Davenport v. DeRobertis

Decision Date30 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. 83 C 4392.,83 C 4392.
PartiesJames DAVENPORT, Charles Richmond, Hector Rivera, Carl Lucas, Roger Pennie, Charles Terry, and Mark McBride, Plaintiffs, v. Richard W. DeROBERTIS, Michael Lane, and Michael O'Leary, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph N. DiNatale, Edmund P. Wanderling, DiNatale & Montemurro, Oak Park, Ill., Daniel M. Harris, Mitchell D. Raup, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

John Botner, Joseph F. Spitzzeri, Illinois Atty. Gen.'s Office, General Law Div., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ORDER

WILLIAM T. HART, District Judge.

This is a class action for deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction of the court is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and is not disputed. Plaintiffs seek damages individually and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of current and potential long-term segregation inmates at the Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville") operated by the defendant officials of the Illinois Department of Corrections where plaintiffs were or are now confined. Plaintiffs seek to redress alleged individual and class violations of their eighth amendment rights because they contend that they were incarcerated under conditions that subjected them to pain, physical deterioration and emotional distress caused by a lack of adequate showers and physical exercise.

On March 31, 1986, for the purpose of seeking injunctive relief, plaintiffs Rivera and Lucas were certified as representatives of the following class: all present and future Stateville inmates confined to Stateville segregation for 90 or more consecutive days.

The defendants in this action are Richard W. DeRobertis, former Warden of Stateville, Michael P. Lane, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, and Michael O'Leary, current Warden of Stateville. Each defendant was sued for damages and injunctive relief in his individual capacity. After trial, plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to allege that each defendant was also sued in his official capacity. The charges and issues have essentially related to official conduct. See Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 597, 93 L.Ed.2d 597 (1986). Inasmuch as no objections have been made to this amendment and because no other or different proofs would have been presented, this motion is granted. The amendment, however, has eleventh amendment implications which must be considered.

Inasmuch as damages were sought, the liability and damage issues were properly tried to a jury. The matter of injunctive relief, if any, was reserved for decision by the court.

The jury was asked to return a special verdict answering seven questions and to determine damages. In response to the liability questions, the jury found that, under the totality of the circumstances in this case: (1) providing only one shower per week constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (2) providing only one hour of out-of-cell exercise per week constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (3) each defendant was personally responsible for cruel and unusual punishment; (4) each defendant acted with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the health and well-being or constitutional rights of plaintiffs; (5) plaintiffs sustained injury or damages; (6) defendants' acts or conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injury or damages; (7) there exists a pattern or custom of defendants which has resulted in the denial of rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Each of the named plaintiffs was awarded one dollar compensatory and one dollar punitive damages against each defendant.

Defendants filed timely motions for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The parties were also directed to separately brief the issue of relief should the post-trial motions be denied. This was done, and the matter was set for a status hearing on December 22, 1986. At that time the parties were asked by the court whether they wished to offer any additional evidence directed solely to the question of appropriate relief. Each side indicated a desire to submit the case to the court on the record made at the trial of the liability and damage issues and on the briefs submitted without any additional evidence.

The matters to be resolved are (1) the post-trial motions, (2) defendants' claims of qualified immunity, (3) the application of the eleventh amendment, and (4) the nature of any injunctive relief.

I. Post-Trial Motions
A. Directed Verdict — Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

The legal standard applicable to defendants' motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is clear. "The motion `should be denied where the evidence, along with the inferences to be reasonably drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing such motion, is such that reasonable men in a fair and impartial exercise of their judgment may reach different conclusions.'" Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 3553, 77 L.Ed.2d 1400 (1983) (quoting Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 15 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016, 100 S.Ct. 668, 62 L.Ed.2d 646 (1980)). The court must "resolve all conflicting evidence in favor of the jury's verdict," and may not "reweigh the evidence or make its own determinations of credibility." Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1986). The motion must be denied where the evidence includes "disparate accounts of the underlying incidents," raising questions of credibility that only the jury may resolve. Freeman, 695 F.2d at 488; Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1227 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("if there is substantial conflicting evidence, the judgment n.o.v. motion must be denied.").

