Datcher v. State
| Decision Date | 07 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A01–1111–CR–506.,82A01–1111–CR–506. |
| Parties | Janella DATCHER, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court; The Honorable Kelli E. Fink, Magistrate; Cause No. 82C01–1102–FA–264.
Matthew J. McGovern, Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Janella Datcher (“Datcher”) pleaded guilty to two counts of battery, 1 each as a Class D felony and was convicted of child molesting 2 as a Class A felony after a jury trial. Datcher was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five years executed for these convictions. She appeals, raising the following restated issues:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence under the Rape Shield Rule that the victim may have been inappropriately touched by a third person;
II. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it allowed evidence of Datcher's battery against one of her children to be admitted at trial; and
III. Whether Datcher's sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
We affirm.
Until February 2010, Datcher lived with her children, including J .D.1 and J.D.2, in Vanderburgh County. At the time of the trial in the present case, J.D.1 was six years old and J.D.2 was five years old. Both girls were removed from Datcher's custody and placed in foster care in February 2010 for reasons not related to this appeal.
In November 2010, J.D.1 made an allegation of sexual abuse regarding Datcher to a counselor, and a sexual assault examination was conducted by Dr. Emily Krajec (“Dr.Krajec”). During the examination, J.D.1 told Dr. Krajec that Datcher had inserted various objects, including a light and crayons, into her vagina. Dr. Krajec discovered that J.D.1 had a ruptured hymen and trauma to her left lateral perineum, which were consistent with her claims of sexual abuse by Datcher. Before physically examining J.D.1, Dr. Krajec asked her if she had ever been touched inappropriately in the genital area, and J.D.1 responded that she had, by both Datcher and by friends of Datcher. Additionally, the record shows that Datcher struck both girls with an electrical cord, striking J.D.2 in the vaginal area. Datcher also inserted a small toy into J.D.1's vagina.
The State charged Datcher with two counts of child molesting, each as a Class A felony, and two counts of battery, each as a Class D felony. Before the jury trial commenced, Datcher pleaded guilty to two counts of Class D felony battery, and a jury trial subsequently commenced on the remaining two counts of Class A felony child molesting. Prior to trial, Datcher sought to exclude evidence of the batteries under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). The trial court ruled that limited evidence of the batteries by Datcher against the children could be admitted as intrinsic evidence of the molestations and as evidence of the relationship between Datcher and her children and her motive for committing the molestation. At trial, J.D.2 testified that Datcher “whipped” her “private parts,” which she described as where she pees, with a cord. Tr. at 105. J.D.2 also testified that Datcher had touched her “private parts” with her hand on the outside of J.D.2's clothes, but had not inserted anything inside her “private parts.” Id. at 105–07, 109. Following J.D.2's testimony, the State moved to dismiss the charge of child molesting related to J.D.2, which the trial court granted.
Additionally, prior to trial, the trial court ruled that, under the Rape Shield Rule, the defense was precluded from presenting evidence about any fondling or touching by other individuals that would not have resulted in the physical harm to the children. Id. at 11. Only evidence that someone else could have been responsible for the physical trauma to the alleged victims was allowed to be presented. Id. During the trial, the trial court excluded testimony under the Rape Shield Rule by Dr. Krajec that J.D .1 had said that someone other than Datcher had touched her inappropriately, because these statements by J.D.1 did not accuse others of inserting anything into her vagina, and therefore, could not provide an alternative cause for the physical injuries described. Id. at 161–63.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Datcher guilty of the one remaining charge, one count of child molesting as a Class A felony. A sentencing hearing was held, at which the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) Datcher was in a position of trust as mother to the victims; (2) the offenses were committed in the presence of minor children; and (3) the offenses were committed against two different victims. It also found two mitigating circumstances: (1) Datcher had no criminal history; and (2) Datcher pleaded guilty to two counts of Class D felony battery. Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Datcher to thirty-five years on her conviction for Class A felony child molesting and to two years on each conviction for Class D felony battery and ordered the three sentences to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of thirty-five years. Datcher now appeals.
The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence. Gutierrez v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind.Ct.App.2009)). The trial court's ruling on review of admissibility of evidence will be disturbed on review only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Conrad v. State, 938 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ind.Ct.App.2010)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Oatts v. State, 899 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). In reviewing the admissibility of evidence, we consider only the evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling and any unrefuted evidence in the appellant's favor. Redding v. State, 844 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). As a rule, errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Id. In determining whether an evidentiary ruling affected a party's substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the evidence on the trier of fact. Id.
Datcher argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded testimony by Dr. Krajec, pursuant to the Rape Shield Rule, that other individuals, in addition to Datcher, had touched J.D.1 inappropriately in her genital area and therefore may have committed the offense with which Datcher was charged. She specifically contends that the exclusion of such testimony violated her right of cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She asserts that the State was allowed to present evidence corroborating the victim's accusation of molestation, i.e., Dr. Krajec's testimony that J.D.1's hymen was not intact and that she had trauma to her left lateral perineum, and that she should have been allowed under the Sixth Amendment to present evidence that others may have been responsible for the offenses.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him....” The Fourteenth Amendment makes this right of confrontation obligatory upon the states. Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461, 464–65 (Ind.2006) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, (1965)). The essential purpose of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is to ensure that the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Id. at 465 (citing State v. Owings, 622 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind.1993)). Trial judges, however, have “wide latitude to impose reasonable limits based on concerns including harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Wright v. State, 836 N.E.2d 283, 289 (Ind . Ct.App.2005), reh'g granted with instructions,845 N.E.2d 263 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied.
The admission of evidence relating to a victim's past sexual conduct is governed by Indiana Evidence Rule 412, which is commonly referred to as the Rape Shield Rule. Evidence Rule 412 provides that,
a) In a prosecution for a sex crime, evidence of the past sexual conduct of a victim or witness may not be admitted, except:
(1) evidence of the victim's or of a witness's past sexual conduct with the defendant;
(2) evidence which shows that some person other than the defendant committed the act upon which the prosecution is founded;
(3) evidence that the victim's pregnancy at the time of trial was not caused by the defendant; or
(4) evidence of conviction for a crime to impeach under Rule 609.
Ind. Evidence Rule 412(a). This rule is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Sallee v.. State, 785 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied, cert. denied540 U.S. 990 (2003).
In the present case, physical evidence showed that J.D.1 had a ruptured hymen and trauma to her left lateral perineum, which were injuries consistent with having an object inserted into her vagina as she alleged Datcher had done. The testimony of Dr. Krajec that Datcher sought to have admitted provided that others had touched J.D .1 inappropriately, but not that anyone else had inserted an object into her vagina. The trial court...
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