Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, No. 23868
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | FINNEY; HARWELL |
| Citation | 432 S.E.2d 451,315 S.C. 114 |
| Parties | Nancy Jane DAVENPORT, Gary Dwight Dye, Vera H. Pursley, Martha R. Rast, Steven D. Rast, Sr., Enid Christine Ray, and Rook H. Sturgis, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ROCK HILL, Defendant. . Heard |
| Decision Date | 03 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 23868 |
Page 451
Martha R. Rast, Steven D. Rast, Sr., Enid
Christine Ray, and Rook H. Sturgis, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF ROCK HILL, Defendant.
Decided June 7, 1993.
Page 452
[315 S.C. 115] A. Camden Lewis and William R. Calhoun, Jr., both of Lewis, Babcock & Hawkins, Columbia, for plaintiffs.
Jane W. Trinkley, Daniel R. McLeod, Jr., and M. William Youngblood, all of McNair Law Firm, P.A., Columbia, and Emil W. Wald and James W. Sheedy, both of Spencer & Spencer, P.A., Rock Hill, for defendant.
Elizabeth F. Warren, Columbia, for amicus curiae South Carolina School Boards Ass'n.
Roy D. Bates, Columbia, for amicus curiae Mun. Ass'n of South Carolina.
Robert E. Lyon, Jr., and Mark W. Tollison, Columbia, for amicus curiae South Carolina Ass'n of Counties.
FINNEY, Associate Justice.
This proceeding is brought within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court due to the significant public interest involved. See Key v. Currie, 305 S.C. 115, 406 S.E.2d 356 (1991). We deny relief.
The city council (council) of Rock Hill (City) adopted a tax ordinance effective January 1, 1992, which provided that the council was empowered at any time in 1992 to authorize the issuance of tax anticipation notes (TANS) pursuant to S.C. Const. art. X, § 14 and S.C.Code Ann. § 11-27-40 (1986). On July 1992, the City issued TANS 1 in the amount of $3 million. The issuance and sale of $6.4 million in general obligation bonds pursuant to S.C. Const. art. X, § 14 were authorized on August 24, 1992, thereby creating the potential for $9.4 million in general obligation debt. Plaintiffs alleged that issuing the August 24 bond authorization would place the City above the limit of general obligation debt it could constitutionally [315 S.C. 116] incur. On January 13, 1993 the City requested that this Court entertain this matter in its original jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs now argue that TANS are subject to the eight percent debt limitation imposed on other general obligation debt as prescribed by S.C. Const. art. X, § 14(7)(a).
S.C. Const. art. X, § 14 states in relevant part:
(2) The political subdivisions shall have the power to incur bonded indebtedness ... in the following categories and in no others:
(a) General obligation debt; and
(b) Indebtedness payable only from a revenue-producing project or from a special source.
(3) "General obligation debt" shall mean any indebtedness of the political subdivision which shall be secured in whole or in part by a pledge of its full faith, credit and taxing power.
(4) General obligation debt may be incurred only for a purpose which is a public purpose and which is a corporate purpose of the applicable political subdivision.
(6) If general obligation debt be authorized by a majority vote of the qualified electors of the political subdivision voting in a referendum authorized by law, there shall be no conditions or restrictions limiting the incurring of such indebtedness except:
(a) those restrictions and limitations imposed in the authorization to incur such indebtedness;
Page 453
(b) the provisions of subsection (4) hereof; and
(c) such general obligation debt shall be issued within five years of the date of such referendum.
(7) General obligation debt may also be incurred by the governing body of each...
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State v. Taylor, Appellate Case No. 2020-001184
...language or used other terms, but it intentionally amended the statute to add a visual requirement. See Davenport v. City of Rock Hill , 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) ("It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this 870 S.E.2d 172 state without......
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JK CONST. v. REGIONAL SEWER AUTHORITY, No. 24981.
...inserted in the law of this state without the intention of thereby conveying 336 S.C. 171 some meaning." Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 JKC urges the Court to read Article X, Section 12 to include special purpose districts. We agree with Authority tha......
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State v. Taylor, 28085
...language or used other terms, but it intentionally amended the statute to add a visual requirement. See Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) ("It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this state without the intention o......
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State v. Elwell, No. 27259.
...some meaning, force, and effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction.” (citation omitted)); Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) (“It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this state without the intention ......
-
State v. Taylor, Appellate Case No. 2020-001184
...language or used other terms, but it intentionally amended the statute to add a visual requirement. See Davenport v. City of Rock Hill , 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) ("It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this 870 S.E.2d 172 state without......
-
JK CONST. v. REGIONAL SEWER AUTHORITY, No. 24981.
...inserted in the law of this state without the intention of thereby conveying 336 S.C. 171 some meaning." Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 JKC urges the Court to read Article X, Section 12 to include special purpose districts. We agree with Authority tha......
-
State v. Taylor, 28085
...language or used other terms, but it intentionally amended the statute to add a visual requirement. See Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) ("It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this state without the intention o......
-
State v. Elwell, No. 27259.
...some meaning, force, and effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction.” (citation omitted)); Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) (“It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this state without the intention ......