Darnell v. Jones
| Decision Date | 29 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-12-1065-M |
| Parties | RONNY DARNELL, Plaintiff, v. JUSTIN JONES et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Plaintiff Ronny Darnell, also known as Phoebe Halliwell, a state prisoner appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, as well as a state-law negligence claim.1 Chief United States District Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange has referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Defendants Justin Jones, Don Sutmiller,2 Janet Dowling, Katryna Frech, James Smash, Michael Addison, Buddy Honaker, James Keithley, and Joel McCurdy (collectively, "Defendants") have moved for summary judgment on or dismissal ofPlaintiff's constitutional claims, to which Plaintiff has responded and Defendants have filed a reply. See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. ( Doc. No. 96); Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.'s MSJ Resp.," Doc. No. 101); Defs.' Reply (Doc. No. 102). Defendants additionally have filed a corrected Special Report ("S.R.," Doc. No. 83) in accordance with Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims and a supporting declaration, and Defendants have responded. See Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 118); Pl.'s Decl. (Doc. No. 117); Defs.' Resp. (Doc. No. 120). Plaintiff additionally has filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, to which Defendants have responded and Plaintiff has replied. See Doc. Nos. 107, 108, 109, 110. Finally, Plaintiff has submitted two requests to amend her Amended Complaint, to which Defendants have responded, as well as a motion asking the Court to provide certain records to Plaintiff. See Doc. Nos. 97, 100, 112, 114, 116.
Having considered the arguments, pleadings, and, where appropriate, evidentiary materials submitted by the parties, the undersigned recommends: (1) that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Jones, Sutmiller, Addison, Honaker, Keithley, and McCurdy in their official capacities seeking money damages be dismissed; (2) that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiff's remaining constitutional claims; (3) that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied; and (4) that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim. The undersigned further recommends that (4) Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction be denied; and (5) Plaintiff's remainingmotions be denied, with the exception of Plaintiff's request to substitute current Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("ODOC") Director Robert Patton as the successor party on official-capacity claims asserted against former ODOC Director Justin Jones.
The claims asserted by Plaintiff arise out of events occurring at James Crabtree Correctional Center ("JCCC") and Joseph Harp Correctional Center ("JHCC"), the two ODOC prison facilities in which Plaintiff has been incarcerated since August 2008. See Am. Compl. at 9-14; Defs.' MSJ Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 96-2) at 1 ().3 Plaintiff alleges that she is a male-to-female transgender person with Gender Identity Disorder (or "GID"). See Am. Compl. at 9. Plaintiff asserts that she has been denied proper medical care, including hormone replacement, and other accommodations that are necessary for treatment of her serious medical needs associated with GID. See id. Plaintiff further asserts that she has been harassed by JHCC and JCCC staff members and has not been permitted to live in a cell with another transgender offender. See id. at 9-10.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' deliberate indifference with respect to her GID-related medical and mental health needs constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 10-13.4 Plaintiff additionally claims thatshe suffered a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights in connection with the denial of GID-related treatment and accommodations. See id. at 12, 13.5 Finally, Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim under Oklahoma law. See id. at 6, 7, 8, 13. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, to include access to a transgender specialist, the "Real Life Experience" of living life as a woman, and sex reassignment surgery. See id. at 14.6
Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The Court must grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and the inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005). While the Court construes a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, such a litigant nevertheless is held to the same rules of procedure as are binding on other litigants. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant need not convince the Court that it will prevail at trial, but it must cite sufficient evidence admissible at trial to allow a reasonable jury to find in the nonmovant's favor—i.e., to show that there is a question of material fact that must be resolved by the jury. See Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact through:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).
A defendant seeking summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense must show that the undisputed material facts establish all of the elements of the defense. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997) (). If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to cite evidentiary material that shows there is a genuine factual dispute as to one or more elements of the affirmative defense, absent which summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant. Id.
With respect to cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must evaluate each motion on its own merits, "constru[ing] all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." See Pirkheim v. First Unum Life Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000). Although summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts, the Court is permitted "to assume that no evidence needs to be considered other than that filed by the parties." Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court analyzes each cross-motion for summary judgment separately; "the denial of one does not require the grant of another." Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants styled their dispositive motion as one for dismissal or alternatively for summary judgment, and they attached and cited various materials outside of the Amended Complaint and public record to both their motion and their reply. See Defs.' MSJ (Doc. No. 96) (citing Special Report and additional exhibits throughout); Defs.' Reply (Doc. No. 102) (same). In turn, Plaintiff's response in opposition refers to Defendants' motion as an alternative request for summary judgment, cites outsideevidence, and is itself accompanied by an item of documentary evidence. See Pl.'s MSJ Resp. (Doc. No. 101). Further, Plaintiff herself expressly moved for summary judgment and supplied additional documentary evidence to that end. See Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. & Exs. 1, 2 (Doc. Nos. 118, 118-1, 118-2); Pl.'s Decl. (Doc. No. 117).
It is evident that Plaintiff was on notice to present and did present all material pertinent to Defendants' dispositive motion and that Plaintiff desired the Court to consider materials outside of the pleadings in ruling on both parties' dispositive motions. Accordingly, the undersigned has treated the motion as one for summary judgment with respect to Defendants' assertion of the affirmative defense of lack of administrative exhaustion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56(c)(1); Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 2000).
Citing the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Defendants Jones, Sutmiller, Addison, Honaker, Keithley, and McCurdy7 move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims to the extent they seek money damages from Defendants in their official capacities. See Defs.' MSJ at 29-31; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6). The Court therefore is...
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