Daugherty v. Runner

Decision Date03 November 1978
Citation581 S.W.2d 12
PartiesByrd E. DAUGHERTY, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Lula Daugherty Roach, Deceased, Appellant, v. E. Michael RUNNER, Appellee. E. Michael RUNNER, Cross-Appellant, v. Byrd E. DAUGHERTY, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Lula Daugherty Roach, Deceased, Cross-Appellee.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Gary L. Gardner, Gary L. Gardner & Associates, Louisville, for appellant and cross-appellee.

William S. Bowman, Stiles & Miller, Louisville, for appellee and cross-appellant.

Before HAYES, HOGGE and HOWARD, JJ.

HAYES, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict which exonerated the appellee, an attorney, from the charges of legal malpractice. The charges of the legal malpractice claim arose from a medical malpractice cause of action on behalf of the deceased, Lula Daugherty Roach. This type of action is commonly referred to as a "suit within a suit." The basis for the legal malpractice claim is that appellee Runner, while representing the deceased Roach for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, failed to pursue a medical malpractice claim by the estate of Roach against the hospital where Roach was treated for her injuries after her accident and against the doctors who treated her, until her claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

The jury found for Runner on the legal malpractice claim and additionally found that the appellant would have recovered on the medical malpractice case, if suit had been timely filed, in the amount of $146,123.75. Both parties appealed.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of Runner's negligence to the jury and in failing to instruct the jury properly.

Appellee's cross-appeal is of a protective nature wherein it is contended that if we reverse the trial court based on appellant's assignments of error, then appellee believes the jury verdict awarding appellant $146,123.75 on his medical malpractice claim is erroneous because of improperly admitted evidence.

We will not reach the claim of appellee on cross-appeal since we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

On February 22, 1972, Mrs. Roach and her husband Russell were involved in an automobile accident near Richmond, Kentucky. After receiving emergency medical treatment in Richmond, Mrs. Roach was transferred to St. Joseph Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky. She was admitted on February 22, 1972, under the care of an orthopedic doctor, George Gumbert, Jr. Mrs. Roach died in the hospital on March 17, 1972. The official cause of death listed on the certificate of death was bronchial pneumonia due to, or as a consequence of, generalized peretonitis and bacterial endocarditis. On the date of Mrs. Roach's death, her husband Russell, individually and as executor of the estate of Mrs. Roach, entered into a contract with attorney Runner to the effect that Runner was to "institute a claim for damages against any and all responsible parties as a result of injuries received upon the 22nd day of February, 1972." The contract was a standard contract approved by the Louisville Bar Association.

A later contract, dated July 28, 1973, was entered into between James Russell Roach and another attorney, whereby this "second attorney" was to represent Roach, individually and as administrator of the estate of Lula Roach, in the medical malpractice claim. James Russell Roach was a nonresident, so the present appellant, Byrd E. Daugherty, was appointed ancillary administrator.

Suit was filed on August 1, 1973, in Fayette Circuit Court on behalf of Daugherty by his present attorney, against St. Joseph Hospital and others based on the medical malpractice claim. The trial court in that case granted a summary judgment against Daugherty and the estate of Lula Roach because the suit was not filed within the period of limitations prescribed by KRS 413.140. The trial court further relied upon the rule of law established in the case of Hackworth v. Hart, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 377 (1971). 1

Runner testified he was not hired to represent the estate of Lula Roach on a medical malpractice claim; made an investigation of the facts surrounding the auto accident; filed suit on same in Federal Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington against the driver of the other auto in the accident, and never suspected the possibility of a medical malpractice claim.

Appellant contends it is what Runner did not do that makes him liable for malpractice. It is asserted he did not examine the hospital records until after the statute of limitations had run on any medical malpractice claim, and that he never advised his client that he did not handle medical malpractice cases. There was also testimony on behalf of appellant that Russell Roach, who had died prior to the trial, had telephoned Runner in January, 1973, inquiring of Runner the status of any medical malpractice investigation Runner was conducting. Runner denied ever having such a conversation. It is uncontradicted, however, that appellant hired the "second attorney" on March 15, 1973, to represent him in the medical malpractice claim against St. Joseph Hospital and others.

The Fayette Circuit Court had determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the medical malpractice claim "on March 17, 1972, and certainly no later than July 20, 1972, when the record of the decedent's treatment was fully complete." From the evidence in the record and the legal briefs filed on behalf of the parties, it is unclear why the second attorney, who accepted a retainer fee, did not file the medical malpractice claim within the period of time permitted by the statute and case law of this Commonwealth.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) submitting the question of the attorney's negligence to the jury; (2) allowing an expert opinion to be presented to the jury based upon improper evidence; and, (3) in failing to instruct the jury that the fact that other hired counsel might have been able to toll the statute of limitations was no defense to appellee Runner.

Both parties indicate this is possibly a case of first impression in Kentucky. They refer us to but one Kentucky case, that of Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 908 (1967).

