Davel v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 14 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-2003,89-2003 |
| Citation | 902 F.2d 559 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15589A Thomas J. DAVEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jack Longert, Lisa Lietz, Robert Hanson, Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Persons, Madison, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael C. Messer, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Region V, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, POSNER and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Thomas J. Davel was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a charge of sexual contact with a person twelve years of age or under on June 15, 1983 in the courts of the State of Wisconsin. He was committed for a maximum of forty years to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, which placed him in the Mendota Mental Health Institute for treatment. Davel applied to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on August 4, 1986 for disability benefits. He was found to be totally disabled as of September 22, 1983 due to mixed personality disorder and dysthymic disorder/pedophilia, and benefit checks were sent to Davel at Mendota.
Davel made considerable progress in his treatment, and he eventually was given overnight passes out of the institution. But in 1985, while on an overnight pass, Davel made another sexual attack. He pleaded guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault, and on January 14, 1987, he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment at the Dodge Correctional Institution. The state did not send Davel to Dodge, but returned him to Mendota. Both Dodge and Mendota are operated by the Department of Health and Social Services, and Davel receives credit against his eight-year term for time spent in Mendota. On March 1, 1987, the Social Security Administration informed Davel that his benefits were suspended as of January 1987 under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(x) because from that date Davel was "confined in a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility, pursuant to his conviction of an offense which constituted a felony under applicable law." 1
Davel's request for reconsideration of the suspension of benefits was turned down, and the decision was affirmed by an Administrative Law Judge and by the Appeals Council. Davel appealed to the district court without success, and he now appeals to this Court.
Davel maintains that Congress did not intend the words "a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility" to include Mendota, at least under these circumstances. 2 He argues that prior to his conviction, he was plainly not being held in a correctional facility, and his circumstances have not changed at all as a result of the conviction; that he is in Mendota for treatment rather than for punishment, and that the eight-year felony sentence is irrelevant for all practical purposes. Davel's treatment has not been altered in any way by the fact of conviction, and the criminal sentence is almost certain to expire before Davel's release from civil commitment.
The Secretary responds that under his regulations, Davel's stay at Mendota is confinement in a correctional facility, irrespective of the fact that Davel lived there prior to his conviction. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.468(c) reads:
(c) Confinement. In general, a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility is a facility which is under the control and jurisdiction of the agency in charge of the penal system or in which convicted criminals can be incarcerated. Confinement in such a facility continues as long as the individual is under a sentence of confinement and has not been released due to parole or pardon. An individual is considered confined even though he or she is temporarily or intermittently outside of that facility (e.g., on work release, attending school, or hospitalized).
Because Mendota is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health and Social Services, and because under Wisconsin law the Department may choose to have convicted felons serve their sentences at Mendota, Davel is serving his civil commitment and his criminal sentence concurrently. If Davel recovers from his mental illness before his criminal sentence expires, he will be required to serve the rest of his eight-year term, probably in a regular prison, even though he will be released from his civil commitment.
Davel urges us to find that the Secretary's regulation, as applied, is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. He argues that a mental institution is not a prison, and that Wisconsin differentiates between prisoners and patients. We believe that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. Congress' language barring imprisoned felons from receiving benefits is mandatory--the Secretary is not given discretion to continue benefits to any incarcerated felon in any case. There is a real difference between persons civilly committed to Mendota and those criminally committed--the latter are there pursuant to felony convictions, and the statute by its terms requires that such persons not be given benefits. Davel is not free to leave the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services even if he suddenly regains his mental health, and the reason he is not free is that he has been convicted of a violent felony.
Davel contends that his situation is functionally identical to that considered in Graves v. Heckler, 607 F.Supp. 1186 (D.D.C.1985). In Graves, the court held that benefits should not be suspended under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(x) when the claimant was committed to a mental hospital after a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental defect. The difference between that fact situation and this one is that Davel is serving two concurrent commitments--one civil (like Graves) and one criminal. Davel's argument is that the difference is irrelevant--that commitment and incarceration are mutually exclusive, and that he is merely committed. We disagree. Section 402(x) is written in broad language: Congress used the word "confined" rather than "jailed" or "incarcerated." The phrase "other penal institution or correctional facility" implies a broad understanding of the terms. The state need not...
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