Dart v. Dart, Docket No. 110361, Calendar No. 8.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 110361, Calendar No. 8. |
| Parties | Katina Estelle DART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Charles DART, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Carson, Fischer, P.L.C. (by Robert M. Carson and Michelle C. Didorosi), Birmingham, Butzel, Long, P.C. (by Frederick G. Buesser and Brett D. Pynnonen), Bingham Farms, and Arthur R. Miller, Cambridge, MA, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Dickinson, Wright, P.L.L.C. (by Hanley M. Gurwin, Robert W. Powell, and Amy A. Stawski), Bloomfield Hills, for the defendant-appellee.
We granted leave to determine whether the parties' English divorce judgment is entitled to full faith and credit under the principle of comity, and whether res judicata bars the action.1
We hold that principles of comity and res judicata mandate that the Darts' foreign divorce judgment be enforced. The English court decided the property distribution issue on the merits, and no evidence was presented showing that plaintiff Katina Dart was denied due process. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1980 and were residents of Okemos, Michigan until 1993, when they moved to England. The couple owned a large house in Okemos, situated on thirty-nine acres of land, valued at $1,500,000. The parties had two children. The defendant is the son of the founder of Dart Container Corporation, one of the largest family-controlled businesses in the United States. The defendant's earned income for the years 1992, 1993, and 1994, was $313,009, $563,917, and $281,548, respectively. Between 1990 and 1993, the family's annual expenditures ranged from $300,000 to $600,000. The move to England made possible a September 1993 transfer of several hundred million dollars to the defendant from family trusts.
In 1974, before the marriage, the defendant's father established a trust for the benefit of defendant and his brother. For the transfer to occur, defendant had to renounce his United States citizenship and relocate outside the United States. The plaintiff refused to renounce her United States citizenship, and she also refused to renounce the citizenship of the children. She claims that, despite the relocation to London, England, she has always considered herself a resident and domiciliary of Okemos, Michigan.
In 1993, the parties jointly purchased a house near London for £2.75 million, and began renovations that took over a year to complete and cost another £3.5 million. They enrolled the children in the American School of London. Between 1993 and 1995, plaintiff asserts that she and the children made regular trips to Michigan for holidays, medical care, vacations, haircuts and other activities. Also, she maintained her Michigan driver's license and voted regularly in Michigan elections.
In September 1993, defendant received his distribution from the family trust which had a present, net value of £274 million (approximately $500,000,000). In the fall of 1994, plaintiff announced that she wanted a divorce. She revealed that what she had previously described to the defendant as a "one night stand" in 1989 had actually been a regular, adulterous affair with a man in Greece. The plaintiff asserted that she and defendant agreed to postpone the divorce action until she and the children returned to Michigan after the 1994-95 school year.
Despite the putative agreement, defendant filed for divorce in England on February 3, 1995. Plaintiff was served with process at the parties' home the following day. She contacted her American attorneys, and they filed a similar suit on her behalf in Michigan in the Ingham Circuit Court four days later. The parties remained in England until a consent order was entered in the English court on June 9, 1995, allowing plaintiff to return with the children to Michigan. On March 21, 1995, in the Ingham Circuit Court, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (6) on the bases of lack of jurisdiction and pendency of a prior proceeding. Following a hearing, the circuit court determined that jurisdiction was proper in Michigan and assumed jurisdiction over the children and the divorce proceeding. The court reserved for future decision the issue of jurisdiction over the parties' property.
Plaintiff also brought a jurisdictional challenge. The English court ruled on June 13, 1995, that jurisdiction was proper in England. Defendant then asked the Ingham Circuit Court to defer jurisdiction to the English court on the basis of forum non conveniens. After a hearing on August 7, 1995, the circuit court denied the motion and assumed jurisdiction over the parties' property.
Both suits proceeded. On October 27, 1995, a "decree absolute" of divorce was entered in the English court. This was followed by a seven-day trial in March 1996 in which plaintiff filed an answer claiming the "full range of financial ancillary relief available to a wife under the Matrimonial Causes Act [of] 1973."
