Darty v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth.

• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT
• Citation: Darty v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth., 345 So.3d 1214 (Miss. App. 2022)
• Decision Date: 09 August 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-WC-00986-COA
• Parties: Robert DARTY Jr., Appellant v. GULFPORT-BILOXI REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and Mississippi Municipal Workers’ Compensation Group, Appellees

345 So.3d 1214

Robert DARTY Jr., Appellant

v.GULFPORT-BILOXI REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and Mississippi Municipal Workers’ Compensation Group, Appellees

NO. 2021-WC-00986-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

August 9, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BENJAMIN U. BOWDEN, Gulfport

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: CHRISTOPHER HOWELL MURRAY, KRISTI ROGERS BROWN, Gulfport

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Robert Darty Jr. appeals from a decision issued by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) affirming an administrative judge's order denying Darty's motion to reinstate his claim because it was time-barred. The administrative judge (AJ) found that any additional claim for benefits was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-53 (Rev. 2011). Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Darty's workers’ compensation claim in this case related to an admittedly compensable work injury that he incurred on June 2, 2010. Darty's employer, Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority, and its insurance carrier, Mississippi Municipal Workers’ Compensation Group (the Employer/Carrier), paid workers’ compensation disability benefits for about three years and provided medical services and supplies, including back surgery by Dr. Eric Graham in March 2011.

¶3. Darty hired an attorney in December 2012, and on June 3, 2013, Darty's attorney filed a petition to controvert. In August 2014, the Employer/Carrier filed a B-18 form providing that benefits were suspended February 4, 2014, because Darty had been released at maximum medical improvement on May 10, 2012. The record reflects that in 2014 and 2015, the parties filed prehearing statements, medical reports, and motions. The workers’ compensation file also contained correspondence "indicating that the parties were working to reach a compromise and settlement agreement and communicating that fact to Administrative Judge Homer Best."¹

¶4. On January 24, 2017, a case status inquiry was issued pursuant to Procedural Rule 7 of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission² and mailed to Darty's attorney. On March 2, 2017, Administrative Judge Best ordered that Darty's claim be dismissed due to Darty's failure to respond to the January 24, 2017 status inquiry. The March 2, 2017 dismissal order provided that it would become final unless a written request for review was filed within twenty days pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-47 (Rev. 2011), and the order further provided that the dismissal was "the rejection of a claim" that triggers the one-year statute of limitations set forth under section 71-3-53.

¶5. No pleadings or other documents were filed until October 2020 (over three years later). On October 26, 2020, Darty's new attorney filed a motion to reinstate Darty's claim. The Employer/Carrier responded, asserting that the motion should be denied because the Commission was without jurisdiction to reinstate the claim by operation of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 71-3-53, which barred Darty's claim as of March 2018.

¶6. After telephonic hearings and upon consideration of the workers’ compensation file, Darty's motion to reinstate his claim, and the Employer/Carrier's response, Administrative Judge Linda Thompson denied Darty's motion and entered her "Order Denying Motion to Reinstate" on April 29, 2021. Darty appealed the AJ's order to the Commission, and on July 27, 2021, the Commission issued its order affirming the AJ's April 29, 2021 order.

¶7. Darty appeals, asserting that the "beneficent purposes of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act" (the Act) require reversal and remand of his case for further proceedings before the Commission.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. "The standard of review in workers’ compensation cases ‘is limited to a determination of whether the Commission erred as a matter of law or made factual findings contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.’ " Tillman v. KLLM Transp ., 334 So. 3d 1224, 1226 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Clements v. Welling Truck Serv. Inc ., 739 So. 2d 476, 478 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ). "We will only reverse the Commission's rulings where findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, matters of law are clearly erroneous, or the decision was arbitrary and capricious." Garcia v. Super Sagless Corp ., 975 So. 2d 267, 269 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Studaway , 930 So. 2d 481, 484 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) ).