There is no dispute as to the applicable constitutional standard. As stated in the instructions to the jury: "prison conditions can be cruel and unusual when they deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," when they inflict "pain without justification," or when they violate "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The jury was instructed to make its determinations based on the "totality of the circumstances." Defendants did not object to these instructions, and they are supported by precedent. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7th Cir.1986).

The jury had before it the following uncontested facts which were part of the final pretrial order:

1. Stateville is a maximum security prison operated by the Illinois Department of Corrections. The segregation unit at Stateville is a maximum security unit that houses those inmates who have been found guilty of violating prison rules and regulations. At any one time approximately 225 single-celled inmates are confined in segregation. Prior to January 1985, the segregation unit was in F-House. In January, 1985, the segregation unit was moved to I-House, a newly built segregation unit.

2. The cells in F-House are virtually identical to each other. The dimensions of the typical F-House cell are somewhat pieshaped 10'6" × 4'9" × 10'6". Available unblocked floor space consists of two rectangular areas measuring approximately 3' × 6½', and 40" × 30".

3. I-House has 24 wings, each wing containing 12 or 13 cells. The cells in I-House are virtually identical to each other. The dimensions of the typical I-House cells are 7'2" × 13'2". Available unblocked floor space consists of a rectangular area approximately 10'2" by 4'9".

4. There is one shower stall in each wing which measures 4'3½" × 7'. It serves the 12 or 13 cells in its wing.

5. The typical I-House cell has a metal door through which the inmate can peer at certain times through a slot 29" from the floor. The cell walls and floor are made of concrete. The typical cell has a window to the outdoors that measures 48" × 11", which can be opened and closed by the inmate.

6. The segregation unit inmates are provided with a stool fixed to the floor, bed (including mattress, pillow, and blanket), sink, toilet, soap, towel, and shelf. The sink has running water. Inmates are allowed to have personal toiletry items in their cells. The prison provides a laundry service for segregation inmates once a week.

7. The defendants, Michael Lane, Michael O'Leary, and Richard DeRobertis were at all times relevant to the lawsuit acting under color of the laws of Illinois and the rules and regulations of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Michael Lane is the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Richard DeRobertis was Warden at Stateville until November 1983, at which time Michael O'Leary became Warden.

8. Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Rule 804, and Department of Corrections Rules, Section 504.620 (which superseded AR 804), both provide that segregation unit inmates shall be provided with not less than one shower and one hour of recreation or exercise outside their cells a week. Defendant Michael Lane was personally involved in the adoption of these rules. The warden at Stateville has discretion to provide more than the minimum amounts of showers and exercise.

9. Out-of-cell recreation for segregation inmates consists solely of time spent in one of two outdoor recreation yards. Each yard is blacktopped and enclosed by a chain-link fence. The dimensions of the irregularly shaped F-House yards are approximately 63' × 18' × 40' × 42'. The dimensions of the five sides yards at I-House are approximately 55' × 45' × 32' × 41'. Both yards have basketball hoops.

10. The procedure for giving segregation inmates their yard time...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Hanson v. Madison Service Corp.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • May 11, 1989
    ...Girardeau, 794 F.2d 330, 339 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 688 (1987); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 653 F.Supp. 649, 657 (N.D.Ill.1987), modified, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 260, 102 L.Ed.2d 248 (1988).6 Hanson's acti......
  • Williams v. Bierman, 93-1212
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • December 20, 1994
    ...rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F.Supp. 504 (S.D. Ill. 1980); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 653 F.Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1987). However, in Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988), the Court found that the denial of yard exercise,......
  • Cummings v. Connell
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 29, 2005
    ...damages, in lieu of nominal damages, were appropriate. Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 265 (3d Cir.1984). See also Davenport v. DeRobertis, 653 F.Supp. 649 (N.D.Ill.1987) (approving jury's award of $1.00 in nominal damages to each of the named plaintiffs in prisoner class action Finally, a......
  • Davenport v. DeRobertis
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • May 23, 1988
    ...the exercise or shower rights provided herein for a reasonable period of time pursuant to regulation approved by this court." 653 F.Supp. 649 (N.D.Ill.1987). The defendants' challenge to the district court's decision is a narrow one. They do not challenge the jury's finding that the conditi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT