Darryl D., In re

• Decision Date: 01 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 37,37
• Citation: 520 A.2d 712,308 Md. 475
• Parties: In re DARRYL D. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 475

308 Md. 475

520 A.2d 712

In re DARRYL D.

No. 37, Sept. Term, 1986.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 2, 1987.

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Assistant Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Ronald M. Levitan, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ., and MARVIN H. SMITH, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

MARVIN H. SMITH, Judge, Specially Assigned.

We shall here hold that a juvenile court judge abused his discretion when, pursuant to the recommendation of a master, he dismissed petitions which alleged that Darryl D. was a delinquent child. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in In Re Darryl D., 66 Md.App. 434, 504 A.2d 676 (1986), although we shall not adopt the reasoning of that court.

An adjudicatory hearing before a Baltimore City juvenile master was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 11, 1985. That hearing, however, never took place. The facts may be gleaned from the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations of the master to the juvenile court judge. With minor editing, her statement is as follows:

"On that morning, all state and defense witnesses, as well as respondent's counsel (Public Defender Panel), were ready for trial at 9:30 a.m. My staff and I were also ready. The Assistant State's Attorney did not appear or let anyone (including the Court, my staff, respondent's counsel, state or defense witnesses) know where he was or when he would be coming to Court. ¹

"After our other scheduled matters were resolved, we all were still waiting for word from the Assistant State's Attorney. (We had searched for him and finally found him in another Court. I left him the message to contact my Court immediately upon concluding that matter.) He neither came to my Court nor called or contacted any of us.

"At about 11:15 a.m., I went back to the other Court, found him still there on another matter, and left a message that I was dismissing Darryl D.'s case if it did not start by 11:30 a.m. ² I went back to my Courtroom and advised all state and defense witnesses, family, respondent's counsel, and my staff, of this intention, and inquired as to whether said action would result in a 'travesty of justice'. The police officer on the case advised me it certainly would not, but was a good idea. The victim and parents and state's witnesses relayed the same impression. No one was opposed to the dismissal.

"At 11:30 a.m., I was prepared to gather everyone in Court to dismiss the case, but another Assistant State's Attorney came down to my Courtroom and took them out in the hall. At 11:45 a.m., she called the case (with all those witnesses) for a full trial, at which point, upon motion of defense counsel, I dismissed the case for lack of timely prosecution."

When the master announced that she was "dismissing this case at this time upon motion by defense counsel," an assistant State's attorney was present. She said to the master:

"We are now prepared to proceed. I can proceed even though I am missing one witness who will be here shortly. She is on call and I called her before I came downstairs after I got a message ... [inaudible] I came down immediately after I got the message."

The State took exceptions to the master's report to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Its exceptions were denied after hearing.

An appeal followed to the Court of Special Appeals. Judge Garrity said for that court:

"We hold that the circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, may not under our juvenile code or under our rules governing juvenile proceedings dismiss summarily a valid petition alleging delinquency, over the State's Attorney's objection and prior to an adjudicatory hearing, upon the ground that there has been a lack of prosecution not amounting to the denial of a constitutional right to a speedy trial or the violation of a mandatory period of limitation." 66 Md.App. at 440, 504 A.2d at 678.

We granted the juvenile's petition for a writ of certiorari in order that we might address the important public question here involved.

At the outset it is well to bear in mind that although certain of the constitutional rights incident to criminal prosecutions apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, in this State the proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature. In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 523, 255 A.2d 419, 422 (1969), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 926, 91 S.Ct. 2257, 29 L.Ed.2d 706 (1971). We took occasion in Matter of Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 96-97, 321 A.2d 516, 522-23, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 21, 42 L.Ed.2d 35 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 2399, 44 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975), to trace the equity background of our juvenile courts and indicated that in Baltimore City and in all of the counties of the State, other than Montgomery, juvenile matters were handled by equity courts, which was not always the case.

Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol., 1986 Cum.Supp.) § 3-824(a)(1), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article makes plain that "[a]n adjudication of a child pursuant to [our juvenile law] is not a criminal conviction for any purpose and does not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by a criminal conviction." The Code provisions and rules applicable to juvenile proceedings, while expressly permitting the State's attorney to dismiss a juvenile petition alleging delinquency (Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol., 1986 Cum.Supp.) § 3-812(d), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article), do not address whether and under what circumstances a circuit court may do so. ³ Although Title 2 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure authorizes dismissal of a civil action for lack of prosecution in some circumstances and juvenile proceedings are civil, Maryland Rule 1-101 states specifically that Title 2 is not applicable to juvenile causes.

Because we believe that the judge in this instance abused his discretion, we prefer to leave for another day the question of the inherent power of a court to dismiss a juvenile cause in circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, to assume, without deciding, that the court was vested with such power, and to proceed to an examination of the issue of an abuse of discretion. ⁴

There is no Maryland case directly on point. Nonetheless, Maryland's enacted law and decisional law, as well as cases decided in other jurisdictions, are instructive. Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) § 3-802, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, sets forth the special purposes of the juvenile proceedings subtitle. The overriding concerns include providing

"for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child's best interests and the protection of the public interest "

and removing "from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior." Id. § 3-802(a)(1), (a)(2) (emphasis added). Section 3-802 further provides, "This subtitle shall be liberally construed to effectuate these purposes." Id. § 3-802(b).

Decisions by this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have placed great emphasis upon the special goals of juvenile proceedings. In In re Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401, 430 A.2d 76 (1981), we held that a juvenile court judge erred in dismissing a delinquency proceeding because a juvenile master failed to conduct a disposition hearing within 30 days of the adjudicatory hearing as required by the rules. There was no suggestion of fault on the part of the State. We acknowledged that the 30-day provision was mandatory. We said, however, that it did not follow that dismissal was the appropriate sanction "[I]ts mandatory nature does not indicate the sanction to be applied nor does the sanction necessarily inure to the benefit of the juvenile. It must not be forgotten that one of the purposes of the juvenile statute as set forth in § 3-802(a)(2) is '[t]o remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior....' Therefore, § 3-820(b) relative to disposition provides, 'The overriding consideration in making a disposition is a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child consistent with the public interest.' " 290 Md. at 405-06, 430 A.2d at 79.

In determining that dismissal was improper, we suggested that other sanctions might be available, sanctions which would not thwart the policies of the juvenile statute:

"We do not have before us in this proceeding the question of what, if any, sanction other than dismissal of the proceeding might be applied. There was at least a suggestion that the juvenile judge might confer with the masters pointing out the mandatory nature of the rule. Conceivably there could be yet other remedies. The State as the representative of the general public has an interest in seeing that this juvenile is rehabilitated so that he becomes a useful citizen and in no way a menace to society." 290 Md. at 407, 430 A.2d at 80.

In Dewayne H., we quoted from Matter of Davis, 17 Md.App. 98, 299 A.2d 856 (1973), where Chief Judge Orth said for the Court of Special Appeals:

"The raison d'etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that a child does not commit a crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not a criminal. He is not to be punished but afforded supervision and treatment to be made aware of what is right and what is wrong so as to be amenable to the criminal laws." 17 Md.App. at 104, 299 A.2d at 860.

Cases in which the Court of Special Appeals has held that dismissal is an improper sanction,...