DISCUSSION

¶9. Darty asserts that the AJ's and Commission's orders are contrary to the beneficial purposes of the Act and therefore should be reversed. Darty "admits that there was no appeal or attempt to reinstate his claim from March 2, 2017 until October 22, 2020." He then points out, however, that "it is equally clear and admitted that [the Employer/Carrier] did not file a Form B-31 [(notice of final payment)]." Following these observations, Darty explains that "he had no idea that his claim had been dismissed until approximately September 2020, when he learned of same through his new counsel." Under these circumstances, Darty asserts that this Court must reverse the AJ's and Commission's orders "consistent with the beneficent purposes of the ... Act."³

¶10. We observe that the "beneficent purposes" principles on which Darty relies were "legislatively abolished for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2012," Jones v. Miss. Baptist Health Sys. Inc ., 294 So. 3d 76, 82 (¶29) (Miss. 2020),⁴ when the Act was amended, effective July 1, 2012, to specifically provide that "notwithstanding any common law or case law to the contrary, this chapter shall not be presumed to favor one party over another and shall not be liberally construed in order to fulfill any beneficent purposes." Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-1(1) (Supp. 2012); see 2012 Miss. Laws, ch. 522, § 1 (S.B. 2576). Because Darty sustained his work-related injury on June 2, 2010 , however, we do not reject Darty's assertions on this basis. Rather, we reject Darty's contentions because the Act, the Commission's own rules, and the applicable caselaw support the Commission's order affirming the AJ's April 29, 2021 order, which found that Darty's claim was time-barred under section 71-3-53 and that, therefore, the Commission no longer had jurisdiction over his claim. Finding no error, we affirm that decision.

¶11. The AJ's March 2, 2017 dismissal order expressly informed Darty and his attorney that "[Darty's] claim is dismissed for failure to respond to a status request," and then warned Darty and his attorney that "[t]his order will become final unless Claimant or any other party files a written request for review of this order within twenty ... days per ... [section] 71-3-47 ." The March 2, 2017 dismissal order further warned Darty and his attorney that "[a] final order of dismissal for failure to respond to a status request is ‘the rejection of a claim’ sufficient to trigger the one-year statute of limitations set forth in ... [s]ection 71-3-53."

¶12. Section 71-3-53, which was referenced in the AJ's March 2, 2017 dismissal order, provides for the Commission's "continuing jurisdiction" as follows:

Upon its own initiative or upon the application of any party in interest on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the commission may, at any time prior to one (1 ) year after date of the last payment of compensation , whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one (1 ) year after the rejection of a claim , review a compensation case, issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation.

(Emphasis added). Thus, a claim may be reviewed within "one ... year after date of the last payment of compensation" or "one ... year after the rejection of a claim." Id. ; accord Tillman , 334 So. 3d at 1227 (¶11) ; Garcia , 975 So. 2d at 269 (¶9).

¶13. The "last date of compensation" event triggers the running of the one-year limitations period and occurs when the employer/carrier files a Form B-31 notice of final payment, see Tillman , 334 So. 3d at 1227 (¶11) ; Garcia , 975 So. 2d at 269 (¶9), pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-37(7) (Rev. 2011).⁵ The Employer/Carrier in this case did not file a Form B-31, and the AJ specifically made this finding in her April 29, 2021 order denying Darty's motion to reinstate his claim. For this reason, the AJ based her order denying Darty's motion to reinstate his claim on the "rejection of a claim" trigger set forth in section 71-3-53.

¶14. Citing Garcia , 975 So. 2d at 269-70 (¶9), the AJ found that the March 2, 2017 dismissal order, which was based upon Darty's failure to respond to the Procedural Rule 7 status inquiry, constituted the "rejection of a claim" under section 71-3-53 when it became final on March 22, 2017, thus triggering the one-year limitations period under that statute. The AJ maintained its ruling regardless of whether the Employer/Carrier filed a Form B-31. Because Darty did not file his motion to reinstate his claim until October 2020 (over two years after March 22, 2018), his claim was time-barred, and the Commission lacked jurisdiction over his claim. We find no error in the AJ's analysis or conclusion.

¶15. This Court has held on several occasions that an AJ's dismissal order constitutes "the rejection of a claim" where a claimant has failed to meet a procedural deadline, as in this case. In Tillman , Garcia , and Edwards , for example, this Court found that the AJ's dismissal order based upon the claimant's failure to file a prehearing statement was to be treated as a rejection of a claim under section 71-3-53 and marked the beginning of the limitations period. Tillman , 334 So. 3d at 1227 (¶¶10-12) ; Garcia , 975 So. 2d at 269-70 (¶...