Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 May 1980 |
| Citation | 180 Conn. 469,429 A.2d 943 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Pierre DAVEY v. PEPPERIDGE FARMS, INC. et al. |
Robert R. Sheldon, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was T. Paul Tremont, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).
William F. Gallagher, New Haven, with whom were Elizabeth A. Dorsey, Branford, and, on the brief, John R. McGrail, New Haven, for appellee (defendant Leroy A. Spinner).
Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, PETERS and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.
On December 19, 1975, the plaintiff brought an action in negligence against Pepperidge Farms, Inc., Harry Maring, Jr., Inc., the Connecticut Light and Power Company, Dico-Side-O-Matic Hoist Company and Leroy A. Spinner. On August 8, 1979, the trial court granted the defendant Spinner's motion for summary judgment. From that judgment, the plaintiff has appealed.
The uncontested facts are as follows: On March 8, 1974, the plaintiff was instructed by his employer, the Milford Concrete Company, to deliver eight concrete blocks to the premises of the defendant Pepperidge Farms. In making the delivery the plaintiff used a flatbed truck which was equipped with a hydraulic hoist. In order to operate the hoist, the truck's engine had to be running. The actual movement of the hoist, however, was controlled either by means of switches from the truck bed or by hand-held switches attached to a twenty foot cable.
In the course of unloading the concrete blocks, the hydraulic hoist became stuck in an upright position. The plaintiff telephoned his employer and asked for assistance. The employer immediately dispatched the defendant Spinner, a mechanic and fellow employee, to the site. Spinner checked the hoist and decided that the truck and hoist had to be returned to the Milford plant for repairs. To do so, however, required that the hoist be swung around to the right.
At this point the defendant Spinner was standing on the truck bed facing the rear of the truck and was manipulating the hydraulic controls. The plaintiff was standing on the ground, to the rear of the driver's side of the vehicle, facing Spinner, and holding the remote control switch. Spinner directed the plaintiff to "(b)oom (the hoist) right." The plaintiff then pressed the toggle switch thereby causing the hoist to strike high tension wires. As a result the plaintiff sustained severe injuries.
The trial court took note of the fact that where an employee is injured by the negligence of a fellow employee, the sole remedy is under the Workmen's Compensation Act; General Statutes §§ 31-275 through 31-355; except where the negligence is in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in § 14-1 of the General Statutes. The court then concluded that since the defendant Spinner did not fall within the statutory definition of "operator," the plaintiff's action against him was thereby precluded. The trial court further found that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact which would preclude summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the validity of the court's conclusions.
Section 31-293a of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides in relevant part: "If an employee ... has a right to benefits ... on account of injury ... caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee except for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1 ...." (Emphasis added.)
Section 14-1 provides: On the basis of this definition, the trial court held that the defendant Spinner was not an "operator" 1 of a motor vehicle at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff, in order to persuade this court to adopt a definition of "operation" which is broader than that provided in § 14-1(32) sets forth a rule of statutory construction to the effect that where no statutory intention appears, preferential and qualifying words and phrases refer solely to the last antecedent. He then claims that the last antecedent in § 31-293a is "motor vehicle" not "operation."
Even if we accept the proposition that it is to the definition of "motor vehicle" that the court must turn, the plaintiff cannot prevail. While defining "motor vehicle" as any vehicle propelled or drawn by any power other than muscular, § 14-1(26) 2 specifically excludes any vehicle "not suitable for operation on a highway." The hoist alone is clearly not suitable for operation on a highway. Moreover, the hoist was controlled not by the truck motor, but by the remote controls which were...
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...with respect to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We begin by addressing the case law analyzing the act.In Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469, 429 A.2d 943 (1980), our Supreme Court stated, in addressing the motor vehicle exception, that "[w]hile it is true that ‘operation’ i......
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...Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 178997 (March 5, 1974). The cases drew some very fine distinctions. In Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc., 180 Conn. 469, 472, 429 A.2d 943 (1980), the court held that a hoist attached to a flatbed truck was not a motor vehicle; the hoist was "not suitable for o......
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