David v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1:08-CV-22278.,1:08-CV-22278.
• Citation: 629 F.Supp.2d 1309
• Parties: Kirk DAVID, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION and Suzuki Motor Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

629 F.Supp.2d 1309

Kirk DAVID, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION and Suzuki Motor Corporation, Defendants.

No. 1:08-CV-22278.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

June 16, 2009.

Alexander Clark, Bradley Winston, Winston & Clark, Plantation, F.L., Kimberly Lynn Boldt, Alters, Boldt, Brown, Rash & Culmo, P.A., Miami, F.L., Michael S. Levin, Ruben Honik, Stephan Matanovic, Golomb & Honik P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Ismael Diaz, Stanley Howard Wakshlag, Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., Miami, F.L., Richard I. Werder, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, New York, NY, Ryan S. Goldstein, Shon Morgan, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS TO DISMISS [DE 8, 29, 32]; CONVERTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

ALAN S. GOLD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant American Suzuki Motor Corporation's ("American Suzuki") and Defendant Suzuki Motor Corporation's ("Suzuki Japan") Motions to Dismiss [DE 8, 29, 32] and American Suzuki's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Nationwide Class Allegations [DE 30]. Plaintiff filed responses to the motions [DE 16, 47, 48], and Defendants filed replies [DE 22, 52, 53]. American Suzuki also filed a Request for Judicial Notice [DE 24], to which no responses in opposition were filed. I held oral argument on the motions on March 27, 2009. For the reasons stated below, I convert Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Express Warranty (Count II) claim into a motion for summary judgment, and I dismiss the remaining counts in Plaintiffs Complaint [DE 1] without prejudice. I grant American Suzuki's unopposed Request for Judicial Notice [DE 24], and I reserve on American Suzuki's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Nationwide Class Allegations [DE 30].

I. Background

The facts, as set forth in the Complaint and taken as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, are as follows. On March 1, 2006, Plaintiff purchased a 2006 Suzuki GSX R-1000 from Motorsports in Miami, an authorized Suzuki dealer. [Complaint, DE 1, ¶ 19]. Plaintiff was issued a written warranty¹ ("Warranty"), termed a "limited warranty" and stating that "American Suzuki warrants that each vehicle is free from defects in materials and factory workmanship, subject to the following exclusions, obligations and limitations." [Warranty, DE 8-2, p. 4]. If a defect is found, the Warranty provides for repair and replacement parts:

If an eligible defect is found, the needed repairs will be performed at no charge to you for parts or labor. Warranty repairs may be made at any authorized American Suzuki Motor Corporation motorcycle dealer in the continental United States of America. Any needed parts replacement will be made using new or remanufactured genuine Suzuki parts. If parts for the warranty repair must be ordered, you will not be required to leave your vehicle in the dealer during the order period.

[Id.]. Under "Limitations," the Warranty states that the Warranty "does not cover incidental or consequential damage." [Id. at p. 5]. Finally, the Warranty states that "Suzuki makes no promises or warranties other than those promises made in these limited warranty." [Id. at p. 6].

On May 29, 2006, the frame of Plaintiffs motorcycle broke and fell apart during normal use, while the motorcycle was in motion, directly at the point where the horn hole was drilled into the frame of the motorcycle. [Complaint, DE 1, ¶ 21]. Plaintiff requested that inspection and repair of the frame be conducted by Defendants' representatives, but Plaintiffs requests for repair were refused. [Id. at ¶ 22].

Plaintiff Kirk David then brought suit against Defendants American Suzuki Motor Corporation and Suzuki Motor Corporation, contending that a design flaw in the frame of the 2005 and 2006 model year Suzuki GSX-R1000 motorcycles weakens the frame and, as a result, the motorcycles are prone to coming apart while in operation on the roadway. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the frame contains a drilled hole for mounting of a horn which "renders the motorcycle's frame susceptible to splitting in two while the motorcycle is being operated." [Id. at ¶ 3].

On his own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated nationwide, Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action: Count I—Implied Warranty of Merchantability; Count II—Express Warranty; Count III—California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); Count IV—California's Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 and 17500 ("Unfair Competition Law" or "UCL"); Count V—California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; Count VI—Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act; and Count VII—Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of "All individuals within the United States and its territories who have acquired, by lease or purchase, 2005 and/or 2006 model year Suzuki GSX-R1000 motorcycles." [Id. at ¶ 25].

II. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts a complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true and evaluates all inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir.2003); Hoffend v. Villa, 261 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir.2001). Although a plaintiff need not state in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) "still requires a `showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In other words, a plaintiffs pleading obligation requires "more than labels and conclusions." Id. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Pafumi v. Davidson, No. 05-61679-CIV, 2007 WL 1729969, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2007). "While Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations omitted)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff must have "nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

III. Analysis

Before reaching Plaintiff's specific claims for relief, I conduct a limited choice-of-law analysis and discuss standing, both of which affect multiple counts in Plaintiff's Complaint. I then evaluate each of Plaintiffs claims in turn.

A. Choice of Law

To properly evaluate reach Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, I must determine which state's law applies to Plaintiffs claims.² See, e.g., Brisson v. Ford Motor Co., 602 F.Supp.2d 1227 (M.D.Fla. 2009) (conducting choice-of-law analysis before reaching defendant's motion to dismiss). A federal district court sitting in diversity³ applies the choice-of-law rule of the state in which it is located, in this case Florida. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 550 F.3d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir.2008) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)); Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) ("A federal district Court is bound to apply the conflict of laws rules prevailing in the forum state."). As a preliminary matter, the court must characterize the legal issue and determine whether it sounds in torts, contracts, property law, etc. Grupo Televisa v. Telemundo Commc'ns Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240-1241 (11th Cir.2007). Once it has characterized the legal issue, it determines the choice-of-law rule that the forum state applies to that particular type of issue. Id. (citing Acme Circus Operating Co., Inc. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Here, Plaintiff brings both contract and tort-based claims. Plaintiff's implied and express warranty claims (Counts I and II), and corresponding Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act claim (Count VI) are in the nature of contract. See Brisson, 602 F.Supp.2d at 1230 ("An express warranty has long been recognized as `bargained-for terms of a contractual agreement' and therefore in the nature of a contract."); Rose v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc., 989 So.2d 1244, 1248 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2008) ("With regard to the breach of warranty claims, in Florida there are two parallel but independent bodies of products liability law. One, strict liability, is an action in tort; the other, implied warranty, is an action in contract.") (citing West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80, 88 (Fla.1976)).⁴

Florida's choice-of-law rule applies the doctrine of lex loci contractus to contract actions and considers where the contract was executed. U.S. Fidelity, 550 F.3d at 1033; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So.2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006) ("[I]n determining which state's law applies to contracts, we have long adhered to the rule of lex loci contractus."). Because Plaintiff purchased his motorcycle in Florida, under Florida choice-of-law analysis, Florida law applies to these counts as to Plaintiff David. See Brisson, 602 F.Supp.2d at 1227 (where complaint failed to allege where plaintiffs purchased their trucks, applying Florida law, rather than Delaware law, to implied and express warranty and MMWA claims, despite Defendant being incorporated and one class member residing in Delaware, as "In a situation in which the facts alleged do not substantiate application of any particular foreign law, the forum generally applies the law of the state in which it sits."); Bailey v. Monaco Coach Corp., 350 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1042 (N.D.Ga.2004) (applying Georgia choice-of-law analysis, which recognizes the rule of lex loci contractus, "[plaintiff] negotiated and executed the sales contract, which included...