Darnell v. Starks, Civ. No. 66-133.
| Decision Date | 06 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 66-133. |
| Citation | 258 F. Supp. 31 |
| Parties | Elizabeth DARNELL, Plaintiff, v. Allan Joseph STARKS and Tommy J. Gilliam, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
James B. Griswold, Green, Richardson, Griswold & Murphy, Portland, Or., for plaintiff.
Frederic D. Canning, Hershiser, Canning, Pullen, Mitchell & Rawls, Portland, Or., for defendant, Starks.
Victor E. Harr, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for defendant, Gilliam.
Defendant Starks seeks a remand to the state court on the ground there is no diversity of citizenship on the cause stated against him, as required by the Diversity Statute.1
Plaintiff was riding in a vehicle which left the highway as a result of a collision between vehicles driven by defendants Starks and Gilliam. Gilliam was operating a Government vehicle within the scope and course of his employment. Originally, the action was filed in the Clackamas County Circuit Court. It was removed to this Court on the petition of the United States. The issue here is on Starks' motion to remand.
Plaintiff and the United States oppose the motion and cite 28 U.S.C. § 2679, providing that in an action such as this, the sole remedy is against the United States and that the individual employee is immune from liability. The action is viewed as one in tort against the United States.
The opposition to the motion to remand is sound. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c),2 was enacted to meet the problem, here presented. Van Dorn v. Huffman, 221 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.Ill.1963), is directly in point and should be followed. Lipinski v. Bartko, 237 F.Supp. 688 (W.D.Penn. 1965), teaches the same doctrine, but is not precisely in point.
Taylor v. Starks and the United States, Civil No. 64-332, in which Judge Solomon dismissed the case to one defendant, was an original proceeding in this Court. Consequently, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) was not applicable and played no part in the dismissal.
The motion to remand should be denied.
It is so ordered.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
"(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction."
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Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.
...federal employees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra § 3727, at 693. See, e. g., Darnell v. Starks, 258 F.Supp. 31 (D.Ore.1966). Applications of other removal provisions are similarly consistent with our interpretation of § 1441(d). 6 See Farina v. M......
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Jacobs v. United States
...were not "necessary" parties. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra. The modern cases are in accord with joinder. Darnell v. Starks, 258 F.Supp. 31 (D.Ore.1966) (court had jurisdiction over nongovernment-driver claim); Van Dorn v. Huffman, 221 F.Supp. 285 (E. D.Ill.1963); see Davis v. ......
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Jones v. Adams, CASE No. 1:12-cv-01432-LJO-MJS (PC)
...court mayexercise supplemental jurisdiction over closely related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Darnell v. Starks, 258 F.Supp. 31, 32 at n.2 (D.C.Or. 1966). Defendants properly and timely removed the action from state court within 30 days of receiving notice of the filing of thi......
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Andelman v. Getz
...of duplicate trials. Van Dorn v. Huffman, supra, at 288. The Van Dorn case was cited with approval and followed in Darnell v. Starks, 258 F.Supp. 31 (D.C., Or.1966). Both the Van Dorn and Darnell courts premised their holdings upon subparagraph (c) of the 28 U.S.C. § 1441 removal statute, w......