Davey v. Hedden, 73543
| Decision Date | 12 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 73543,73543 |
| Citation | 920 P.2d 420,260 Kan. 413 |
| Parties | Jason A. DAVEY, Appellant, v. Jennifer S. HEDDEN, Richard C. Hedden, C.K.W., Inc., and Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees, and Catherine A. Farnsworth, Defendant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The provisions of K.S.A. 8-222 are interpreted and applied in a personal injury action by a passenger against the driver of a motor vehicle.
2. The statutory liability created by K.S.A. 8-222 is unique. It is not premised upon any common-law rules of liability such as master-servant or principal-agent and is not bound by interpretations of those rules except insofar as they further the purpose of the statute.
3. K.S.A. 8-222 provides that the person who furnishes a motor vehicle to a minor is jointly and severally liable for "any damages" caused by the negligence of the minor. Under a plain reading of the statute, this would apply not only to suits against a third party but also to actions between the person furnishing the vehicle and the minor.
4. K.S.A. 8-222 applies to "any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such minor." Under a plain reading of the statute, "any person" includes a minor.
5. In order to establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, an injury, and proximate cause, that is, a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury suffered. The breach of duty must be the actual and proximate cause of the injury.
6. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act.
7. Whether conduct in a given case is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries is normally a question of fact for a jury. However, where the facts are such that they are susceptible to only one inference, the question is one of law and may be disposed of by the court when the plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary burden of proof.
8. Whether the negligent conduct of the original wrongdoer is to be insulated as a matter of law by the intervening negligent act of another is determined by the test of foreseeability. If the original actor should have reasonably foreseen and anticipated the intervening act causing injury in the light of the attendant circumstances, his or her act of negligence would be a proximate cause of the injury. The foreseeability of some injury from an act or omission is a prerequisite to its being a proximate cause of the injury for which recovery is sought. When negligence appears merely to have brought about a condition of affairs or a situation in which another and entirely independent and efficient agency intervenes to cause the injury, the latter is to be deemed the direct and proximate cause and the former only the indirect or remote cause.
9. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court, like the district court, is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. Where reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.
F.C. "Rick" Davis, of Bruce & Davis, L.C., Wichita, argued the cause, and Kenneth H. Jack, of the same firm, was with him, on the briefs, for appellant.
Alvin D. Herrington, of McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, P.A., Wichita, argued the cause, and Sharon A. Werner and Alisa M. Arst, of the same firm, were with him, on the brief, for appellees.
The issues in this case arise within the context of a personal injury action based upon negligence and negligent entrustment. The district court granted all defendants summary judgment based upon its interpretation of K.S.A. 8-222 and its further conclusion that negligent entrustment, if it existed at all, was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Richard and Jennifer Hedden reside in Wichita with their two sons, Jeff and Jon. At the time of the accident, Jeff and Jon were high school freshmen, age 14. A married daughter, Natalie Hedden Long, age 22, lived away from the family residence. Plaintiff Jason Davey, age 15, was a high school friend of Jeff and Jon. Catherine Farnsworth, age 15, also a friend, was the driver of the car involved in the accident that injured Davey.
A week prior to the accident, Richard and Jennifer went to Hawaii on vacation. While they had previously taken vacations without their two sons, they had never before taken a trip while their sons were driving automobiles under restricted drivers' licenses. Natalie stayed in the Hedden home while Richard and Jennifer were in Hawaii. However, Natalie was employed from 3 to 11 p.m., 4 days a week, and when she was not at the residence there was no adult supervision.
The Heddens left two vehicles at the residence, a minivan and a yellow 1973 Mercedes convertible. Both Jeff and Jon had restricted drivers' licenses and both were allowed by their parents to drive the vehicles to and from school and to school-related activities even though driving to school activities exceeded the restrictions imposed by their licenses. See K.S.A. 8-237.
There is a controversy over whether Richard and Jennifer talked to Jon and Jeff about not letting other friends drive their cars. Neither could recall a specific instance when they did so immediately prior to the trip to Hawaii. While such an instruction may have been given, it was not given in conjunction with their departure for Hawaii.
Several friends of Jeff and Jon drove the Mercedes while Richard and Jennifer were in Hawaii. Whether this occurred with the permission of the Hedden boys is disputed. However, on the evening the accident occurred, while at another friend's residence, plaintiff Jason Davey asked Jon Hedden for permission to drive the Mercedes so that he could put gas in the car. The plaintiff then left the residence with Catherine Farnsworth as a passenger. The plaintiff and Farnsworth were under the age of 16 and both possessed restricted drivers' licenses.
After leaving the house, the plaintiff pulled over and let Farnsworth drive the Mercedes. After obtaining gas, Farnsworth drove down Hidden Valley Road, a route with which she was not familiar. According to the plaintiff, Farnsworth let the right wheels fall off the side of the road, over corrected, and lost control, and the Mercedes hit a tree. The plaintiff went through the windshield and suffered severe injuries.
The plaintiff filed suit against Farnsworth, as well as against Jennifer and Richard Hedden; C.K.W., Inc., a joint corporate owner of the Mercedes; and Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company (Farmers Alliance). He alleged that Farnsworth's negligence caused his injuries. He also alleged that Richard and Jennifer Hedden, as well as C.K.W., Inc., negligently entrusted the Mercedes to the Heddens' minor sons and that as a proximate result, he was injured. He further alleged that Jennifer and Richard Hedden were liable under K.S.A. 8-263 and K.S.A. 8-264 for permitting an unauthorized minor to drive their car. He also alleged that the Heddens and C.K.W., Inc., were liable under the provisions of K.S.A. 8-222 for permitting Farnsworth to drive the car. Finally, he claimed coverage under the uninsured motorist coverage provision of the Hedden auto policy with Farmers Alliance. He alleged that Farnsworth was uninsured and negligent in her operation of the Mercedes, that her negligence caused him damages, and that those damages were covered under the policy.
The plaintiff settled his claim against Farnsworth. As part of the settlement agreement, judgment in the amount of $277,137.43 was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against Farnsworth. However, the plaintiff agreed not to execute on assets of Farnsworth or garnish on the judgment but instead to proceed against Farmers Alliance under the uninsured motorist provision. Farmers Alliance had earlier denied coverage.
One of the main issues in this action is the application of K.S.A. 8-222, which provides:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of sixteen years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, and any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by the negligence of such minor in driving such vehicle." (Emphasis added.)
The defendants filed a motion asking for a resolution of the following issue of law: Whether K.S.A. 8-222 operated to make the plaintiff jointly and severally liable for damages caused by Farnsworth because he furnished the car to a minor. The defendants followed this motion with a motion for partial summary judgment. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding:
The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court, without deciding whether there had been a negligent entrustment, concluded on the undisputed facts:
The plaintiff raises two issues by his appeal. The first issue is one of first impression and...
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