Daughtry v. Dennehy
| Decision Date | 21 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-12338-WGY. |
| Citation | 946 F.Supp. 1053 |
| Parties | Regina A. DAUGHTRY, Petitioner, v. Kathleen DENNEHY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
John J. Bonistalli, Law Offices of John J. Bonistalli, Boston, MA, for Petitioner.
Ellyn H. Lazar, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Respondent.
Convicted by a Massachusetts jury of first degree murder, Regina A. Daughtry ("Daughtry") is presently serving a life sentence. After exhausting all available state court remedies, Daughtry now petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241 and 2254 (West 1994).
With appropriate deference to the fact-finding role of the courts of the Commonwealth, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994), the following facts may be gleaned from the voluminous record of this case:
A. The Trial
On June 29, 1991, Daughtry attended a party in Boston. At some point, Daughtry left the party with Christopher Jenkins ("Jenkins") and the two walked to the corner of Elm Hill Avenue and Hutchings Street. A group of young people were hanging out further down Elm Hill Avenue. A shot came from the corner where Jenkins and Daughtry were standing. It struck Angela Clayton ("Clayton") in the head, killing her. Commonwealth v. Daughtry, 417 Mass. 136, 139, 627 N.E.2d 928 (1994) (Nolan, J.).
Daughtry was indicted for first degree murder by a Suffolk County grand jury on September 9, 1991. Trial commenced before the Honorable James D. McDaniel, Jr. in the Massachusetts Superior Court on August 10, 1992. The Commonwealth's primary theory at trial was that Daughtry, accompanied by Jenkins, shot into the crowd intending to kill Ernest Polite ("Polite") whom she believed to be in the crowd, but killed Clayton instead. Id. at 137, 627 N.E.2d 928. The Commonwealth introduced ample evidence to warrant a jury conviction on this theory and Daughtry does not now contend otherwise. Indeed, Jenkins testified for the Commonwealth that Daughtry had fired the gun. Id. Defense counsel ably and professionally cross-examined Jenkins, raising the inference that it was he, and not Daughtry, who had been the shooter.
After the close of all the evidence, the Commonwealth, apparently impressed by the power of the cross-examination, asked that the case be submitted to the jury on the alternative theory that, while Jenkins had fired the shot which killed Clayton, Daughtry could nonetheless be convicted as a joint venturer. Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Respondent's Opposition") at 2. In instructing the jury on the applicable law, the trial justice included an instruction on joint venture. Daughtry, 417 Mass. at 137, 627 N.E.2d 928. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. Reviewing the matter on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that, "[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth ... there was sufficient evidence of joint venture to warrant the jury in convicting [Daughtry] on that basis." Id. at 139, 627 N.E.2d 928.
B. The "Elevator Incident"
Closing arguments and jury instructions took place on August 17, 1992 and, pursuant to Massachusetts practice, Mass.R.Crim.P. 20(d), the trial justice randomly selected four alternates from the sixteen-member empaneled jury which he held in reserve.1 The twelve deliberating jurors then commenced their deliberations.
One of the alternates failed to appear for jury service on the first full day of deliberations and, after a hearing at which the juror and counsel were present, she was excused from the jury but was assessed one hundred dollars in court costs. There were then twelve deliberating jurors and three alternates.
On August 19, 1992 — the second full day of deliberations — the jury requested that the court reinstruct them on joint venture, which the court did. The jurors continued their deliberations. At the end of deliberations on that day, one deliberating juror asked to be excused for medical reasons. The court excused the juror from further jury service, over the objection of defense counsel. Daughtry, 417 Mass. at 145-46, 627 N.E.2d 928. At that time, there were eleven deliberating jurors and three alternates.
On the following morning, August 20, 1992, the court received a telephone call from another deliberating juror who indicated that he had become ill during the previous night and that he did not wish to come into court. The trial justice was prepared to excuse this juror (as a result, there would have been ten deliberating jurors and three alternates remaining) when he was informed of yet further problems with the deliberating jurors.