Our research reveals that the facts here presented make this case one of first impression; however, we do find the old case of Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n. v. Ducker's Exr., 111 Ky. 759, 64 S.W. 671 (1901) to be helpful on the law to be applied to these facts.

In Humboldt, the defendant-attorney was employed by the plaintiff-foreign corporation to be its attorney in Kentucky for the purpose of examining and passing upon the validity of titles to real estate upon which the corporation was to make loans of money. The corporation made a loan to one Morrison and submitted the title to the attorney for his examination. He examined and approved it. He failed to advise the plaintiff-corporation of the existence of a materialman's lien. The end result was, in a foreclosure suit by the subcontractor to enforce his lien, that the plaintiff-corporation lost some $2,800.00, the property lacking that much in value to pay both the lien and the corporation's mortgage. The plaintiff-corporation then sued the defendant-attorney based upon the negligence of the attorney. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed on appeal.

While recognizing the cases are distinguishable on the facts, the Humboldt case discusses the standard of care owed by the attorney to his client. The standard of care is perhaps the most fundamental factor in attorney malpractice litigation. The court stated at page 763 of the Kentucky Reports, at pages 672, 673 of 64 S.W.

. . . Many interesting cases have been cited by counsel, and examined with care. From them we feel authorized in stating that, while the rule in England seems to have been that an attorney is liable to his client only in case of gross neglect or gross incompetence, yet in this country a juster rule for the client, and one which the profession can not reasonably find fault with, is that the attorney is liable for the want of such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195-199, 25 L.Ed. 621. When one seeks and obtains admission to that profession dealing with so many important and involved affairs of men, and holds out his services to be engaged by those standing in need of such, he engages that he possesses to an ordinary extent the technical knowledge commonly possessed by those in the profession, and that he will give to the matters submitted to him such care and attention as is ordinarily given similar affairs by men of this profession. He does not agree, in the absence of special contract to that effect, that he will make no mistake of judgment. On the contrary, the law recognizes, in fixing this liability of the attorney, that human judgment is fallible. Courts, as well as lawyers, do disagree concerning the many matters about which each one may have a fairly fixed opinion. The law is a science, it is true, but an imperfect one, for the reason that it depends for exemplification and enforcement upon the imperfect judgments and consciences of men. Therefore when the attorney has used ordinary care in acquainting himself with the facts, his misjudgment as to the law thereon will not generally render him liable. . . .

What is the level of service demanded from members of the legal profession? The relationship of attorney-client is a contractual one, either expressed or implied by the conduct of the parties. The relationship is generally that of principal and agent; however, the attorney is vested with powers superior to those of any ordinary agent because of the attorney's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
69 cases
  • Osborne v. Keeney
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • June 20, 2013
    ...states have used this commonsense approach to instructing the jury.20 In fact, this is the approach that Kentucky law has adopted. Daugherty v. Runner has become a keystone in the practice of legal malpractice actions in the Commonwealth. Palmore and Cetrulo cite Daugherty as the source for......
  • Horwitz v. Holabird & Root
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 20, 2004
    ...the most scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client's interest.'" Clark, 917 S.W.2d at 575, quoting Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky.App.1978). This court has similarly emphasized the heightened duty attendant to attorneys as a result of the unique role attorneys play......
  • Olfe v. Gordon
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1980
    ...an attorney disobeys the lawful instructions of his client he is liable for any loss which ensues from such act."); Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky.App.1978) ("The relationship (between client and attorney) is generally that of principal and agent; however, the attorney is vested......
  • Nevada-Martinez v. Amhad
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
    • April 15, 2016
    ...with this client-principal the most scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client's interest." Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); see also Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1996). Indeed, a fiduciary duty is "the highest order of duty imposed by la......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • THE CASE AGAINST THE "CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE": HOW TO DISARM THE MANY TRAPS THAT LIE IN WAIT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE PLAINTIFFS.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Law Review Vol. 66 No. 3, March 2021
    • March 22, 2021
    ...claims effectively immunize lawyers from liability for settling against clients' wishes). (131.) See Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (defining the fiduciary duty as an attorney's duty to "exercise in all his [or her] relationships with this client-principal the mo......
  • The Ethical Obligation to Disclose Attorney Negligence
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 13-2, February 1984
    • Invalid date
    ...460 (2d ed. 1981). 6. Id. at 463. 7. Gunn v. Mahoney, 408 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1978); supra, note 1 at 8. 8. See, Daugherty v. Runner, Ky.App. 581 S.W.2d 12 (1979). 9. Neel v. Magana, 491 P.2d 421 (1971). 10. Matter of Loring, 374 A.2d 466 (1977). 11. 550 P.2d 94 (1976). 12. In re Sullivan, 494 S.......
  • Preventive Law and the Legal Health Audit
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 07-1989, July 1989
    • Invalid date
    ...538 P.2d 1238 (Wash.App. 1975). 6. Watson, supra, note 1. 7. Grand Isle Campsites, supra, note 4 at 273. 8. Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky.App. 1978). 9. Id. 10. For an explanation of this subject, see, Ozols and Scheffel, "The Independent Contractor versus the Employee---Tax Conseq......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT