Davern v. Civil Service Commission of City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 17 November 1970
• Docket Number: No. 42629,42629
• Citation: 47 Ill.2d 469,269 N.E.2d 713
• Parties: William E. DAVERN, Jr., Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 713

269 N.E.2d 713

47 Ill.2d 469

William E. DAVERN, Jr., Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants.

No. 42629.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 17, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1971.

Certiorari Denied June 14. 1971.

See 91 S.Ct. 2229.

Raymond F. Simon, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Marvin E. Aspen and Howard C. Goldman, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Richard F. McPartlin, Chicago, for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff, William E. Davern, Jr., passed an examination given by the Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago (hereinafter referred to as Commission) for the position of patrolman in the Chicago Police Department, and was, on September 27, 1965, certified for appointment to that position.

On October 19 plaintiff was directed to appear before the Commission on October 29 'to show cause why your certification to the position of patrolman should not be disapproved.' Plaintiff appeared as directed, without counsel, and answered questions by the members of the Commission, and no witnesses were presented against him. Thereafter, on November 4, plaintiff was advised by letter that his certification had been disapproved, and his name was to be stricken from the eligible list and from the register.

He then commenced this action by filing his complaint under the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 110, pars. 264--279) seeking reversal of the order of the Commission. The cause was remanded to the Commission by the trial court for the taking of additional evidence, pursuant to which an 'investigation' before the Commission was held on November 2, 1966. The Commission confirmed its original decision of decertification and removal. Upon receipt of the supplemental record the circuit court of Cook County reversed the decision of the Commission and held it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. It ordered the plaintiff's immediate restoration to the eligible list and certification.

The Commission appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court (115 Ill.App.2d 93, 253 N.E.2d 149) and held that the plaintiff could be removed from the eligible list and the register only upon presentation of proof of cause for removal and that the Commission's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 42 Ill.2d 584.

The Administrative Review Act provides that agency findings on questions of fact are 'prima facie true and correct.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 110, par. 274.) We have construed this provision to limit the function of the reviewing court to ascertaining whether the findings and decisions of the administrative agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See E.g., DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm. of Chicago, 31 Ill.2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522; Logan v. Civil Service Comm., 3 Ill.2d 81, 119 N.E.2d 754; Harrison v. Civil Service Comm. of Chicago, 1 Ill.2d 137, 115 N.E.2d 521; Drezner v. Civil Service Comm., 398 Ill. 219, 75 N.E.2d 303.) The courts will not reweigh the evidence, but are limited to a determination whether the final decision of the administrative agency is just and reasonable in light of the evidence presented. (Fantozzi v. Board of Fire and Police Com'rs of Villa Park, 35 Ill.App.2d 248, 182 N.E.2d 577, affirmed 27 Ill.2d 357, 189 N.E.2d 275.) Neither the appellate court nor the trial court may substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. (See E.g., DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm. of Chicago, 31 Ill.2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522; Olsen v. Civil Service Comm. of Chicago, 28 Ill.App.2d 146, 171 N.E.2d 80; Miglieri v. Lee, 16 Ill.App.2d 545, 149 N.E.2d 193.) The sole question before us, therefore, is whether the Commission's finding that plaintiff's name was properly stricken from the eligible list was sufficiently supported so that it cannot be said to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Commission could have found plaintiff to be of 'bad character' within the meaning of section 6 of Rule II of its rules which provides in part as follows: 'Disqualifications. Proof of * * * bad character, dissolute habits, immoral conduct * * * shall be grounds for * * * removal from an eligible register * * *.'

The appellate court made a comprehensive review of all the facts and evidence offered in the two hearings before the Commission (115 Ill.App.2d 93, 253 N.E.2d 149), and in view of the fact that the petition for leave to appeal, upon which defendants elected to stand in the instant proceedings, did not contain a reargument of those facts, we deem it sufficient to merely highlight the contentions and facts applicable thereto.

The plaintiff, prior to the certification here in question, had previously been a member of the Chicago Police Department for a period of approximately five years. In April of 1959, while assigned to the Summerdale Police District, he participated in the arrest and investigation of Richard Morrison, who was later found to have been involved in criminal activities with certain police officers other than the plaintiff. These activities of Morrison and those police officers drew national attention.

All of the alleged misdeeds of the plaintiff are predicated on activities which took place in relation to the arrest and investigation of Morrison. 'The only witness for the Police Department was Marcus McGill, a sergeant in the Department, who testified that the plaintiff's name was mentioned as a result of the police investigation into the statements and allegations made by Richard Morrison. The plaintiff was a detective on April 14, 1959, the night that Morrison and Jerry Bossuyt were arrested in the Summerdale Police District. The arresting officers were Handley and Gilmartin. The detectives involved as investigating officers were the plaintiff, Kann, and Norcott. The following property was found in Morrison's car: a Polaroid camera; bottles of liquor; cigarettes; and approximately $475.00 in coins. The arresting officers and the detectives escorted Morrison, Bossuyt, and the seized property to the Summerdale Police Station where the evidence was inventoried. Through police channels, it was learned that the items matched a description of merchandise taken in the burglary of Carmen sakol Motors, which was located in another Police District. Morrison and Bossuyt were then detained on a burglary warrant. Continuing, McGill stated that although the property seized should have been taken at the earliest possible time from the Summerdale Station to the custodian's office located in Central Police Headquarters, the merchandise remained at Summerdale for six days before it was sent to the proper place. In addition, the Polaroid camera was entered on...