Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights

• Decision Date: 07 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. SC 88012.,SC 88012.
• Citation: 231 S.W.3d 814
• Parties: Douglas L. DAUGHERTY, Appellant, v. The CITY OF MARYLAND HEIGHTS, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

231 S.W.3d 814

Douglas L. DAUGHERTY, Appellant, v. The CITY OF MARYLAND HEIGHTS, Respondent.

No. SC 88012.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

August 7, 2007.

Rehearing Denied September 25, 2007.

Greg C. Kloeppel, Kevin J. Dolley, St. Louis, for appellant.

Patricia M. McFall, James N. Foster, Jr., William B. Jones, Amy R. Brown, St. Louis, for respondent.

Ferne P. Wolf, D. Eric Sowers, Kathryn Render, St. Louis, for amicus curiae, St. Louis Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Douglas Daugherty appeals after summary judgment was entered against him on his suit against the City of Maryland Heights. Daugherty sought relief under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA),¹ alleging that the City wrongfully terminated his employment as a police captain on the basis of age and disability. This Court granted transfer after opinion by the Court of Appeals, Eastern District. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to MO. CONST. art. V, sec. 10.

This Court reverses the trial court's judgment. Daugherty presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on both his age and disability discrimination claims and is entitled to have a trier-of-fact determine if he suffered employment discrimination. The cause is remanded.

Background

Daugherty was a 59-year-old police captain when he was terminated in 2002. The parties disagree about the circumstances of his termination.

Daugherty began employment with the City's police department in 1986, following his work for other area police departments. While on duty supervising an accident scene in 1986, he was struck by a vehicle operated by a drunk driver. His resulting injuries kept him off work for over a year, but he then returned to active duty. He was promoted to police captain in 1999. In 2000, he missed months of work after having back surgery for degenerative spine disease related to his 1986 injury. His recovery and on-going medical issues subsequent to this surgery increased his use of available sick leave. His 2002 performance evaluation reflected his increased use of sick leave and two violations of the police department's leave policies.

The City contends that Daugherty's frequent absences demonstrated that his physical condition made him unable to perform the duties of a front-line officer. It argues that Daugherty's physical condition began to deteriorate in 1999, which led to increasing absenteeism because of his narcotic prescription medications. The City maintains that all police officers, even police captains, must be able to perform front-line officer duties. It asserts that it required Daugherty to submit to a "fitness for duty" examination in 2002 in order to determine if he was physically able to perform his duties as a police captain. The City's doctor determined that Daugherty was unable to perform the duties of a front-line officer, but he was able to perform his supervisory duties as a police captain.

Daugherty was informed that he was terminated because the examination revealed that he could not perform certain physical tasks required of front-line officers, such as suspect capture. Daugherty disputes the City's arguments that he was incapable of performing the police captain's job, arguing that there is no evidence showing that he failed to complete the essential functions of the position. Although Daugherty admits that the City had the right to send officers for fitness for duty evaluations, he alleges that the City required him to take a "disability examination" that was not required of other similarly-situated officers. He also complains that he was encouraged to take disability retirement² in order to avoid termination.

After Daugherty learned of his termination, he met with his supervisor, Chief Thomas O'Connor, who is also his brother-in-law. Daugherty taped his conversation with Chief O'Connor, recording Chief O'Connor stating that the city administrator wanted to get rid of employees over the age of 55 because their salaries were costly to the City. When Daugherty told Chief O'Connor he thought this was age discrimination, Chief O'Connor agreed. The City discounts the taped statements made by Chief O'Connor regarding Daugherty's age, arguing that Chief O'Connor's subsequent deposition testimony reveals that he made the statements in an effort to appease his brother-in-law.

Daugherty believes that he was terminated on account of his age and perceived disability in violation of the MHRA. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Missouri Human Rights Commission, he filed suit.³ The City moved for summary judgment on Daugherty's age and disability discrimination claims. The trial court entered judgment for the City on both claims, finding that Daugherty failed to establish a prima facie case for both age and disability discrimination.

Daugherty appeals, arguing that his age and disability discrimination claims should have survived summary judgment.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A "genuine issue" that will prevent summary judgment exists where the record shows two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts and the "genuine issue" is real, not merely argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous. Id. at 382. This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Id. at 376. The movant bears the burden of establishing a legal right to judgment and the absence of any genuine issue of material fact required to support the claimed right to judgment. Id. at 376-81.

Summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases, because such cases are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence.⁴ Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir.2005); Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr.-W. Campus, 160 F.3d 484, 486-87 (8th Cir.1998). Summary judgment should not be granted unless evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-movant. Lynn, 160 F.3d at 487.

Analysis for MHRA Claims

In deciding a case under the MHRA, appellate courts are guided by both Missouri law and federal employment discrimination caselaw that is consistent with Missouri law. See, e.g., Midstate Oil Co., Inc. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Mo. banc 1984) (an MHRA case approving use of the burden-shifting model of proof outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), used in federal discrimination claims); Medley v. Valentine Radford Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Mo.App.2005) (applying federal disability caselaw in MHRA case); West v. Conopco Corp., 974 S.W.2d 554, 556-57 (Mo.App.1998) (considering federal age discrimination cases in MHRA age discrimination case). Missouri's discrimination safeguards under the MHRA, however, are not identical to the federal standards and can offer greater discrimination protection. See, e.g., Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 112-13 (Mo. App.2006) (discussing that MHRA & federal Title VII⁵ are "coextensive, but not identical, acts" and MHRA is "in some ways broader than Title VII, and in other ways is more restrictive"). "If the wording in the MHRA is clear and unambiguous, then federal caselaw which is contrary to the plain meaning of the MHRA is not binding." Id. at 113.

Daugherty brought his claim under section 213.055, the section of the MHRA that prohibits employers from engaging in discriminatory employment practices, including wrongful termination. The MHRA defines "discrimination" to include "any unfair treatment based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment, disability, or familial status as it relates to housing." Section 213.010(5) (emphasis added). Nothing in this statutory language of the MHRA requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial or determining factor in an employment decision; if consideration of age, disability, or other protected characteristics contributed to the unfair treatment, that is sufficient. See McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 207 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Mo.App.2006).

Past MHRA cases have followed a pattern of analysis articulated by the federal courts.⁶ But this Court's 2003 decision holding that jury trials are available under the MHRA,⁷ followed by the adoption of a pattern verdict-directing instruction for MHRA employment discrimination claims—MAI 31.24—in 2005, signals an opportunity to review the analysis applied in MHRA cases. Missouri employment discrimination law in a post-MAI 31.24 environment should more closely reflect the plain language of the MHRA and the standards set forth in MAI 31.24 and rely less on analysis developed through federal caselaw.

Application of MAI 31.24 to MHRA Employment Discrimination Claims

Previously, MHRA discrimination analysis has focused on determining if a challenged employment decision was "motivated" by an illegitimate purpose. See, e.g. Midstate, 679 S.W.2d at 845 (looking at whether the defendant employer's conduct was "motivated by an invidious purpose or whether it was based on a legitimate and rational consideration"). Citing MAI 31.24, however, Daugherty argues that his claims should have survived summary judgment because he alleged genuine issues of material fact as to whether age or disability were "contributing factors" in the City's termination decision. The application of MAI 31.24 at the summary judgment stage of MHRA employment discrimination claims is an issue of first impression for this Court.

MAI 31.24 states:

Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:

Fi...