Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors, No. 88-CV-1299L.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 88-CV-1299L.
• Parties: Marjorie DATSKOW, Executrix of the Estates of Robert C. Gross and Susan C. Gross, deceased, and Administratrix of the Estates of Michael and David Gross, deceased, and Grossair, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS, A DIVISION OF TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

826 F. Supp. 677

Marjorie DATSKOW, Executrix of the Estates of Robert C. Gross and Susan C. Gross, deceased, and Administratrix of the Estates of Michael and David Gross, deceased, and Grossair, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS, A DIVISION OF TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.

No. 88-CV-1299L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

July 15, 1993.

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Arthur Alan Wolk, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiffs.

Stephen R. Stegich, III, Stuart Robinowitz, New York City, Michael Kelly, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

LARIMER, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

This products liability case arises out of the crash of a private airplane in which four people were killed. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of the engine on the theory that a defect in the plane's engine caused the crash.

On February 24, 1993, after a month-long trial, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor on theories of strict liability, negligent design, and failure to warn. The jury awarded the following damages: $250,000 to Juletta Cook, the mother of one of the decedents, on her wrongful death claim for economic loss; $5000 for funeral expenses; $30,000 to plaintiff Grossair, Inc., the owner of the plane, for loss of the aircraft, and a total of $107,000,000 for conscious pain and suffering of the decedents.

Defendant, Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Products ("TCM"), has filed a motion seeking three alternative types of relief: to set aside the jury verdict and enter judgment in TCM's favor under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59; or for remittitur of damages under Rule 59.

Plaintiffs have also filed two motions. First, in the event that the court grants defendant's motion for a new trial or for remittitur, plaintiffs request that the court apply North Carolina law. Second, plaintiffs move to strike two affidavits submitted by defendant in support of defendant's motion.

DISCUSSION

TCM's motion is lengthy (204 pages including reply brief plus exhibits) and raises virtually every issue that was disputed during the month-long trial. Although I have carefully considered the many arguments made by TCM, there are only a few that merit discussion.

Many of TCM's issues, especially concerning evidentiary matters, are issues that were discussed at length during the trial. As to these matters, this motion is nothing more than an attempt to reargue issues upon which I ruled against TCM — no matter how inconsequential relative to the final verdict. As to these evidentiary issues, I made rulings and gave reasons, often extensive ones, for ruling as I did. Nothing would be served by my repeating those rulings in this written decision. I made my rulings and gave reasons for those rulings; I stand by them and see no basis to "change" those rulings now.

Nothing advanced by TCM now persuades me that I should have ruled differently relative to disputed issues at trial. In addition, none of TCM's arguments, whether considered separately or as a whole, warrants either granting judgment in TCM's favor or granting a new trial on liability. As to damages, however, I do find the verdict to be excessive in several respects and I grant a new trial on damages, unless plaintiff accepts a remittitur of the excessive portion of the jury verdict.

I. Issues Relating to Liability

1. Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendant has moved to set aside the jury verdict and to enter judgment in its favor under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). In support of the motion, defendant argues that plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the engine was defective or that a defect in the engine caused the fatal crash. In particular, defendant contends that there was no evidence of an obstruction in the engine's fuel line or that there was an in-flight fire.

The standard for deciding a Rule 50(b) motion "is appropriately strict." Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1988). The court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was sufficient to have allowed a reasonable juror to arrive at a verdict for plaintiffs. Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp., 733 F.2d 1007, 1013 (2d Cir.1984). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, and all questions of credibility must likewise be decided in plaintiffs' favor. Id.

The Second Circuit has cautioned that in making these determinations, "the trial court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp., "Huguenot", 618 F.2d 163, 167 (2d Cir.1980). Rather, the court should grant the motion "only when (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict against him." Id. at 167-68.

Defendant has not met this burden. Essentially, TCM seeks to "reargue" the case to the jury. There was conflicting proof and the jury determined the factual issues against TCM on all points. In this type of case, when the four principal eyewitnesses to the crash — the Gross family — were killed, plaintiffs had to rely on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony to make the case. In my view, the direct and circumstantial evidence together with all of the expert testimony provided more than sufficient evidence for the jury to have found against TCM on each of the three grounds for liability — strict products liability, negligent design, and failure to warn — that form the basis for the jury verdict. The evidence at trial was extensive on both sides and was in sharp conflict. Although a full recitation of all the evidence is neither practicable nor necessary here, I note that plaintiffs presented both eyewitness and expert testimony. The latter included testimony by Donald Sommer, a mechanical engineer with a background in accident reconstruction. Sommer opined that a fuel nozzle inside the engine had become clogged, causing fuel to leak out and catch fire during the flight. He based this opinion on examinations and tests of the actual engine and of mock-up or model engines. He explained the basis for his opinion to the jury through his testimony, and by means of videotaped experiments and courtroom demonstrations.

Sommer further testified that, in his opinion, there was an alternative design available for the engine, referred to as an "upper deck" system, which he said would have avoided the fire which occurred here. Tr. 833. There was evidence that such a system was in fact used by Teledyne for its turbo-charged engines, and in Sommer's opinion it was feasible for the engine involved in this case.

Much of defendant's attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is really an attack on the qualifications of Sommer, whom defendants derisively refer to as "a so-called `accident investigator,'" "putative expert," "accidentologist," and "a professional witness who makes a living by devising possible scenarios for accidents long after the fact." Def. Memo. p. 11.

To the extent that defendant is challenging the qualifications of Sommer, or any other of plaintiffs' experts for that matter, those qualifications were amply set forth in the record. The basis for my allowing these witnesses to testify as experts is also clearly reflected in the trial transcript, and I see no need to repeat my rulings in that regard here.¹

In addition, if defendant is suggesting that testimony by an expert in accident reconstruction is per se improper, its position is untenable. Accident reconstruction experts are frequently used in trials, and their testimony can support a verdict. See, e.g., Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (10th Cir.1993); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 981 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 248 (2d Cir.1981).

Furthermore, defendant itself used its own accident reconstruction expert, Terrence Heaslip. Like Sommer, he testified about a wide variety of subjects, including fire damage, radiography, the airplane's flight path, and tree limbs that had allegedly been severed by the plane's propeller.

In fact, much of the expert testimony offered by defendant was plainly meant to counter that offered by plaintiffs. Like plaintiffs, defendant called witnesses who offered opinions on fire, weather conditions, piloting an aircraft, the cause of death, and so on.

That defendant would want to rebut plaintiffs' experts' opinions is not surprising, of course. The point is that the jury heard a wealth of expert testimony (Sommer's alone took the better part of five days), and it was the jury's province, not the court's, to decide the weight to be given that testimony. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 248; Mattivi, 618 F.2d at 167.

Plaintiffs also called Patrick McGinley, an expert in fire investigation. He concluded from his examination of the airplane wreckage that a fire began in the engine while the plane was still in flight, not after the plane hit the ground or trees. Tr. 1942. His testimony was largely consistent with, and corroborative of, Sommer's opinion that the fire had resulted from leaking fuel. Tr. 1946-47.

In addition, there was evidence that the particular engine in the crash aircraft had a long history of problems, including fuel leaks. This evidence supported plaintiffs' theory that the engine had been defectively and negligently manufactured. Tr. 931.

Again, it is unnecessary to recite all the evidence here. Suffice it to say that the evidence was more than adequate to present the jury with issues of fact on plaintiffs' various theories of liability. Defendant's motion for...