Davenport v. NC DEPT. OF TRANSP.
| Decision Date | 22 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-572-CIV-5.,90-572-CIV-5. |
| Citation | 776 F. Supp. 1080 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Ronald E. DAVENPORT, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Defendants. |
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M. Jackson Nichols, Everett, Hancock & Nichols, Raleigh, N.C., for plaintiff.
James Peeler Smith, Isham Barney Hudson, Jr., Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., N.C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, N.C., Thomas Earl Barwick, Walker, Young & Barwick, Goldsboro, N.C., for defendants.
Plaintiff, Ronald E. Davenport, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with a pendent state law claim of civil conspiracy in response to his alleged discharge from his position as an employee of the North Carolina Department of Transportation on account of his political affiliation. The North Carolina Department of Transportation ("DOT"), Tommy Harrelson, the current Secretary of Transportation, James E. Harrington, the former Secretary of Transportation, E.H. McEntire, former Chief Engineer, Cloyce B. Alford, former Director of Personnel, G.R. Shirley, Division Engineer, Jerry Hardesty, former Assistant Secretary of Transportation, Sue Sutton, employee of DOT, Randy Doub, former DOT board member, and Michael Sutton, Chairman of the Lenoir County Republican Party, are named as defendants. Defendants Harrington, McEntire, Alford, Shirley, Hardesty, Sue Sutton and Doub are being sued both in their individual and their official capacities. Defendants DOT and Harrelson are being sued only in their official capacities. Defendant Michael Sutton is being sued only in his individual capacity. As relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. The action is presently before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set out below, the motion is GRANTED.
The action arises out of plaintiff's suspension and ultimate discharge from his employment with DOT. Plaintiff, a Democrat, was employed as a district engineer in the Lenoir County District Office of DOT from August 5, 1967 until March 27, 1987. His principal office was in Kinston, North Carolina. Plaintiff requested and DOT allowed him outside work permits to perform private survey work for ten hours per week in the evenings and on weekends. Plaintiff allegedly began engaging in his private surveying business during his work hours at DOT, using state equipment and facilities while doing so.
On March 27, 1987, Davenport was suspended without pay pending an investigation by the State Bureau of Investigation. The suspension letter did not specify any alleged misconduct on plaintiff's part. Plaintiff appealed his suspension and requested a hearing. On September 3, 1987, plaintiff was given a letter of dismissal by DOT, informing him that he was being dismissed for misuse of department facilities, equipment, and personnel. The letter did not give specific names, dates, or times when plaintiff had in fact conducted his private business while at his DOT job. Plaintiff alleges that he was not given a pre-dismissal hearing. Defendant asserts that plaintiff was given a pre-dismissal hearing on September 3, 1987. At the time of his suspension and discharge, plaintiff was a "non-exempt" employee, meaning that he was subject to the protections of the North Carolina State Personnel Act, N.C.G.S. § 126-1 et seq., which provides that, "no permanent employee subject to the Act shall be discharged, suspended, or reduced in pay or position except for just cause." N.C.G.S. § 126-35. Plaintiff sought a hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"), claiming his dismissal was not for just cause and was therefore in violation of the Act. The administrative law judge concluded that DOT had not presented sufficient evidence to show just cause for the termination of plaintiff, a career employee. The administrative law judge also found that DOT failed to give plaintiff specific reasons for his dismissal as required by law and recommended reinstatement with full benefits including back pay and attorneys' fees.
The State Personnel Commission adopted the administrative law judge's recommendation that plaintiff be reinstated but that plaintiff not receive any back pay. DOT then petitioned the Wake County Superior Court for judicial review of the Commission's final decision. Plaintiff meanwhile filed a similar petition in Lenoir County protesting the Commission's denial of back pay. These cases were consolidated into the Wake County action and on May 15, 1990 Superior Court Judge Gregory Weeks affirmed the Commission's decision but modified it to include the order of back pay. DOT appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals who affirmed the Superior Court's order.
On December 18, 1987, plaintiff had also filed a Section 1983 claim in state court in Pitt County seeking injunctive relief and damages for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. This separate lawsuit was pending throughout the course of plaintiff's OAH hearing and its subsequent appeals. When DOT appealed the Commission's order to the Superior Court it did not seek to join plaintiff's pending Section 1983 suit. On August 31, 1990, plaintiff's Section 1983 suit was voluntarily dismissed and was refiled four days later as the present action in state court. Over plaintiff's objections, the suit was removed to this court on September 27, 1990 and plaintiff's motion to remand the suit back to state court was denied by this court on December 20, 1990. Plaintiff was reinstated on April 22, 1991 as an employee with DOT at the same pay level he had been under prior to his dismissal.1
On a motion for summary judgment a court must grant the motion if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, interrogatory answers, and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991). In particular, courts must take special care in cases where motive plays a critical issue. Ballinger v. N.C. Agricultural Extension Service, 815 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 897, 108 S.Ct. 232, 98 L.Ed.2d 191 (1987).
Plaintiff claims that all of the listed defendants, except for Michael Sutton, working together, sought to replace him and other non-exempt DOT employees with Republicans and other persons loyal to Governor James Martin and that such behavior violated his First Amendment freedom of association. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by defendants' failure to give plaintiff a pre-dismissal hearing and failure to tell him the specific reasons for his termination.
a. Res Judicata
Defendants contend that plaintiff's Section 1983 claim should be dismissed on res judicata grounds. Defendants' argument is that the doctrine of claim preclusion bars plaintiff's present suit since plaintiff has already litigated essentially the same claim in state court proceedings.
By federal statute, state judicial proceedings have the same full faith and credit in every federal court as they have in the state court from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. The United States Supreme Court has held that Section 1738 is applicable to claims brought in federal court under Section 1983. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). As such, a party's state court judgment has the same preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in state court. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). This is true even where the party's state court claim was not brought pursuant to Section 1983. Id. It is clear that this court must look to North Carolina law concerning res judicata in order to determine whether plaintiff's present suit is barred by claim preclusion. Under North Carolina law, "the doctrine of res judicata treats a final judgment as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same `claim' or `cause of action'." State v. Public Staff — N.C. Utilities Commission, 322 N.C. 689, 370 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1988). The elements of res judicata are: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits. Id. Where the plaintiff prevailed in the earlier suit, the doctrine of merger causes the second cause of action to "merge" with the earlier judgment. Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986).
It is clear that the first element of res judicata is satisfied in the case sub judice. The final decision of the State Personnel Commission was appealed to the Wake County Superior Court and then to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Thus, a final judgment was rendered.
The primary issue of contention concerns the second prong of the res judicata test. Defendants contend that plaintiff's present claims are essentially the same as the ones he advanced or should have advanced in the OAH hearing and later in the state courts since plaintiff's present and past claims are concerned with the same subject matter — wrongful discharge and improper dismissal procedures. Plaintiff, conversely, maintains that while some of the factual assertions may overlap, its present civil conspiracy and Section 1983 claims against...
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Davenport v. North Carolina Dept. of Transp.
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