Das v. Das

• Decision Date: 28 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 2319,2319
• Parties: Vincent DAS v. Anuradha DAS.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

754 A.2d 441

133 Md. App. 1

Vincent DAS v. Anuradha DAS.

No. 2319, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 28, 2000.

Reginald W. Bours, III and David R. Bach, Rockville, for appellant.

Joseph C. Paradiso (Paradiso, Dack, Taub & Oler, P.C., Bethesda and John S. Weaver, Gaithersburg, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SALMON, EYLER, and THIEME, JJ.

THIEME, Judge.

The genesis of this appeal arises from the strategic decision of Vincent Das ("Husband") not to attack the suit brought against him by Anuradha Das ("Wife") frontally but on the flank. His strategy is unsuccessful.

The issues that Husband presents to this Court arise from the denial of his motion to vacate a default judgment of absolute divorce entered against him and in favor of his Wife in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Husband, who now sojourns in India after spiriting away one of the couple's minor children, filed a subsequent motion to strike this order and requested a hearing. The court addressed his motion by advising counsel that a hearing would be scheduled "on condition that Mr. Das and the minor child, Radha, are present." Husband appeals and asks:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Husband's motion to vacate the order of default?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or deny Husband due process by not granting a continuance of the divorce hearing?

3. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in granting Wife an absolute divorce?

We answer "No" to these questions and explain.

Facts

The parties were married on August 13, 1978, in New Dehli, India. Two children were born of the marriage: Radha, on October 7, 1983, and Jaya, on October 3, 1985.

The parties separated in January 1998, following entry of a domestic violence protective order granted to Wife by the District Court of Montgomery County. The order granted Wife custody of the children, who are minors. Because the order was set to expire on January 10, 1999, the parties entered into an "Interim Agreement," reached during voluntary mediation and designed to preserve the status quo for custody and living arrangements, on December 14, 1998. The agreement provided that Husband would not "resume residence in the family home" for three months from December 10, 1998, and would "deliver the children's passports to David S. Goldberg, mediator, for safekeeping."

On January 19, 1999, Wife filed an Emergency Complaint for Custody, which alleged that Husband had undermined her custody of and relationship with Radha in violation of the Interim Agreement and that he had "abused the process to gain possession of his daughter."¹ The court denied this complaint on January 20, after it conferred with counsel. At this time, the parties agreed through counsel that Wife would retain custody of the children.

Notwithstanding the Interim Agreement and subsequent oral custody agreement, Husband fled the country, taking Radha with him, on or about April 16, and went to Japan, following personal service of the Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce on March 8.² Wife neither knew of nor consented to Husband's plans to remove the child from Maryland. In response, Wife filed a second Emergency Complaint for Custody. The Emergency Complaint stated that "Defendant [fled] to Japan with the minor child on or about April 16, 1999, where he and the child remain at this time." Husband did not oppose this complaint, because, he alleges, neither he nor his attorney were served. The court granted Wife legal and physical custody of the children by an order issued April 30.

Cheryl P. Vural entered an appearance as counsel on Husband's behalf on March 25 and moved to strike Wife's divorce complaint. Neither Husband nor his lawyer, however, appeared for the scheduling conference on April 28, despite the court's notice to husband mailed on March 19. The court denied Husband's Motion to Strike on June 1. Before the period for filing an Answer began, Vural moved to strike her own appearance on May 12, and the court granted her motion without a hearing on June 3. The court immediately mailed Husband Notice to Employ New Counsel.

Husband's residential address before he left the country—and the address used by the court for the divorce proceedings—was 5104 White Flint Drive, Kensington, Maryland 20985. Wife alleges in her opposition to the motion on appeal that Husband continued to pay rent for this apartment home at the time of the post-judgment motions. He used this address on the mediation agreement executed on December 4, 1998, and his own attorney certified in her Motion to Strike Appearance that this address was Husband's "last known mailing address," but she also explained that her "various efforts" to contact her client had been unsuccessful and she had not heard from him since April 13.

