David v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility
Decision Date | 27 March 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-7628(JBS-AMD) |
Parties | KWAME T. DAVID, Plaintiff, v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DAVID OWENS, and CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF FREEHOLDERS, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
OPINIONAPPEARANCES:
Kwame T. David, Plaintiff Pro Se
1048 S. 4th Street
Camden, NJ 08104
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiff Kwame T. David seeks to bring a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF"), David Owens ("Owens"), and the Camden County Board of Freeholders ("BOF") for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1) dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against CCCF; (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim regarding unconstitutional conditions of confinement from (a) overcrowding, (b) food service, (c) rodents and insects, and (d) inadequate medical care, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); and (3) allow the Complaint to proceed as to Plaintiff's claim against Owens and BOF for unconstitutional conditions of confinement from unsanitary living spaces.
II. DISCUSSION
4. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: "(1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
5. Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983, "[t]he term 'persons' includes local and state officers acting under color of state law." Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To say that a person was "acting under color of state law" means that the defendant in a § 1983 action "exercised power [that the defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation omitted). Generally, then, "a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law." Id. at 50.
6. Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged that a "person" deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) () (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) ( ). Given that the claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as a defendant.
7. Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim as to overcrowded conditions of confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9. The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's review under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff's Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred from supposed overcrowding during Plaintiff's confinement at CCCF.
10. To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim3, the Complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
11. A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's screening under § 1915.
12. However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, the present Complaint states: Complaint § III(C).
13. Plaintiff states that these events occurred "Sept. 22 - October 2, 2016." Id. § III(B).
14. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered "breakout on face and chest and back from dirty showers[,] blankets and sheets" in connection with these events. Id. § IV.
15. With respect to damages sought, Plaintiff "will leave monetary relief up to the courts" in connection with his claims. Id. § V.
16. Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred.
17. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) ( ); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) . More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violate due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Hubbard II") ( ). Some relevant factors are the length of the confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement, any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of confinement, etc.
18. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to impose liability on the BOF, as this defendant is not a separate legal entity from Camden County and is therefore not independently subject to suit. See Bermudez v. Essex Cty. D.O.C., No. 12-6035, 2013 WL 1405263, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013) (citing cases). Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to impose liability on Camden County. Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (). If Plaintiff wishes to sue Camden County, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant Camden County...
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