Dasler v. Knapp

Decision Date10 September 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action 2:21-cv-135
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Vermont
PartiesTimothy Dasler, Plaintiff, v. Jennifer Knapp, formerly known as Jennifer Dasler, Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART

(Docs. 1, 3)

Kevin J. Doyle United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Timothy Dasler, a New Hampshire resident representing himself, seeks to file a civil Complaint alleging claims under state and federal law against Defendant Jennifer Knapp his ex-wife. Dasler filed an Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, or without prepaying fees or costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, supported by the required financial Affidavit. (Docs. 1, 1-2.) Because Plaintiff's Application satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), Plaintiff's request to proceed without paying the filing fee (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. For the reasons set forth below, however, Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 3) is DISMISSED IN PART for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Analysis
I. Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff's claims arise from a series of alleged events related to a child custody dispute with Defendant and associated Vermont state-court proceedings. Plaintiff generally seeks damages based on the allegedly unlawful conduct of Defendant, as well as redress for alleged deficiencies in the law and procedure that apply in Vermont family court proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that the court has both federal-question and diversity jurisdiction as well as supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

He alleges nine claims against Defendant: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2) malicious prosecution and abuse of process; (3) intrusion upon seclusion; (4) stalking, false imprisonment, and kidnapping; (5) assault; (6) interference with contract and interference with visitation; (7) fraud; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (9) slander and libel. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgments “to prevent continued abuse through the Vermont Court system.” (Doc. 3 at 19, ¶ 124.) He specifically seeks declarations as to the constitutionality of a Vermont domestic relations law, as well as the procedures that apply in the state's family court. In addition to declaratory judgments, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages and [r]elief from enforcement of [a] fraudulently obtained custody order.” (Id. at 20.)

Plaintiff's factual allegations are discussed in connection with the analysis of each of his claims, as that is how they appear in the proposed Complaint.

II. Standard of Review

Under the in forma pauperis statute, the court conducts an initial screening of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction; a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the claimant is entitled to relief; and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(1)-(3). The court is required to read a self-represented plaintiff's complaint liberally and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (noting district courts must afford “special solicitude” to a self-represented litigant, including reading the complaint liberally and construing it to raise the strongest arguments it suggests); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint” and decide whether the complaint states a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). All complaints must contain “sufficient factual matter[] . . . to state a claim” for relief. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While “special solicitude” is required, self-represented litigants nevertheless must satisfy the plausibility standard set forth in Iqbal. See Harris, 818 F.3d at 57; Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). [T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Nevertheless, the court must dismiss the complaint if it determines that the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff alleges this Court has both federal-question and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a)(1). He asserts diversity jurisdiction applies because he and Defendant are from different states and the amount in controversy is over $75, 000.[1] Where a federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction considering state-law claims, the court applies state law to the substantive issues. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

A. Plaintiff Has Not Stated Plausible Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

1. Section 1983 Claim Based upon the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments

In Claim 1 of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant deprived him of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. His § 1983 claim appears to be premised on Defendant obtaining “a temporary ex[]parte order stripping [him] of parental rights and consequently forcing him to pay her child support in the equivalent of a pre[]trial attachment.” (Doc. 3 at 6, ¶ 1.) Although Plaintiff suggests that family court process and procedure itself ultimately worked to his detriment, he alleges that it was Defendant's allegedly improper use of those family court remedies that resulted in the deprivation of his rights. (See Id. ¶ 5 (“As a result of [Defendant's] usurpation of court authority it was neither able to preserve [Plaintiff's] rights, nor could it require her to meet any burden of proof (based upon state court precedent).”); ¶ 6 (“Because of [Defendant's] pre[]trial ex[] parte action the burden shifted to [Plaintiff] to prove it was harmful for her to retain custody rather than requiring that she justify the restriction of his rights. Through her fraudulent accusations and ex[] parte action she was able to deprive [Plaintiff] of an opportunity to have a fair hearing.”)). Allegedly as a consequence of Defendant's improper use of state-court remedies, on May 15, 2017, Defendant obtained a temporary ex parte order that denied him parental rights.

Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide a statutory remedy for violations of the Constitution and other federal laws. The statute authorizes suit against a “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege (1) ‘that some person has deprived him of a federal right,' and (2) ‘that the person who has deprived [the plaintiff] of that right acted under color of state . . . law.' Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). Section 1983 does not reach the conduct of private individuals. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (noting that “the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful” (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, “state action may be found when there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant was acting under color of state law when she allegedly acted in a manner that deprived him of his constitutional rights. A person's mere participation in a family court proceeding, or otherwise availing herself of remedies in that forum, does not make a person a “willful participant in joint activity with the State for § 1983 purposes. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant allegedly made “fraudulent accusations” in the custody proceedings are insufficient to render Defendant a “state actor.” See, e.g., Davis v. Whillheim, 17 Civ. 5793 (KPF), 2019 WL 935214, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that social worker and her supervisor were not state actors when they submitted allegedly defective reports to Family Court during child visitation proceedings).

Additionally Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged substantive violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant. The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” absent “probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A ‘search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider...

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