Husband was thus without representation at the June 30 hearing on pendente lite child support, and Wife testified there that Husband was "to the best of [her] knowledge" in India.³ The master filed a partial transcript as a report and recommendation, which was sent to Husband at the Kensington address. Moreover, because Husband did not file an Answer to Wife's Amended Complaint, Wife requested an Order of Default on June 21, which was entered on June 30.⁴ The Clerk mailed Husband a Notice of Default Order at the Kensington address.

Concurrent to the custody and divorce actions, a child in need of assistance (CINA) action for Radha was wending its way through the District Court. On May 25, Nancy Karkowsky, Radha's court-appointed attorney, filed a Praecipe notifying that court and the circuit court that, after first being taken to Japan, Radha was now "staying with the father and the family of the father's cousin ... in Chandigarh, India." On June 2, Karkowsky notified the courts in a Second Praecipe of what she believed to be Radha's exact address in New Delhi, India.⁵ Information in both notices as to the whereabouts of Husband and Radha came from Husband's father. Copies of these notices were sent to counsel of record for both Husband, i.e., Vural, and Wife.

When the divorce trial began on August 11, Gary Segal, Husband's attorney for employment matters, attended the hearing. He explained that he was "here for Dr. Das," but because he received little notice he was ill-prepared to enter an appearance and undertake full representation. Segal advised the court that, if he were to enter an appearance, he would petition the court for a continuance; however, at the present time, he "[did] not feel that [he] would be capable of properly defending Dr. Das in this matter." The court excused Segal, noting that any request for continuance would be denied, which "is pretty typical in our process today. Under the best of circumstances, cases are not continued...."

At trial, Wife testified that she had been subject to repeated acts of physical and mental cruelty during the marriage. Her brother corroborated this testimony. Husband's father, Badri Das, who had been given power of attorney for Husband's affairs in the United States, sought to give testimony and present documents to the court. The court allowed him to testify as to Husband's and Radha's current locale, which was different from the address Karkowsky provided.⁶ The elder Das could not, however, recall their exact address. The court did not allow the father to speak otherwise on behalf of his son,⁷ and the testimony of Wife and her brother went untested by cross-examination.

On August 19, the court granted Wife an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruelty and excessively vicious conduct, legal and residential custody of the parties' minor children, child support, use and possession of the family home and family-use personalty, a monetary award, and attorney's fees.

Husband quickly retained new counsel; however, on October 19, the court denied his Motion to Vacate Order of Default, Stay Entry of Judgment, Permit Filing of Responsive Pleadings, Grant a New Trial and/or Reconsider Award of Custody, and Certain Other Relief. Husband then, on October 26, filed a pleading styled Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Strike Order Dated October 19, 1999, and Set Hearing in Open Court, to which Wife filed opposition. By letter dated November 16, 1999, the court addressed this motion by advising counsel: "I do not believe that there is any requirement that I schedule a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Order.... However, I will agree to schedule a hearing on the condition that Mr. Das and the minor child, Radha, are present." Husband noted a timely appeal on November 24.

Discussion

I Standard of Review

The question of whether this appeal is ripe for our review has troubled us, and we flirted with dismissing it entirely. Husband appeals a judgment that appears not to be final, yet the trial court's response to his most recent motion and ministerial failure to deny this motion leave the parties in a deadlock.

Husband's Motion to Vacate Order of Default was filed eleven days after the Judgment of Absolute Divorce was docketed. Husband's motion was thus a request to revise a final judgment, filed pursuant to the limitations of Maryland Rule 2-535,⁸ rather than a motion to alter or amend a non-final judgment filed under the more generous standard of Maryland Rule 2-534.⁹ The instant appeal, at least as framed by the parties, is from the trial court's denial of that motion.

The problem lies with Husband's Unopposed [sic] Motion to Strike Order Dated October 19, 1999, and Set Hearing in Open Court, filed but a single day after the docketing of the court's order denying Husband's Motion to Vacate Order of Default. Under Rule 2-534, Husband's diligence in filing this motion within 10 days of judgment stayed the entry of the court's order and this appeal. Unnamed Atty. v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n, 303 Md. 473, 486, 494 A.2d 940 (1985) ("[W]hen a motion to alter or amend an otherwise final judgment is filed...