Dassig v. Honeywell Int'l
| Decision Date | 05 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-485-SMY |
| Parties | SHANNON DASSIG, individually and as executrix of STEPHEN KRUEGER, deceased, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Stephen Krueger died from metastatic adenocarcinoma of the colon in 2019. His daughter, Shannon Dassig, individually and as executrix on behalf of Krueger, brings this wrongful death and property damage action against Defendant Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”), alleging Krueger's cancer was caused by his exposure to excessive levels of radiative and other toxic materials emanating from Honeywell's facility in Metropolis, Illinois. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of the Price Anderson Act (“PAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. (Count I) and alleges state law claims of negligence/gross negligence (Count II), ultra-hazardous activity/strict liability (Count III), and wrongful death (Count IV) (Doc. 1).
Now pending before the Court is Honeywell's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 14). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and are deemed true for the purposes of this motion. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008):
Honeywell and its predecessor operated a nuclear plant on the outskirts of Metropolis, Illinois from 1959 until late 2017 (the “Plant”). The Plant processed uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride (“UF6”). The UF6 generated by the Plant was highly toxic radioactive gas that other facilities acquired for purposes of enriching or purifying into fuel for nuclear reactors or bombs. Honeywell's source term (and therefore dose) reporting was vastly underestimated due to the faulty and inadequate air monitoring system inside the Plant, its historic underreporting of emissions, violations of permits setting allowable emission limits from licensed stacks and vents, and worker accounts of regular leaks and spills. Even after operations ceased, the Plant continues to leak radioactive and hazardous contamination offsite into the Metropolis community through air and groundwater.
Decedent Stephen Krueger lived within 0.6 miles of the Plant. He did not know he was being exposed continuously for decades to air laden with radioactive particles and toxic chemicals blown out of the Plant into Krueger's home, neighborhood and community. Scientific analysis reveals levels of radiation in dust and soil samples from Krueger's property that far exceed the federal annual dose limits established in 10 CFR 20 for protection of the public. Soil sampling also reveals substantial levels of contamination to the surrounding environment far in excess of what Honeywell reported to federal regulators.
The federal system of notice pleading requires only that a plaintiff provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). However, the allegations must be “more than labels and conclusions.” Pugh v Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008). This requirement is satisfied if the Complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Honeywell argues that Plaintiff's state-law negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims are inconsistent with the PAA and must be dismissed. Honeywell further asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim under the PAA.
The Price Anderson Act was enacted in furtherance of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq. to encourage private investment in nuclear energy by ensuring that public funds are available to compensate affected parties in the event of a nuclear incident and to limit liability for such nuclear incidents. 42 U.S.C. § 2012; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64-65 (1978). At the time of its enactment, the Atomic Energy Act provided for the licensing of privately constructed and operated nuclear power plants that would be supervised by the Atomic Energy Commission (now the NRC). Id. at 63. The PAA subsequently required such licensed facilities to purchase private liability insurance in exchange for indemnification by the federal government for damages more than the amount covered by private insurance. Id. 64-5; 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a - c). Through various amendments, the funds used to compensate victims were broadened to include indemnification from a fund subsidized by nuclear reactor owners. Id.
In the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 (“Amendments Act”), Congress gave federal courts original jurisdiction over “any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.” 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2); In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 856-857 (3rd Cir. 1991). The Amendments Act further provides that “the substantive rules for decision in such action shall be derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with [the Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). Thus, while there appears to be only one recognized federal claim for relief, several state law theories can be used to support the claim as long as they are not deemed inconsistent with the Act itself. See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1106 (3d. Cir.1995); O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1099 (7th Cir. 1994). Generally, courts have held that claims of intentional torts, fraud, and negligence are not inconsistent with the PAA. See Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co, 401 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (D.N.M. 2005) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges a PAA cause of action with sub-parts based on state law theories of negligence, strict liability, and wrongful death.
Negligence/Gross Negligence[1]
To state a claim for negligence under Illinois law, a plaintiff must establish “the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach.” Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d 753, 763-64 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45 (2011)). Negligence claims are not inconsistent with the PAA as long as the standard of care is provided by the federal regulations. O'Connor, 13 F.3d at 1105.
In this case, Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for negligence under the PAA utilizing the federal regulations as the standard of care. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of the applicable federal regulations in effect at the time of Honeywell's operations and that Honeywell's violations proximately caused Plaintiff injuries:
Defendant contributed to the Decedent's overexposure to radiation through actions which contributed to airborne particulate matter containing radionuclides to contaminate the Decedent's property in excess of 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301, et seq. (and its predecessors) by: (1) failing to properly contain enormous clouds of dust and excessive airborne particulate matter containing radioactive isotopes of uranium, thorium, radium, plutonium and their daughter products, which now contaminate Decedent's property; and (2) failing to properly design, manage, repair, and operate the Plant.
Plaintiff has alleged sufficiently stated a negligence action under the Act. Accordingly, Honeywell's motion to dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff's negligence claim.
In Illinois, “[a] defendant who performs an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or chattels of a plaintiff resulting from the activity, although the defendant has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.” In re Chicago Flood Litig., 176 Ill.2d 179, 208, 680 N.E.2d 265, 279 (1997), holding modified by Andrews v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 2019 IL 124283, 160 N.E.3d 895; See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519, at 34 (1977).
Allowing a claim for ultrahazardous/strict liability would be inconsistent with the PAA and would create the possibility that Honeywell would meet the federal standard of care mandated, but still be held strict liable under Illinois state law. See Wilcox, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1201; Koller v. Pinnacle West Capital Corp., 2007 WL 446357, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2007) (); McLandrich v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 942 F.Supp. 457, 465 n. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ( that “applying the ‘ultrahazardous activities' doctrine here would be clearly inconsistent with the Price-Anderson Act.”); Adkins, 960 F.Supp.2d at 766, 768 (). Therefore, Plaintiff's ultrahazardous/strict liability claim is dismissed with prejudice as preempted by the PAA.
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act provides a cause of action “[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat 180/1; Williams v....
To continue reading
Request your trial