. During that conversation, Hickman allegedly asked Darnell if he had considered retiring. In response, Darnell said that asking such a question was illegal,3 and that he did not want to retire.

While working at Store T-110, Darnell complained to merchandise manager, Herb Vanderploeg (age 43), that Hickman assigned him long hours and menial tasks and treated him in a demeaning manner. Vanderploeg responded that Hickman treated him exactly the same way.

Until August 1985, Darnell never reported or complained of his working conditions to any Target manager with authority over Hickman, such as Richard Larson. Interestingly, Darnell claimed that he and Larson got along "beautifully," and that he spoke frequently with Larson.

In August 1985, Darnell met with Nancy Lagaard, regional personnel manager, and told her that Hickman did not like him and was trying to force him to retire. Darnell considered this discussion to be a "loose conversation" with Lagaard, and not a complaint. Lagaard encouraged Darnell not to retire, but indicated that if he chose to retire, he might be able to work as a part-time manager, filling in for managers who were off work.

On October 15, 1985, Darnell met with Larson at Store T-110. Darnell told Larson that he could not tolerate working for Hickman. Never before had Darnell voiced dissatisfaction with his working conditions to Larson. Larson remarked that he knew Darnell was unhappy working at Store T-110. He indicated that he was working on transferring Darnell, but that he could not transfer him immediately.

During this discussion, Darnell inquired about retiring and working part-time as a fill-in manager. Larson stated that Darnell would receive minimum wage for any post-retirement employment with Target. At the conclusion of his conversation with Larson, Darnell announced that he would retire.

Prior to this conversation with Larson, Darnell characterized his relationship with Larson as "always back slapping, doing a great job, shaking hands, buying you coffee. I thought everything was beautiful." Darnell's last day on the job was November 15, 1985.

On February 26, 1986, Darnell filed an age-discrimination charge with the EEOC, alleging that he had been forced to retire because of his age, in violation of the ADEA. On November 4, 1987, the EEOC issued its determination, finding no ADEA violation.

On November 15, 1987, Darnell filed his complaint, essentially alleging that he received disparate treatment and was constructively discharged from Target because his age.

Darnell bases his constructive discharge claim on allegations that Target had a "program" to force him and other "old" Ayr-Way managers to retire, and that Larson was the force behind such program. Darnell alleges that the existence of such a program is evidenced by the following circumstances:

a. Target denied him certain job responsibilities, such as responsibility for payroll and budget;
b. Hickman required him to work oppressive hours;
c. Hickman treated him in a demeaning manner;
d. Hickman gave him menial, janitorial duties;
e. Prior to his assignment at Store T-110, he was transferred numerous times;
f. He was unfairly passed over for participation in Target's JET4 program for job advancement.

Each of these allegations is discussed below under the section entitled "Darnell's Burden of Proof."

III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

"Summary judgment is designed to head off a trial if the opposing party does not have a reasonable prospect of prevailing before a reasonable jury — that is, a jury that will base its decision on facts and the law, rather than on sympathy or antipathy or private notions of justice." Karazanos v. Navistar Internat'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir.1991).

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows by pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 1990).

Thus, to survive summary judgment, the nonmovant must present affirmative evidence, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or speculation about what might be adduced later at trial. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir.1988); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 465 n. 8 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066, 107 S.Ct. 954, 93 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1987). Furthermore, a factual dispute must be outcome determinative to preclude summary judgment. Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.1988).

The plaintiff must "present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Further, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must consider the substantive law of employment discrimination and the applicable burden of proof. Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 424 (7th Cir.1989). A plaintiff alleging a violation under the ADEA must prove that his employer took some adverse employment action against him based on his age and that the employer would not have taken such action but for his age. Id. (citation omitted).

In determining whether a genuine issue of material...

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1 cases
  • Darnell v. Target Stores
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • March 29, 1994
    ...Darnell capitulated on their affidavit statements." Darnell now asks us to reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. 808 F.Supp. 1370 (1992). The standard of review we apply when reviewing a district court's summary judgment decision is de novo. Witham v. Whiting Corp., 975 F.......

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