On the morning of August 20, 1992, the third full day of jury deliberations, the foreperson of the jury notified a court officer of an incident which had occurred on the elevator as the jury was departing the prior evening. The incident, which was witnessed by the forelady and other members of the jury, involved at least three young men who had been seated in the back of the courtroom behind Daughtry during the trial. As the jurors left the building on August 19, 1992, they were confronted in the elevator by the three men. One of the men said to a juror, "Would you push No. 1, you geek?" Transcript of Proceedings in the Superior Court, August 20, 1992, Volume 9 ("Tr. 9") at 12. The juror replied, "Oh, shut up," and was threatened. Id. at 12-13. The juror and the men exchanged words, id. at 12, and the altercation ended with one of the men saying to the juror "I'm going to get you," id. at 34, and calling the juror, "Casper, white ghost," id. at 37, before spitting on the elevator door, id. at 26, 34.
As a result of this information, the trial justice withdrew its discharge of the reportedly ill juror until it could question the jurors about the alleged incident and assess the composition of the remaining jury. At that point, then, there were again eleven deliberating jurors and three alternates.
The trial justice proceeded to question each juror individually concerning the elevator incident, under oath, outside the presence of other jurors. Id. at 12-68. The trial justice also questioned each juror concerning the impact of the incident on that juror's ability to deliberate fairly and impartially. Id. Each juror cognizant of the incident told a story similar to that of the foreperson. Id. Although certain of the jurors mentioned that they were bothered by the incident, all but two indicated that they remained fair and impartial and able to deliberate the case solely on the evidence and the law. Id. at 33-36, 55-59, 70; see Daughtry, 417 Mass. at 146, 627 N.E.2d 928. The judge excused the two jurors who declared that they were no longer impartial. Daughtry, 417 Mass. at 146-47, 627 N.E.2d 928.
This left eight deliberating jurors and three alternates. The juror who had called in sick was brought into court. He told the court that he suffered from diarrhea and an upset stomach, but that he would make an effort to deliberate. With nine deliberating jurors ready for service, the three alternates were placed on the deliberating jury and, as reconstituted, twelve jurors began deliberations afresh. The jurors spent the remainder of August 20, 1992, deliberating. They resumed on the morning of August 21, 1992, and returned their verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree at 10:30 a.m. on that day.
C. Post-trial Proceedings
Daughtry was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was filed with the trial justice in the Massachusetts Superior Court and subsequently denied on January 19, 1993. Daughtry then appealed her conviction and the denial of the motion for new trial to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which affirmed both Daughtry's original conviction and the denial of her motion for new trial. Daughtry, 417 Mass. at 137-39, 627 N.E.2d 928.
In her fifty-three page Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petitioner's Memorandum"), Daughtry presents five grounds for relief. First, Daughtry maintains that the Commonwealth withheld evidence favorable to her. Second, she insists that the Commonwealth failed to acknowledge a benefit, reward, or inducement given to Jenkins, its primary witness. Third, she alleges that she was not afforded fair and reasonable notice of the precise charges against her and, in any event, she asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for any rational jury to find her guilty of joint venture premeditated murder. Finally, Daughtry contends that she was deprived of her Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury by the circumstances surrounding the deliberations in her case.
The Commonwealth moved to dismiss this petition on the grounds that review of one of Daughtry's claims is precluded by procedural default in the state court, and that none warrant federal habeas corpus relief. At a hearing before this Court on May 15, 1996, the Court heard arguments from both parties and took the matter under advisement. The Court ordered the petition denied on September 25, 1996. This memorandum of decision explains that ruling.
Daughtry maintains that her rights to due process and a fair trial were violated by the Commonwealth's withholding of evidence favorable to her before the trial commenced. Specifically, Daughtry alleges that her rights were violated by the Commonwealth's failure to inform her that (1) the testimony of one witness, Raquel Phillips ("Phillips"), would differ from the evidence earlier disclosed by the Commonwealth on the issue of Daughtry's clothing on the morning after the murder, and (2) that Polite had stated in an earlier interview that he was not at the murder...
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