Davidson v. Capuano

• Decision Date: 05 September 1986
• Docket Number: D,No. 20,20
• Citation: 792 F.2d 275
• Parties: Ronald DAVIDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clement B. CAPUANO, David R. Harris and Joseph P. Keenan, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 85-2068.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 275

792 F.2d 275

Ronald DAVIDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clement B. CAPUANO, David R. Harris and Joseph P. Keenan,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20, Docket 85-2068.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 23, 1985.

Decided May 29, 1986.

As Amended Sept. 5, 1986.

David B. Wechsler, New York City (Townley & Updike, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Myron Paul Schamis, New York City, Asst. Atty. Gen. of N.Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of N.Y., Richard L. Liskov, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before MANSFIELD, PIERCE, and PRATT, Circuit Judges.

GEORGE C. PRATT, Circuit Judge:

After prevailing in a state court proceeding brought under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") in which he sought, in addition to having his prison records expunged of all reference to an earlier disciplinary proceeding, a reinstatement of his prisoner benefits and the return of property taken from his prison cell by challenging the procedures followed in his prison disciplinary proceeding, Ronald Davidson amended his complaint in this federal action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 to assert similar claims, but seeking only damages. On consent of the parties the case was referred to United States Magistrate Nina Gershon, who dismissed the amended complaint on the ground that Davidson's failure to raise his Sec. 1983 damage claims in the prior Article 78 proceeding barred this action under the doctrine of res judicata. Because Davidson could not properly have obtained in the state court Article 78 proceeding the damage relief he seeks here, we hold that his present action is not barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

In June 1978, while incarcerated at the Green Haven Correctional Facility in Stormville, New York, Davidson commenced an Article 78 proceeding (first Article 78 proceeding) alleging that a Green Haven employee had negligently disbursed funds from his inmate account. In September 1978, shortly after a decision was rendered in that proceeding, prison officials charged Davidson in a misbehavior report with fraud. Upon Davidson's plea of not guilty, the superintendent commenced a disciplinary proceeding to determine the validity of the charge. After two days of hearings Green Haven's deputy superintendent for administration, Clement Capuano In the meantime, Davidson had commenced a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, naming as defendants Capuano and two other Green Haven employees, Sunny Shriver and Catherine Keane. While that federal complaint, which alleged that the superintendent's disciplinary proceeding had been commenced in retaliation for Davidson's first Article 78 proceeding, was still pending, Davidson commenced a new Article 78 proceeding (second Article 78 proceeding) seeking an order in the nature of mandamus compelling defendant Harris, the superintendent of Green Haven, and Richard O. Hongisto, the acting commissioner of correctional services, to vacate and set aside Capuano's October 10 decision on the ground that the superintendent's proceeding had been conducted in violation of Davidson's due process rights.

issued a final report on October 10, 1978, finding Davidson guilty as charged.

To determine the merits of Davidson's second Article 78 proceeding, a hearing was held in Supreme Court, Dutchess County, before Acting Supreme Court Justice Raymond E. Aldrich, Jr., who on January 31, 1979, issued a written decision finding: (1) that Davidson had not been afforded the opportunity to make a statement at the superintendent's proceeding; (2) that defendant Capuano had failed to consider documentary evidence offered by Davidson; and (3) that the respondents in the second Article 78 proceeding, including defendant Harris, had failed to act in accordance with established state procedures. Justice Aldrich concluded that Davidson had been denied his constitutional right to due process of law and ordered that the findings of the superintendent's hearing be set aside and that Davidson's records be expunged of any reference to the October disciplinary proceedings.

Davidson then sought leave to amend his federal court complaint to include allegations concerning Justice Aldrich's disposition of his second Article 78 proceeding. Leave to amend was granted in June 1979 and, after the case was referred to Magistrate Gershon and counsel was appointed to aid Davidson, a second amended complaint was filed on October 29, 1984, substituting David Harris, superintendent of Green Haven, and Joseph Keenan, deputy superintendent for security at Green Haven, as defendants for original defendants Shriver and Keane. That complaint which is the subject of this appeal, abandoned the original retaliation claim, and instead alleged the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the second Article 78 proceeding, asserting that Davidson had been deprived of his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process of law. As a proximate result of this deprivation, Davidson claimed that from October 10, 1978 through January 31, 1979, he was precluded from receiving or purchasing various supplies, was prevented from sending money to his attorney or his common-law wife for support, and was wrongfully transferred, first to Auburn Correctional Facility, and then to Clinton Correctional Facility, for all of which Davidson sought $25,000 compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.

Based on the favorable determination of his second Article 78 proceeding, Davidson moved in this federal civil rights damage action for partial summary judgment on liability. Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiff's failure to assert his Sec. 1983 damage claim in the second Article 78 proceeding precluded him from pursuing that relief here. The magistrate agreed with defendants and, holding that plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim was barred under New York's law of res judicata, dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed, presenting squarely the issue of whether under New York law the judgment in an Article 78 proceeding precludes a later civil rights claim for damages based on the same underlying facts.

DISCUSSION

I. General Principles.

The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States requires This bar against later claims based upon the same cause of action is, however, subject to certain limitations, one of which is that it will not be applied if the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation. Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 141 (1985); see McLearn v. Cowen & Company, 48 N.Y.2d 696, 698, 422 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61, 397 N.E.2d 750, 751-52 (1979); Salwen Paper Co., Profit Sharing Retirement Trust v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 385, 391, 424 N.Y.S.2d 918, 922 (2d Dep't 1980). Where "formal barriers" to asserting a claim existed in the first forum it would be "unfair to preclude [the plaintiff] from a second action in which he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from presenting in the first." Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 26(1)(c) comment c (1982). Mindful of these principles of New York law, we turn to our consideration of what claim-preclusive effect in this case a New York court would afford the judgment in the second Article 78 proceeding.

                a federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as would be given in the state in which it was rendered.   Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984);  see also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738.  New York courts have adopted the "transactional approach" to res judicata, holding that if claims arise out of the same "factual grouping" they are deemed to be part of the same cause of action and the later claim will be barred without regard to whether it is based upon different legal theories or seeks different or additional relief.   Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192-93, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71, 429 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1981);  see also O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (1981);  Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 27, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647, 379 N.E.2d 172, 174-75 (1978)
                

II. The State Court Proceedings.

A. Same Cause of Action?

Initially, we note that for res judicata purposes Davidson's second Article 78 proceeding and the present civil rights action undoubtedly are based on the same cause of action. In both, Davidson sought relief based on the conduct of prison officials in connection with the October 1978 superintendent's disciplinary proceeding. Neither a different theory of recovery nor different relief sought would prevent this Sec. 1983 action and the prior Article 78 proceeding from being considered as part of the same cause of action. See Smith, 54 N.Y.2d at 192-93, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 429 N.E.2d at 749.

B. Full Relief Available in the Article 78 Proceeding?

Whether the forum in which the facts were initially litigated, a special proceeding under CPLR Article 78, could award the full measure of relief now sought hinges upon proper construction of the damage limitation provision applicable to all Article 78 proceedings: CPLR section 7806, which permits damages to be awarded in an Article 78 proceeding only if two conditions are met. First, the damages must be "incidental to the primary relief sought", and second, the relief must be "such as [the petitioner could have recovered] on the same set of facts in a separate action or proceeding suable in the supreme court against the same body or officer in its or his official capacity." CPLR Sec. 7806 (McKinney 1981).

Although New York courts have not fully articulated a...