Both sides presented expert witnesses who testified regarding the parties' assets and plaintiff's reasonable needs. On March 21, 1996, the English court issued a lengthy opinion in which it determined defendant's total net worth to be "about £400 million."
The court ruled that the reasonable needs or requirements of plaintiff, in light of her predivorce lifestyle and habits and the available assets, entitled her to £300,000 ($450,000) a year for life. However, the court held that, "In seeking to achieve justice [the court is] not limited to the reasonable annual expenditure of the wife... or to such other matters ... described as constituting her `reasonable requirements.'"
The court awarded the plaintiff a lump sum of £9 million ($13,500,000), the amount it felt necessary to achieve an equitable distribution. The plaintiff was also awarded the house in Okemos, Michigan, and its contents, that the parties agreed were worth approximately $1.5 million. She was awarded four paintings and her jewelry. The court also set child support in the amount of $95,400 a year for both children.
Defendant was awarded four automobiles and the balance of the marital estate. The English court expressly found that plaintiff was not entitled to a substantial share of defendant's family wealth. It was not a product of the marriage and had not been generated by the efforts of either party.
On March 29, 1996, defendant moved to stay or dismiss the Ingham Circuit Court proceedings, arguing that the English judgment was entitled to enforcement under the principle of comity and under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, M.C.L. § 691.1151 et seq.; M.S.A. § 27.955(1) et seq. At the hearing on April 8, 1996, he urged, also, that the present action was barred by res judicata.
The circuit court judge denied the motion, finding that the English judgment was not entitled to recognition under the UFMJRA or the principle of comity. He reasoned that the English system of law was repugnant to the public policy of Michigan, and the English decision violated plaintiff's "right to have a fair and equitable distribution of property...."
On appeal, in a per curium opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the "entire judgment, including the property division as well as the child support and lump-sum awards," should be enforced under the UFMJRA. 224 Mich.App. 146, 150, 568 N.W.2d 353 (1997).
With regard to whether the English law was repugnant to our public policy, the Court of Appeals explained:
[I]t cannot reasonably be argued that plaintiff was denied due process because she was represented by counsel, given an opportunity to be heard, and presented evidence on her own behalf. Although the circuit court opined that the English judge was not impartial, a review of the lengthy opinion of the English judge fails to support a finding of bias. Further, had the issue of fault been raised, it would not have benefited plaintiff, who admitted that her continuing infidelity was the cause of the marital breakdown. Consequently, no evidence that plaintiff was prejudiced by an unfair tribunal or proceeding is present. [224 Mich.App. at 151-152, 568 N.W.2d 353.]
[T]he factors that judges take into consideration in property division in English divorce cases under § 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 are virtually identical to the factors identified by our Supreme Court in Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 159-160, 485 N.W.2d 893 (1992).... While the Ingham circuit judge might have awarded plaintiff more of the marital estate than did the English judge, that fact alone does not render the English judgment repugnant to the public policy of the state where the children are adequately provided for and the plaintiff has the means to maintain a lifestyle similar to the one she enjoyed throughout the greater part of the marriage. [Id. at 152, 485 N.W.2d 893.]
The Court of Appeals also concluded that comity mandated that the English judgment be respected. Plaintiff had a fair hearing on the merits at which she was present, represented by counsel, and actively participated. Thus, she was accorded due process.
Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that res judicata barred the case from being relitigated because the English court had considered the property, alimony, and child support claims and issued a final order. The English court did not consider child custody or visitation. These issues were within the purview of the Ingham Circuit Court under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, M.C.L. § 600.653; M.S.A. § 27A.653.
When plaintiff appealed, we granted leave on October 12, 1998. 459 Mich. 878, 586 N.W.2d 744.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that comity dictated that the judgment should be enforced because the plaintiff was accorded due process. Since the English judgment adjudicated the property issue, the plaintiff is...
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