David Hill Dev., LLC v. City of Forest Grove
| Decision Date | 30 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | 3:08-cv-266-AC |
| Parties | DAVID HILL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FOREST GROVE, an Oregon municipal corporation, STEVE A. WOOD, individually and in his official capacity as Project Engineer for the City of Forest Grove, ROBERT A. FOSTER, individually and in his official capacity as Engineering Director and Public Works Director for the City of Forest Grove, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Oregon) |
Pending Motion
Following a seventeen-day trial in the above entitled matter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of David Hill Development, LLC ("David Hill"), on its claims against the City of Forest Grove, Steve A. Wood and Robert A. Foster (collectively "City"), for violations of the Takings Clause, including a Temporary Takings and Exacting Property; a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; a violation of David Hill's right to Substantive Due Process; and a violation of David Hill's right to Procedural Due Process. In addition, the jury determined David Hill filed this action in a timely manner, and it concluded David Hill was entitled to $6,539,176 in actual damages.
Pending before the court is Defendants' FRCP 50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Alternative FRCP 59 Motion for New Trial. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), the City moves for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict on all claims decided in this action. Alternatively, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59, the City moves for a new trial on all claims decided by the jury. Finally, in the event the court denies the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and its alternative request for a new trial, the City moves for a reduction in the jury's award of damages, as excessive.
David Hill opposes all of the City's post-trial motions and contends the City has failed to articulate any legitimate basis for the court to reconsider its prior rulings. Additionally, David Hill maintains the City has failed to demonstrate the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. David Hill urges the court to deny the City's motions and leave the jury's verdict untouched.
On July 24, 2012, oral argument was heard on the City's motions, and for the reasons stated below, the City's FRCP 50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Alternative FRCP 59 Motion for New Trial is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
David Hill purchased several acres of farmland with the intention of creating a residential subdivision ("the Parks"). David Hill successfully petitioned the City for annexation of the farmland property within the urban growth boundary and received preliminary plat approval for its development. The Parks ran into problems, however, involving disagreements between David Hill and the City over the sewer line, easements, trees, and phasing. David Hill maintains the City actively frustrated and delayed its development efforts, at least in part, due to a preference in favor of other area developers and personal animus toward one of its principals, Timothy McDonald ("McDonald"). In the meantime, the residential real estate market declined and David Hill received less money on the sale of lots within the development than originally anticipated. David Hill incurred additional development costs as a result of specific actions and demands by the City.
At trial, David Hill claimed the City and its public officials, namely Foster, the City's Public Works Director, and Woods, the Project Engineer, wrongfully and unlawfully delayed the Parks by, among other things, improperly issuing and not timely withdrawing a Stop Work Order, refusing to approve David Hill's construction plans in a timely manner, imposing additional conditions of approval after the original conditions were issued, and requiring additional improvements or work beyond the original conditions of approval. Based upon these actions taken by the City, David Hill claimed the City and its public officials violated David Hill's constitutional rights by: (1) requiring David Hill to dedicate more land to the City beyond that required by the original conditions of approval (Takings - Exactions); (2) temporarily "Taking" David Hill's property by unreasonably delaying the project (Temporary Takings); (3) retaliating against David Hill for insisting the Citycomply with the law (First Amendment Retaliation);1 (4) treating David Hill differently than other developers (Equal Protection violation); (5) treating David Hill in a discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious manner (Denial of Substantive Due Process); and, (6) depriving David Hill of its property rights without due process of law (Denial of Procedural Due Process). As a result of these constitutional violations, David Hill claimed it suffered over $12 million in economic damages in the form of the takings of its property rights, delayed or lost sales, loss of property rights, and additional project and development costs.
At trial, the City denied it violated David Hill's rights or took its property. Instead, the City contended David Hill's conditions of approval required it to submit more detailed construction plans, and construct public improvements such as sewer lines, streets and sidewalks, which satisfied the City's conditions, as well as the public improvements contract, and applicable local, state, and federal regulations. According to the City, the development requirements David Hill claimed were illegal were actually consistent with the agreed-upon terms David Hill was required to satisfy before it could begin construction on the Parks.
The City also denied David Hill was delayed by its actions or inactions and, instead, maintained David Hill's expectations for completing its work were unreasonable and limited by its inexperience. The City contended that, to the extent the Parks was delayed, it was caused by David Hill's own lack of due diligence and failure to timely schedule, design, and construct the subdivision. Specifically, the City argued any delays in completion resulted from David Hill's failure to obtainthe utility easement it needed to develop the property, its failure to obtain required approvals from other government agencies, and its failure to properly supervise and manage its contractors.
The City also challenged David Hill's actions of accepting the benefit of the City's construction approvals, instead of appealing them. According to the City, this strategy allowed David Hill to sell off most of its lots before suing the City, while depriving the City of reasonable notice of the objections David Hill subsequently raised through its lawsuit. The City maintained David Hill's acceptance of City approvals and failure to raise timely objections barred David Hill from recovering through this action in federal court,
Finally, the City contended it did not cause David Hill to suffer any damages because David Hill sold its lots for a considerable amount of money, which satisfied its original expectations. The City further argued that any money David Hill spent was either necessary to complete the Parks, or stemmed from David Hill's own failure to control pricing with its contractor or enforce its rights against its contractor and, therefore, no basis existed for David Hill to recover money from the City or its engineering staff at trial.
A jury verdict can be overturned and a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law granted Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276,1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied, and the jury's verdict must be upheld, if the verdict is supportedby substantial evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist., 251 F.3d 1222,1227 (9th Cir. 2001). "Substantial evidence is evidence adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence." Id. When evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133,150 (2000); see also Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227 ().
Even if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, the court may grant a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 "if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based on evidence which is false, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Silver Sage Partners v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) . The "district court may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict." Silver Sage Partners, 251 F.3d at 819. Rather, the "trial court must have a firm conviction that the jury has made a mistake." Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365,1372 (9th Cir. 1987).
When evaluating a motion for new trial under Rule...
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