Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills
| Decision Date | 28 September 1965 |
| Docket Number | L,No. 96,Gen. No. 65-43,96 |
| Citation | 210 N.E.2d 626,62 Ill.App.2d 274 |
| Parties | Harold E. DATO, Mount Vernon Estates, Inc., a Corporation, and Elmer Clavey, Inc., a Corporation, Appellees, v. VILLAGE OF VERNON HILLS, a Municipal Corporation of Illinois. Appeal of KILDEER COUNTRYSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 96 and Board of Education of Kildeer Countryside School Districtake Country, Ilinois. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Runyard, Behanna, Conzelman & Schultz, Waukegan, for appellant.
Hall, Meyer, Fisher, Van Deusen, Holmberg & Snook, Waukegan, for appellees.
This appeal is taken from an order of the Circuit Court of Lake County denying the petition of a school district to intervene in a zoning case.
On July 7, 1964, the Board of Trustees of the Village of Vernon Hills, pursuant to a recommendation of their Zoning Board of Appeals, rezoned certain property in the Village from a 'R-5' classification to 'R-4'. The pertinent distinction between the classifications is that 'R-4' zoning permits only single-family residential uses while 'R-5' permitted, among other uses, mobile-home parks.
Plaintiff-appellees filed a complaint under the Declaratory Judgments Act alleging that they are the owners of a certain tract of land affected by the re-zoning that they had purchased with the intention of operating a mobile-home park. They seek a determination that the new zoning is 'unreasonable, discriminatory, invalid, null and void' insofar as it affects their property.
The appellants herein, the Kildeer Countryside School District No. 96 and Board of Education of Kildeer Countryside School District No. 96, both appeared and testified at public hearings before the Zoning Board of Appeals and the Village Trustees in opposition to the old 'R-5' zoning. Thereafter, they filed their Motion to Intervene in the pending Declaratory Judgment Action under Section 26.1 of the Civil Practice Act, (Ill.Rev.Stats. Chapt. 110, Sec. 26.1) and prosecute this appeal from the trial court's denial of that motion.
The Petition states that if the property in question is used for a mobile-home park that it would increase the number of school children in the district and, at the same time, be taxed as vacant property, thus greatly reducing the assessed valuation per child in the district. It also alleges that the Village itself is without sufficient funds to employ experts to adequately defend the suit. The allegations in the Petition are not denied by any of the other parties.
Section 26.1 provides for the intervention, under certain specified circumstances, by third parties, into pending lawsuits. The section enumerates instances where intervention is a matter of right, and others where it is permissible at the discretion of the trial court. Since appellants contend that they were entitled to intervene as a matter of right, we shall concern ourselves only with that portion of Section 26.1.
'(1) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted as o right to intervene in an action: (a) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (b) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or may be bound by a judgment, decree or order in the action; or (c) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution of other disposition of property in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.'
While it is not clear on what sub-section of this paragraph appellants rely, it does appear that they feel a recent amendment to the Municipal Code confers upon them the unconditional right to intervene. A new paragraph was added to the Zoning Division of the Municipal Code which provides as follows:
'In any hearing before a zoning commission, board of appeals or commission or committee designated pursuant to Section 11-13-14, any school district within which the property in issue, or any part thereof, is located shall have the right to appear and present evidence.'
Prior to this amendment, school districts had no standing to appear at zoning hearings or, obviously, to intervene in any litigation growing out of such hearings. Appellants here urge that the new provision implies the authorization to go beyond the hearing and appear in any...
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Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Cook County, 57777
...673, 273 N.E.2d 706; Village of Arlington Heights v. County of Cook, 3 Ill.App.3d 213, 278 N.E.2d 841; compare Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills, 62 Ill.App.2d 274, 210 N.E.2d 626; see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1126.) However, on July 1, 1971, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 went into effect. Und......
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Arduini v. Board of Ed., Pontiac Tp. High School, Dist. 90, Livingston County, Ill.
...and St. Clair Counties (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 67, 331 N.E.2d 335.) A school board has no inherent powers. (Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills (1965), 62 Ill.App.2d 274, 210 N.E.2d 626.) Rather its powers consist only of ones specifically granted by statute and the powers necessary to carry out ......
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Morris Community High School Dist. No. 101 v. Morris Development Co.
...the school districts have no standing to engage in any zoning litigation on the basis of the precedent of Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills, 62 Ill.App.2d 274, 210 N.E.2d 626 (1965). We do not believe that the Dato case is a precedent requiring dismissal of the action in the instant case. In ......
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Adams v. Cook County
...contend that the Board of Education does not have the authority to intervene. They rely on the decision in Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills, 62 Ill.App.2d 274, 210 N.E.2d 626 (1965) to support their contention that in the absence of specific statutory authorization, the Board of Education ma......