Datzek v. State
| Citation | 838 N.E.2d 1149 |
| Decision Date | 14 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30A01-0503-CR-114.,30A01-0503-CR-114. |
| Parties | John DATZEK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
John D. Fierek, Voyles Zahn Paul Hogan & Merriman, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
John Datzek appeals his conviction and sentence for operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content greater than .08% but less than .15% as a class A misdemeanor.1 Datzek raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Datzek's blood alcohol test results obtained from a blood draw following a traffic stop;
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Datzek's conviction for operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content greater than .08% but less than .15%;
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Datzek.
We affirm.
The facts most favorable to the conviction follow.2 On October 1, 2003, Greenfield Police Officer Michael Noble was on duty when he stopped at a Citgo gas station to get a drink. While inside, Officer Noble saw Datzek come inside the store and pay for some items. Officer Noble, who was standing four to six feet away from Datzek, noticed that Datzek had "poor balance[,]" "swayed a little bit[,]" and "was unsteady in his steps." Transcript at 20, 22. Officer Noble also thought that he smelled alcohol coming from Datzek. Officer Noble asked a fellow officer whether he smelled alcohol on Datzek, and the officer responded that "he thought so, or that there may have been and he wasn't for sure." Id. at 22. After Datzek left the store, Officer Noble asked the cashier whether she had smelled alcohol on Datzek, and she stated that she was not sure.
Officer Noble left the store and watched Datzek as he drove away. Datzek turned from the Citgo parking lot onto the highway, but he did not use his turn signal. The highway was a four-lane highway with two eastbound lanes and two westbound lanes, and Datzek was traveling in the right lane of the two westbound lanes. After Officer Noble got into his car and followed Datzek on the highway, he noticed that Datzek's front and rear left tires "jerk[ed] across the left white dotted lane divider" into the left lane of the westbound traffic lanes for a few seconds. Id. at 30.
Officer Noble activated his emergency lights, initiated a traffic stop, and wrote Datzek a ticket for the infraction of failing to use his turn signal. After Officer Noble approached Datzek's car and asked for his license, Datzek exhibited manual dexterity problems as he tried to retrieve his license from its holder. As Officer Noble talked with Datzek, he smelled the odor of alcohol on Datzek's breath and saw that Datzek's eyes were bloodshot. Officer Noble administered three field sobriety tests to Datzek, and Datzek failed all three tests.
Officer Noble then read Indiana's implied consent law to Datzek, and Datzek agreed to submit to a chemical test. Officer Noble drove Datzek to Hancock Memorial Hospital for a blood draw. The hospital was approximately three minutes away, and they were at the hospital for ten to fifteen minutes. The hospital report from Datzek's blood test revealed that Datzek had a serum blood alcohol content of .13%.3
The State charged Datzek with operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class A misdemeanor and operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least .08 gram of alcohol but less than .15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of the person's blood as a class C misdemeanor, both of which were enhanced to a class D felony because Datzek had a previous operating while intoxicated conviction within five years from these charged offenses. Datzek waived his right to a jury trial, and the State dismissed the operating a vehicle while intoxicated charge. Datzek moved to suppress the evidence obtained following the traffic stop.
The trial court held a combined suppression hearing and bench trial. During the bench trial, the State presented testimony from Jeffrey Retz, who had been working for the past twelve years as the scientific director of a hospital toxicology lab and had previously worked as the lab supervisor at the Indiana State Department of Toxicology for fifteen years. Retz testified that "[g]enerally serum alcohol content is approximately 15% higher than it would be if whole blood was analyzed" and converted Datzek's serum blood alcohol test results of .13% to a corresponding whole blood alcohol content of .11%. Transcript at 11-12. Datzek objected to the admission of his blood alcohol test results on the grounds that: (1) the traffic stop was illegal; (2) the blood draw was not the least intrusive means of testing available; and (3) Datzek was not advised of his Pirtle rights before being asked to consent to the chemical test of his blood. The trial court overruled the objections and took the case under advisement.
The trial court found Datzek guilty of operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least .08 gram of alcohol but less than .15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of the person's blood as a class C misdemeanor. Datzek stipulated that he had a prior operating while intoxicated conviction within five years from his current offense, which then enhanced his conviction to a class D felony.
The trial court sentenced Datzek under the alternate misdemeanor sentencing scheme and entered Datzek's sentence as a class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Datzek to a 365-day sentence, with ninety days executed in a community corrections program and the other 275 days suspended, and ordered that he serve one year on probation. Thereafter, Datzek moved to stay the execution of his sentence pending appeal, and the trial court granted his motion.
The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Datzek's blood alcohol test results obtained from the blood draw following the traffic stop. Because the admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, we review the admission of evidence only for abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind.2002). An abuse of discretion occurs "where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.2001).
Datzek argues that, despite his consent to submit to a chemical test, the blood alcohol test results obtained from the blood draw were inadmissible because: (A) the traffic stop was illegal; (B) the blood draw was not the least intrusive means of chemical testing available; and (C) he was not advised of his Pirtle rights before being asked to consent to the chemical test of his blood. We will review each argument in turn.
Datzek argues that the traffic stop was illegal because Officer Noble had a mistaken belief that Datzek committed a traffic violation when he failed to use his turn signal when exiting the parking lot.4 "It is well-settled that a police officer may briefly detain a person whom the officer believes has committed an infraction or an ordinance violation." Peete v. State, 678 N.E.2d 415, 419 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. See also Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3.
Here, Officer Noble testified that he observed Datzek make a right turn out of the parking lot and onto the highway without using his turn signal. Officer Noble initiated a traffic stop and wrote Datzek a ticket for the infraction of failing to use a turn signal under Ind.Code § 9-21-8-25. Ind.Code § 9-21-8-25 provides:
A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes. A vehicle traveling in a speed zone of at least fifty (50) miles per hour shall give a signal continuously for not less than the last three hundred (300) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning or changing lanes.
A violation of this statute constitutes a class C infraction. See Ind.Code § 9-21-8-49.
Datzek did not signal before turning, and, thus, violated Ind.Code § 9-21-8-25. Datzek, however, contends that Ind.Code § 9-21-8-25 would not be applicable to him because it does not mention turning from a parking lot and because it would be impossible for him to use his turn signal for 200 feet before turning from the parking lot. Instead, Datzek contends that Ind.Code §§ 9-21-8-245 and 9-21-8-346 would apply to his turn from the parking lot and that he did not violate these statutes when he failed to use his turn signal when turning out of the parking lot.
We find Datzek's arguments unavailing. "Courts are obliged to respect the plain language of a statute" and when a statute is unambiguous, we must apply the plain and obvious meaning and not resort to other rules of construction. Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ind.2001). Ind.Code § 9-21-8-25 provides that "[a] signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes." Thus, the plain language of the statute requires that a vehicle must use a signal whenever it intends to turn or change lanes. There are no restrictions that it only applies in certain situations or on certain roadways. See State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind.2003) (). Turn signals by a driver entering onto a highway provide other drivers on the highway, or preparing to enter from a position opposite and across the highway, with information of the signaling driver's intent. That information is...
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