Davenport v. Indiana Masonic Home Foundation, Cause No. IP 00-1047-C H/G (S.D. Ind. 3/27/2003)
| Decision Date | 27 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. IP 00-1047-C H/G. |
| Parties | NADINE DAVENPORT, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA MASONIC HOME FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED, GRAND LODGE OF THE FREE AND ACCEPTED MASONS d/b/a INDIANA MASONIC HOME, DAVID A. ASHBAUGH, DWIGHT SINGER,) WILLIAM D. BLASINGAME, ROBERT R. STEVENS, JOHN E. GREIN, ROBERT BAILEY, JAMES L. CHESNEY, MAX L. CARPENTER, DOUGLAS O. FEGENBUSH, ROBERT E. HANCOCK, JR., MICHAEL D. BRUMBACK, JERRY B. COLLINS, GEORGE L. KORENSKI, GEORGE G. JEFFERS, DARRELL A. VEACH, ROBERT M. SEIBEL, GEORGE E. PROCTOR, AND OTHER UNNAMED JOHN DOE INDIANA MASONIC HOME FOUNDATION INCORPORATED BOARD MEMBERS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Nadine Davenport has sued the Indiana Masonic Home Foundation, Inc. ("the Foundation") and members of its Board of Directors alleging that her employer, the Indiana Masonic Home ("the Home"), discriminated against her on the basis of sex and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and discriminated against her on the basis of a disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Davenport also asserts contract and tort claims under Indiana law.
Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which they seek a determination that Davenport's Title VII and ADA claims are time-barred because she filed her EEOC charge of discrimination more than 300 days after she was terminated and knew of her termination. In the alternative, defendants assert that Davenport's Title VII and ADA claims must fail because the Grand Lodge of the Free and Accepted Masons of the State of Indiana d/b/a Indiana Masonic Home ("the Grand Lodge") is exempt from the requirements of Title VII and the ADA as a bona fide private membership club.1
Because Davenport's Title VII and ADA claims are manifestly time-barred, the court grants defendants' motion for partial summary judgment without addressing whether the Grand Lodge is a bona fide private membership club. The court also does not address the related issue whether Davenport's true employer was the Home, through the Indiana Masonic Home Foundation. That related issue is also not addressed because the timeliness issue disposes of Davenport's Title VII and ADA claims.2
The relevant facts are set forth in the light most favorable to Davenport, the non-movant. See, e.g., Schwartz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1999). All reasonable inferences have been drawn in her favor; nonetheless, adverse facts established by defendants beyond reasonable dispute are necessarily included in the narrative. The decisive facts are when Davenport was terminated, when she knew of her termination, and when she filed her EEOC charge of discrimination.
Plaintiff Nadine Davenport started her position as the Human Resources Director for the Indiana Masonic Home on March 16, 1998. Davenport Aff. ¶ 2.
The Home claims that Davenport was terminated on April 9, 1999. Ashbaugh Aff. ¶ 5. On or about April 15, 1999, the Home received an Unemployment Insurance Notice of Request for Information concerning Davenport's employment. Id., ¶ 6, Ex. A. Davenport's Indiana Workforce Development Determination of Eligibility lists her date of separation from the Home as April 9, 1999. Ashbaugh Aff., Ex. B. On April 15, 1999, Davenport herself stated in paperwork submitted to the Indiana Department of Workforce Development that she had been terminated on April 9, 1999. Def. Ex. 4. On May 3, 1999, Davenport wrote a letter to David Ashbaugh, CEO of the Home, in which she stated, "I am making a written request for the reason as to my termination on April 9, 1999." Id., Ex. C. On May 17, 1999, Ashbaugh responded to Davenport's letter; he stated that her employment "from March 16, 1998 to April 9, 1999" was "terminated for unsatisfactory work performance." Id., Ex. D. On approximately May 25, 1999, Davenport was hired by another employer as a full-time Employment Specialist. Def. Ex. 5.
On June 2, 1999, Davenport received a form letter from the Home's Benefit Coordinator regarding her eligibility for continued health insurance coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"). The letter states that on June 2, 1999, the Benefit Coordinator was notified of a "qualifying event" that occurred on June 2, 1999, and then the box next to "termination of the employee" is checked as the qualifying event. Id. Thus, Davenport claims she was actually terminated on June 2, 1999. Davenport Aff., ¶¶ 2, 3. Davenport filed her Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on March 3, 2000. Ashbaugh Aff., Ex. E.
Summary judgment is properly granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 511-512 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998). In making this determination, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Schwartz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1999); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995).
The moving party bears the initial burden of production to establish "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, 45 F.3d at 234. The burden then shifts to the non-movant, who may not rest upon mere allegations, but by affidavits, depositions, or other evidence must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, 45 F.3d at 234. The court must enter summary judgment when the non-moving party has failed to "come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question . . .". Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52. However, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
To bring a suit under Title VII, a plaintiff in a deferral state such as Indiana must have filed a charge with the EEOC complaining of the alleged act of discrimination within 300 days of the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act or event. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); see also Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1994). The same is true for a suit under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (). If a plaintiff has not filed a timely EEOC charge, the complaint is untimely. See Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1999). This statutory limitations period serves to "protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past." Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980).
Under Ricks, the limitations period begins to run at the time the decision constituting the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurs and is communicated to the employee. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258. In the present case, the allegedly discriminatory act was Davenport's termination. Thus, the limitations period began to run on the date when the decision to terminate Davenport was made and communicated to her.
To have fallen within 300 days of her EEOC charge, the decision to discharge Davenport would have had to have been made and communicated to her on or after May 8, 1999. Davenport claims on the basis of the COBRA notice that she was terminated on June 2, 1999. However, there is no genuine doubt that Davenport was actually terminated on April 9, 1999, and that she knew she was terminated on April 9, 1999. The undisputed facts show that she wrote a letter in which she herself stated her date of separation was April 9, 1999, to which the Home replied that she was indeed terminated on that date for poor performance. She applied for unemployment benefits prior to April 15, 1999, and she told the Indiana Department of Workforce Development that she had been terminated on April 9, 1999. She was later hired for full-time employment in another position on or around May 25, 1999. These facts establish beyond reasonable dispute that she was fired, and knew she was fired, well before May 8, 1999.
Nonetheless, Davenport insists that her actual separation did not occur until June 2, 1999. The COBRA notice does in fact state that Davenport was terminated on June 2, 1999, but it also states that the Benefit Coordinator was notified of her termination on June 2, 1999. One reasonable interpretation of that letter is that the Benefit Coordinator simply inserted the date she was notified of the qualifying event as the date of the qualifying event itself. Davenport asserts the COBRA notice evinces that...
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