Datiz v. Int'l Recovery Assocs.
| Decision Date | 29 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | 2:15-cv-03549 (ADS)(AKT) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
| Parties | LISA DATIZ, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, INC. Defendant. |
APPEARANCES:
Sanders Law, PLLC
Counsel for the Plaintiff
Garden City, NY 11530
By: Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
David M. Barshay, Esq., Of Counsel.
Robert L. Arleo, Esq.
380 Lexington Avenue 17th Floor
New York, NY 10168
Plaintiff Lisa Datiz (the "Plaintiff") brought the instant action alleging that defendant International Recover Associates (the "Defendant") violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA").
On September 24, 2008, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and awarded the Plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages, which triggered a cascade of motions by the parties.
Presently before the Court is: (1) a motion by the Defendant to reconsider, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3, the amount of statutory damages awarded; (2) a motion by the Defendant to disqualify the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455; and (3) a motion by the Plaintiff for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to reconsider, denies the Defendant's motion to disqualify, and denies the Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.
On June 17, 2015, the Plaintiff commenced this action with the filing of the Complaint. The case proceeded as normal until August 4, 2016, when the Court issued an order granting in part, and denying in part, the Defendant's motion to dismiss. In the Order, the Court granted the motion as to the "illegal fee" claims (the first and second causes of action) but denied the motion as to the "name of the creditor' claims (the third and fourth causes of action).
On August 16, 2016, the Defendant filed a motion seeking a Certificate of Appealability of regarding the denial of dismissal of the "name of the creditor" claims. While the Defendant's motion was pending, the Defendant filed a separate motion seeking to "Vacate that portion of the Memorandum of Decision and Order denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss that portion of the Amended Complaint which alleges an FDCPA violation for the alleged failure to name a creditor in a collection letter."
On January 4, 2017, the Court denied both motions. In doing so, the Court opined that: "Rather than litigate the merits of the case, the Defendant has sought to use any procedural vehicle under the sun to create protracted and expensive litigation."
On January 6, 2017, the Defendant filed a Letter Motion "to Amend/Correct/Supplement Memorandum of Decision and Order issued on January 5, 2017" which sought, in sum, to strike the foregoing language from the order. The Court denied the Defendant's motion without prejudice with leave to refile it as a formal motion.
On February 8, 2017, the Defendant filed a letter motion seeking a hearing regarding "Plaintiff's attempt to breach an alleged agreement to proceed to trial by jury," claiming that the Plaintiff should be compelled to forego summary judgment based on a supposed agreement made during an August 15, 2016 conference before Judge Tomlinson. Judge Tomlinson denied the motion to compel because no stipulation had been entered under which Plaintiff purportedly waived her right to move for summary judgment.
On July 12, 2017, the Defendant filed a letter motion seeking to compel production of the executed deposition transcript of Plaintiff's expert. Judge Tomlinson denied this request finding, inter alia, that "Defendant's counsel has not cited any statutory authority or case law supporting the position he takes or the relief he requests."
On July 31, 2017, the Court held a pre-motion conference regarding the parties' proposed motions for summary judgment. The Court notes that the Defendant opposed the Plaintiff's request to file a motion for summary judgment in a letter on July 18, 2017, despite itself seeking a pre-motion conference for the purpose of filing a summary judgment motion on July 11, 2017. After the conference, the Court issued an order indicating that settlement was not reached, and a briefing schedule had been set for the competing motions for summary judgment.
On September 12, 2017, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. While the motions were pending, the parties filed notices of supplemental authority. The Court directed the parties to cease submitting these notices.
On March 28, 2018, the Court referred the summary judgment motions to Judge Tomlinson for a report and recommendation.
On April 3, 2018, the Defendant filed a letter motion asking for leave to file a sur-reply in connection with the then-pending motions for summary judgment. Before obtaining such leave,the Defendant filed a "Letter Supplement." On April 16, 2018, Judge Tomlinson denied the Defendant's request.
On June 28, 2018, the parties appeared for oral argument before Judge Tomlinson and, thereafter, Judge Tomlinson issued an Order reserving decision on the motions.
On July 9, 2018, the Defendant filed a letter captioned "Letter request to confirm judicial merits opinion statements made at summary judgment pre-motion conference." In this letter, Defendant's counsel states that it was his recollection that "Your Honor adamantly stated that neither party would obtain summary judgment and that Your Honor, if serving on a jury, would know the name of the creditor in the Defendant's collection letter." To this end, Defendant's counsel asked the Court to "advise if any of the law clerks present at the summary judgment pre-motion conference took notes of the conference" which would serve to confirm counsel's recollection.
On July 12, 2018, the Defendant filed a letter addressed to Judge Tomlinson to advise her that the Defendant would not be providing the Court with any further authority on the summary judgment motions, as had been previously requested. Thereafter, on July 16, 2018, Judge Tomlinson acknowledged Defendant's request, which had been "reluctantly granted" to begin with, and admonished counsel that "this was not the first instance" of counsel failing to follow the Court's rules.
On July 27, 2018, Judge Tomlinson issued a report and recommendation that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied and that Plaintiff's cross-motion for similar relief be granted.
On July 31, 2018, the Court issued an order denying the Plaintiff's July 9, 2018 letter motion, in which it stated:
On August 10, 2018, the Defendant filed an objection to Judge Tomlinson's report and recommendation.
On August 20, 2018, before the Court resolved the Defendant's objections, the Defendant submitted a letter to Chief Judge Irizarry asking her to reassign this case. The basis for this request was that the "any procedural vehicle under the sun" statement set forth in the January 4, 2017 order was "patently unjustified" and, therefore, showed animus or prejudice against the Defendant and/or its counsel.
On September 24, 2018, the Court adopted the report and recommendation. In doing so, the Court awarded the Plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages and granted Plaintiff leave to file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs within 30 days of the order.
On October 5, 2018, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order's award of $1,000 in statutory damages, arguing that such an award showed the Court's "blatant disregard" of the governing law.
On October 6, 2018, the Defendant wrote a second letter to Judge Irizarry asking her to reassign the case. The basis for counsel's second request restated the position espoused in the motion to reconsider, namely that the statutory damages award was a "blatant disregard of legal mandate."
On November 1, 2018, the Defendant filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned from this case due to the Court's perceived animus toward the Defendant and/or it's counsel. In essence,the Defendant believes that the undersigned cannot fairly and impartially adjudicate the claims against it, as evidenced by the "under the sun" statement in the January 4, 2017 Order; the Court's admonishment in the July 31, 2018 order; and the supposedly "unjustified" award of $1,000 in statutory damages in the September 24, 2018 summary judgment order.
Local Civil Rule 6.3 permits a party to move for reconsideration of a court order within 14 days after the entry of the Court's determination of the original motion. "The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). "The major grounds justifying reconsideration are 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 at 790). Of importance, "a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Reconsideration "is considered an extraordinary...
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