Daub v. Weaver.*

Decision Date14 March 1935
PartiesDAUB. v. WEAVER.*
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

Error to Circuit Court, Greensville County.

Action by notice of motion by Margaret Daub against W. Channing P. Weaver. To review a judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict for plaintiff, plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, and CHINN, JJ.

Sinnott & May, of Richmond, and E. Peyton Tnrner, of Emporia, for plaintiff in error.

E. E. Eanes, of Emporia, and R. E. Booker and David M. White, both of Richmond, for defendant in error.

CAMPBELL, Chief Justice.

This action by notice of motion was brought by Margaret Daub against Weaver to recover for personal damages sustained by her while riding as guest in defendant's automobile.

The jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,500. On motion of defendant, the court set aside the verdict on the ground that the evidence failed to show gross negligence on the part of the defendant, and entered judgment in his favor.

The sole assignment of error is the action of the court in setting aside the verdict of the jury.

In a written memorandum filled with the record, the Honorable Marshall R. Peterson has correctly set forth the following facts:

"The plaintiff with another young lady as her companion in proceeding from Richmond to Emporia as the expectant guest of the defendant in this case, in whose home, with the defendant's mother, they proposed to pass the weekend, suffered certain facial injuries in consequence of a collision between the car in which they were riding, then driven by the defendant, Weaver, and an automobile operated by a negro, in the environs of the town of Emporia. Until within two or three miles of the town of Emporia, the defendant's friend had driven the car upon its journey south. At this point, because of her unfamiliarity with the suburbs of the town, she surrendered the wheel of the car to the defendant, Weaver, who undertook to complete the journey. At the edge of the town, in the vicinity of the corporate limits, the hard surface State Highway from Richmond to Hallfax crosses another hard surface highway running east and west and intersecting the former at approximately right angles. The defendant's automobile arrived at the point of the accident after night-fall. The testimony is, on the part of the plaintiff and her companion, that the car was traveling at a speed of 50 miles an hour a short distance before reaching the intersection. The defendant admitted that within a hundred or so yards of the crossing--not to be exact--he had been traveling at this rate, but that, as he approached the crossing, he slackened his pace until it was reduced to about 35 miles an hour. The plaintiff herself was unaccus tomed to driving an automobile, and her estimation of the speed was not exact but rather by way of a general impression. Another witness in the case testified that he saw the car as it passed a service station, some 75 yards from the place of the accident, on its way to the crossing, and that, at that time, it was running about 30, 35, or 45 miles an hour. The testimony as to the speed of the car on the whole is as usual in similar cases rather vague, and of necessity so.

"The automobile in which the plaintiff was injured was an Auburn one-seated car. The plaintiff testified that she was not looking ahead at the time of the accident, but that she was endeavoring to release the 'zipper' on her handbag, which had caught and failed to slip in proper fashion. The other young lady seated beside the defendant testified that she was looking ahead, and saw the car, which they encountered, only when they were right upon it, within a space of 10 or 12 feet, as well as I recall the testimony. The defendant's testimony was to the same effect. The defendant also testified that, upon discovering the car ahead of him, he immediately applied the brakes, and that the speed of his car had been materially reduced when the impact occurred. The other car, a second-hand Buick driven by a negro, who was accompanied by another negro, approached the crossing as the defendant's car came up. This negro testified that he was under the impression that he had the right-of-way since according to his claim, his car was the first to reach the intersection although, in point of fact, he was approaching the defendant's automobile on the defendant's left hand. His car was struck by the defendant's automobile on the western half of the Richmond-Halifax highway after he had cleared the middle of the intersection, and the force of the impact was sufficient to slew his car around and almost to reverse its direction. The plaintiff was injured by flying glass leaving a cut which seriously disfigures her face even after proper surgical treatment.

"When an officer, a Motor Vehicle Inspector, appeared on the scene of the accident, a few minutes after the disaster, the Buick car was showing no lights, but, upon some adjustment of the switch controlling the lights, the lights came on though appearing to be dim. The negro admitted that the starter of his automobile was not working, but maintained that this circumstance was attributed to no defect of electric current. He testified that his lights were in good condition previously to the accident, and showed that they had recently been inspected and approved. Other wit-nesses testified that the negro's car carried lights which were visible to such witnesses at a distance of 30 to 40 yards."

In the notice of motion there is no allegation that the defendant was either guilty of willful or wanton misconduct in the operation of the automobile. The sole right of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Wood v. Shrewsbury
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1936
    ... ... 77; Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63; ... Gale v. Wilber, 163 Va. 211, 175 S.E. 739; Young ... v. Dyer, 161 Va. 434, 170 S.E. 737; Daub v. Weaver ... (Va.) 178 S.E. 794. The rule in that state seems to ... [186 S.E. 296] ... have been based in the first instance on the so-called ... ...
  • Chappell v. White
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • May 4, 1944
  • Chappell v. White
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • May 4, 1944
    ...Sydnor, 170 Va. 267, 196 S.E. 619; Grinstead Mayhew, 167 Va. 19, 187 S.E. 515; Kent Miller, 167 Va. 422, 189 S.E. 332; Doub Weaver, 164 Va. 96, 178 S.E. 794; White Gregory, 161 Va. 414, 170 S.E. 739; Tarrall Tarrall, 161 Va. 663, 171 S.E. 500; Osborn Berglund, 159 Va. 258, 165 S.E. 410; Jon......
  • Pond v. Hoffler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • February 24, 1961
    ... ... Bradley, 186 Va. 394, 43 S.E.2d 29; Keen v. Harman, 183 Va. 670, 33 S.E.2d 197; Carroll v. Miller, 175 Va. 388, 9 S.E.2d 322; Doub v. Weaver", 164 Va. 96, 178 S.E. 794; Kent v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 189 S.E. 332; Alspaugh v. Diggs, supra, and others too numerous to cite ...        \xC2" ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT